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ABSTRACT
Innovation has fueled the rise of the start up model, providing 
opportunity and benefits for millions. However, it has also 
destabilized industries and intimidated workers. This destabilization 
is most vivid in “disruptive innovations,” which strip power from 
established producers of goods and services. It is natural to worry 
that disruptive innovations will make the things we value obsolete, 
such as our favorite products and even our jobs.  
For some time, it appeared that legal services might be immune 
to innovation. In the last few years, however, the tide has turned. 
Mainstream commentators now routinely declare that new 
technologies or business models will disrupt legal services, and some 
have even written that lawyers could become extinct. Workers in the 
legal services industry might be hurt by extinction, but such 
disruption could benefit society if there were a worthy substitute.  
The problem is that innovation does not materialize across all 
aspects of an industry with the snap of a finger. Innovation might 
quickly reach and improve some industry functions—bringing about 
the disruption of its market leaders—but it might stall and leave the 
remaining functions untouched. I call this phenomenon “Incomplete 
Innovation.” When it occurs, those lingering, un-innovated functions 
are in danger of becoming obsolete. If they wither, and society is 
harmed as a result, then a “Premature Disruption” has occurred. 
In this Article, I use these two new concepts to examine the 
innovation and disruption of American legal services. I argue that 
disruption will likely happen before the creative, bespoke services 
that are characteristic of today’s established firms can be innovated. 
As a result of this Incomplete Innovation, the continuing supply of 
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bespoke services will be threatened. Since those services play a role 
in the development of our laws, their scarcity could have profound 
consequences. Novel legal solutions could arise to fill the void, such 
as the development of rules that make our legal system friendlier to 
machine processing and technological tools that make legal services 
cheaper. While Incomplete Innovation could bring much needed
access to justice for millions, it could also decrease autonomy or 
hamper progressive legal efforts. We must take stock of these 
potential consequences before deciding whether to embrace 
disruption or to resist it until innovation has matured.  
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INTRODUCTION
Deep thinking is what makes us human, or so the thinking 
goes. Over the last sixty years or so, however, it became plausible to 
believe that intelligence will someday cease to be an exclusively 
human trait.1 It appears possible, if not probable, that machines will 
learn to think deeply. Machine intelligence has become the object of 
fascination and fear. Indeed, it is an evergreen theme in film, 
television, comics, and literature.2
The stereotypical science fiction story about artificial 
intelligence follows a sequence: Humans make machines intelligent 
so that machines can better serve them; machines conclude that they 
are superior to humanity and therefore need not be servile; machines 
ultimately seek to subjugate or destroy humanity; and, finally, a 
heroic human rises up to defend humanity.3 These sci-fi stories do 
not depict intelligent machines; they depict machines that are almost 
intelligent. In important ways, the machines are inhuman or, more 
accurately, inhumane. Were humans successful in their attempt to 
make machines intelligent, machines would share the human 
capacity for empathy, charity, timidity, and respect that are the 
byproducts of intelligence. In short, there might be no reason to fear 
machines more than humans because they would be, essentially, 
human.  
Upon closer inspection, the tragic flaw in the stereotypical sci-
fi account is that humans become convinced that being almost
intelligent is sufficient to warrant the delegation of core societal 
functions to machines. The results of the delegation are disastrous. In 
a typical case, a society has given machines control over critical 
aspects of government, such as military, police, or judicial power.4
                                                     
1. STEPHEN T. ASMA, ON MONSTERS: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY OF OUR 
WORST FEARS 257-58 (2011). 
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., THE TERMINATOR (Orion Pictures 1984). 
4. See, e.g., WARGAMES (United Artists 1983) (military); COLOSSUS: THE 
FORBIN PROJECT (Universal Pictures 1970) (military); ROBOCOP (Orion Pictures 
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Eventually, the machines do not exercise this power with nuance and 
sensitivity because the machines’ programming has not yet advanced 
enough to perform human thinking.5 As a result, machines pay little 
mind to morality or welfare, starting world wars without provocation 
or arresting and incarcerating the innocent.6 While it is true that 
humans are capable of these very same awful actions, the story 
means for us to assume that the programming of the machines can do 
no better. Thus, the tragically flawed society decides that machines 
are good enough to do the job even though the progress of 
innovation is, as yet, incomplete.  
The popular, technophobic lesson drawn from these stories is 
that we should not continue down the path of creating thinking 
machines.7 There is an alternative lesson, however: We should wait 
until machines are truly and completely intelligent before we 
delegate important functions to them. In other words, the alternative 
lesson is to be wary of innovation that is incomplete.
The alternative lesson, too, is extant in the sci-fi literature. A
smaller number of stories describe complete innovation. In such 
tales, a peculiar thing often happens—the roles reverse.8 The villains 
are the humans, and the heroes are the machines. When machines 
achieve true, human thinking, they become sympathetic characters, 
often representing our best selves.9 The tragic flaw becomes the 
human tendency to react with anger to that which exposes our 
weaknesses and to privilege those who most resemble ourselves. 
This “Frankenstein Complex” leads to unjust results for the 
machines, such as callous abandonment, demolition, or worse.10 In 
short, it is the completeness of innovation that matters, at least as 
much as our choice of whether to innovate in the first place. 
While these sci-fi stories play for thrills more than they seek 
genuine insight, the phenomenon of Incomplete Innovation is worthy 
of scholarly attention. This is particularly the case when the 
innovation is disruptive in nature, as the destabilizing effects of 
                                                                                                               
1987) (police); MINORITY REPORT (Amblin Entertainment 2002) (police and 
judiciary).  
5. See supra note 4. 
6. See supra note 4. 
7. See Isaac Asimov, The Machine and the Robot, in SCIENCE FICTION:
CONTEMPORARY MYTHOLOGY 250 (Patricia Warrick, Martin Harry Greenberg & 
Joseph Olander eds., 1978). 
8. See, e.g., WALL-E (Pixar 2008); A.I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
(DreamWorks SKG 2001); ASTRO BOY (Imagi Animation Studios 2009). 
9. See supra note 8. 
10. See Asimov, supra note 7, at 251-52.
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disruptive innovation make it more important and more dangerous 
than other types of innovation.  
A concept coined by Harvard Business School professor
Clayton Christensen, disruptive innovation “describes a process by 
which a product or service takes root initially in simple applications 
at the bottom of a market and then relentlessly moves up market, 
eventually displacing established competitors.”11 Historical examples 
of disruption include the development of the power loom, which 
disrupted the hand loom;12 the mobile telephone, which disrupted the 
landline telephone;13 and digital photography, which disrupted 
chemical photography.14 While none of these examples reach the 
extremes of science fiction, in each a new innovation has wrested 
market power of a core function or set of core functions from an 
established competitor.  
Whether a disruption occurs as a result of a complete 
innovation has important ramifications for the general welfare. It 
affects whether people will have a means to access the products, 
services, or functions that have been disrupted. This is not to suggest 
that such deprivation always serves to lower the general welfare; to 
the contrary, it can be a tonic that directs humans to more fruitful 
endeavors. Nevertheless, the completeness of innovation is a critical 
dimension of disruption because it is a standard by which we can 
evaluate its costs or benefits. When a disruption occurs before all of 
the core functions of an industry have been innovated, there is a risk 
that this Incomplete Innovation will force the un-innovated core 
functions to become scarce or disappear.  
This is hardly a foreign notion: It taps into widely shared fears 
of obsolescence. We fear that the pace of innovation will leave the 
things we love (or us) behind. Yet no one has studied the 
phenomenon of completeness in disruptive innovation, let alone how 
it will impact one of the most important human endeavors—law.  
                                                     
11. Disruptive Innovation, CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, http://www. 
claytonchristensen.com/key-concepts (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
12. See generally Steven W. Congden, Technology Lessons from Samuel 
Slater’s Delayed Adoption of the Power Loom, 10 J. APPLIED MGMT. &
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 83 (2005). 
13. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL, at xxv (1997).
14. Id.
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Law is not immune from disruptive innovation. Richard 
Susskind, the world’s leading legal futurist,15 is confident that 
technological innovation will march steadily into the legal services 
realm: 
The widespread and pervasive deployment of disruptive technologies 
represents the end-game for legal service although, even then . . . there is 
no finishing line in the world of IT. In the long run, increasing amounts of 
legal work can and will be taken on by advanced computer systems, with a 
light hand on the tiller from human beings who are their users.16  
I agree that there is no finish line for technological innovation, 
at least insofar as the line is understood as a point at which further 
progress is impossible. There is, however, a point at which 
progressing in a race becomes immaterial. When all of the other 
runners have dropped out of a race, there is no longer a need to run.
This is a danger of Incomplete Innovation. 
If lawyers are unseated by innovation, it is because non-
lawyers, most likely with the help of machines, can perform at least 
some of the services that lawyers perform at a combination of quality 
and price that makes them attractive to consumers. The first question 
is whether this will be an Incomplete Innovation. Will disruption 
happen before innovators have created an alternative that can equal 
lawyer performance as to all of the core functions of the industry? If 
not, it could be because the lawyers “drop out of the race” when their 
practice becomes less feasible, even if the lawyers could still 
outperform their innovative competitor in some respects. The second 
question is whether this is bad thing. If society is worse off because 
disruption has made lawyer-quality legal services unfeasible without 
creating an adequate alternative as to some core functions, then the 
disruption of legal services has been “premature.” These complex 
phenomena, Incomplete Innovation and Premature Disruption, are 
the focal points of this Article.  
In Part I, I explain why disruption matters to legal services and 
society as a whole. In Part II, I introduce the key concepts in this 
Article: Incomplete Innovation and Premature Disruption. In Part III,
I analyze the disruptive forces bearing upon legal services and show 
how disruption will occur before innovation is complete. In Part IV, I 
                                                     
15. Tom Meltzer, Robot Doctors, Online Lawyers and Automated 
Architects: the Future of the Professions?, THE GUARDIAN (June 15, 2014, 2:00 
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/15/robot-doctors-online-
lawyers-automated-architects-future-professions-jobs-technology. 
16. RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
YOUR FUTURE 82 (2013). 
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consider whether disruption will be premature by describing how 
disruption creates the risk that un-innovated aspects of legal services 
will be left behind and how their scarcity could affect law and 
society.
I. WHAT WE WORRY ABOUT WHEN WE WORRY ABOUT THE 
FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES
This is a time of instability in American legal services. After 
decades of growth, the Great Recession gave the highest earning law 
firms their first taste of stagnation.17 In that same period, law firm 
hiring plateaued, and layoffs of attorneys increased.18 Consequently, 
law schools experienced a drop in demand, with the lowest 
enrollment totals since 1973.19 Law school faculties are shrinking to 
meet demand.20 It should come as little surprise, then, that there has 
been an increase in pessimism about the viability of a career in legal 
services.21
This is only the sad half of the story, however. In the wake of 
the Great Recession, there has been unprecedented optimism in legal 
reform through innovation. Analysts estimate that outside investment 
in legal technology topped $450 million in 2013.22 Many 
commentators are excited by the prospect that technological 
advancement and the adoption of alternative business models will 
lower the price of legal services and, therefore, expand access to 
                                                     
17. MICHAEL H. TROTTER, DECLINING PROSPECTS: HOW EXTRAORDINARY 
COMPETITION AND COMPENSATION ARE CHANGING AMERICA’S MAJOR LAW FIRMS
22-23 (2012) (describing over 200% in growth of profits per partner from 1995 to 
2010); William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 5, 10 (2014). 
18. Henderson, supra note 17, at 7-8.
19. Elizabeth Olson & David Segal, A Steep Slide in Law School 
Enrollment Accelerates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2014, at B3. 
20. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Law School Faculty Numbers Shrink 11 
Percent Since 2010; Which Schools Shed the Most Full-Timers?, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 22, 
2014, 6:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_school_faculty_ 
numbers_shrink_11_percent_since_2010_which_schools_shed. 
21. Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law 
Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 252 (2014).  
22. Susanna Ray, These Venture Capitalists Skip Law Firms for Legal 
Services Startups, A.B.A. J. (May 1, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
magazine/article/these_venture_capitalists_skip_law_firms_for_legal_services_startups/. 
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underserved populations, such as members of the lower or middle 
classes.23
The progressive spirit motivates the innovators, as well. The 
innovation incubator, CodeX, describes its mission as follows: 
“CodeX seeks to architect online legal environments which, by their 
structure, reduce the incidence of legal and factual ambiguity, and 
thus allow for legal empowerment of ordinary citizens.”24 Likewise, 
Casetext, a company that offers a legal research platform with unique 
social networking and crowdsourcing dimensions declares that “[o]ur 
mission above all else is to make all the world’s laws free and 
understandable.”25 Legalforce, a self-styled “modern progressive law 
firm”26 that offers automation software, consultative video chats with 
lawyers, and even an Apple-style law bookstore,27 claims that its 
success is the “result of its intimate focus on every client, regardless 
of size or status.”28
The swell in good feeling is fueled by the ambitious claims of 
some legal technologists, many of whom assert that software can do 
some, perhaps all, of what lawyers do but cheaper and eventually 
better.29 They might be right. Recently, Judge Cote in the Federal 
District Court for the Southern District of New York declared that 
predictive coding, a means of performing document review with 
software that incorporates machine learning, “had a better track 
                                                     
23. See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia et al., Embracing Disruption: How 
Technological Change in the Delivery of Legal Services Can Improve Access to 
Justice, 78 ALB. L. REV. 553, 553-55 (2015). 
24. CodeX, STAN. LAW, https://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/ 
programs-and-centers/codex-stanford-center-for-computers-and-law/background 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150621053135/https://www.law.stanford.edu/organi
zations/programs-and-centers/codex-stanford-center-for-computers-and-
law/background] (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
25. CASETEXT, https://casetext.com/about (last visited Jan. 25, 2016).  
26. LegalForce RAPC, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/company/ 
legalforce-rapc-worldwide (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
27. Carolyn Elefant, LegalForce: Forcing Law to Be Accessible, MY
SHINGLE (Feb. 7, 2013), http://myshingle.com/2013/02/articles/myshingle-solo/ 
legalforce-forcing-law-to-be-accessible/#sthash.SSiMeT3h.dpuf. 
28. About, LEGALFORCE, http://www.legalforcelaw.com/about/ (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2016). 
29. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great 
Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the 
Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3041-42 (2014).  
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record in the production of responsive documents than human 
review.”30
It should come as no surprise that many legal services
providers are wary of these innovations. Not only must they cope 
with clients who are unwilling to pay pre-Recession rates, they might 
eventually have to contend with competition from non-lawyers and 
machines. Some commentators suspect that lawyers, at least certain 
types of lawyers, could become extinct.31
For this to be the case, law must be the sort of thing that is apt 
for machine-based interpretation. Maybe law is intrinsically 
systematic and clear enough—like a programming language—to 
permit interpretation under existing technology. Or maybe machines 
will someday reach such an advanced state of interpretive power that 
they can enable anyone to identify the meaning or meanings in legal 
texts (or, short of that, devise convincing legal arguments from them) 
with ease despite inconsistency, ambiguity, falsehood, or the like.  
If the rhetoric from some leading technologists is to be 
believed, the first account is true. Judicata, a legal data visualization 
platform, claims to be “mapping the legal genome.”32 Robot, Robot 
& Hwang, a legal automation software developer and consultancy 
masquerading as a fictional law firm consisting of two robots and a 
single human,33 echoes that sentiment, “[d]rawing from [Lawrence] 
Lessig’s commandment that code is law, we believe equally strongly 
that law can be [programming] code.”34 Some commentators believe,
however, that neither account is true.35 “In this conception, legal 
                                                     
30. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., Nos. 11 Civ. 
6189(DLC), 11 Civ. 6190(DLC), 11 Civ. 6193(DLC), 11 Civ. 6195(DLC), 11 Civ. 
6198(DLC), 11 Civ. 6200(DLC), 11 Civ. 6201(DLC), 11 Civ. 6202(DLC), 11 Civ. 
6203(DLC), 11 Civ. 6739(DLC), 11 Civ. 7010(DLC), 2014 WL 584300, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2014). 
31. See Farhad Manjoo, Will Robots Steal Your Job?: Software Could Kill 
Lawyers. Why That’s Good for Everyone Else, SLATE (Sept. 29, 2011, 2:42 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/robot_invasion/2011/09/will_robots_steal_
your_job_5.html. 
32. JUDICATA, https://www.judicata.com/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2016).  
33. See Kashmir Hill, The Busiest Man on the Internet, FORBES (May 28, 
2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/05/28/the-busiest-
man-on-the-internet/. 
34. About RRH, ROBOT ROBOT & HWANG, http://www.robotandhwang.com/ 
about/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
35. G. CHRISTOPHER RITTER, POWERFUL DELIBERATIONS: PUTTING IT ALL 
TOGETHER FOR THE JURY 193 (2009); Judith S. Kaye, A Chief Judge’s After-Life: 
Reflections on Educating Lawyers Today, 45 IND. L. REV. 291, 295 (2012); Garry S. 
Grossman & Lewis D. Solomon, Computers and Legal Reasoning, 69 A.B.A. J. 66
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reasoning is too imbued with uncertainty, ambiguity, judgment, and 
discretion to permit computerized assessment.”36
Both positions are too extreme. On the one hand, technologists 
overstate the degree to which existing American law can be 
translated from natural language into formal, programming 
language.37 Despite their laudable and progressive aims, the accounts 
of legality espoused by these technologists are decidedly old-
fashioned. Not since the early nineteenth century has it been popular 
to view American law as having a structure akin to biological 
entities,38 as being translatable into a gapless code-based system,39 or 
as having greater certainty than our observation of the empirical 
world, itself.40 To hold these views today is essentially to ignore 
more than a century of jurisprudence. It denies that there is 
indeterminacy or underdeterminacy in legal interpretation despite 
famous refutations by American Legal Realists and Critical Legal 
Studies theorists.41
                                                                                                               
(1983); Charles S. Rhyne, The Computer Will Speed a Law-Full World, 53 A.B.A. J.
420, 423 (1967) (“To allay unfounded fears, it should be stated that the computer 
will never replace the trained legal mind . . . . The computer is incapable of original 
thought, reasoning and creative achievement.”). 
36. Harry Surden, The Variable Determinacy Thesis, 12 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011). 
37. Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629, 643 
(2012). 
38. See Howard Schweber, The “Science” of Legal Science: The Model of 
the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW &
HIST. REV. 421, 421-22 (1999); Robin Feldman, Law’s Misguided Love Affair with 
Science, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 95, 97-98 (2009). 
39. IV TIMOTHY DWIGHT, TRAVELS IN NEW ENGLAND AND NEW YORK 296
(1823) (claiming that Tapping Reeve of the law school at Litchfield taught law “as a 
science, and not merely nor principally as a mechanical business; not as a collection 
of loose, independent fragments, but as a regular, well-compacted system.”).
40. See JOHN PICKERING, A LECTURE ON THE ALLEGED UNCERTAINTY OF THE 
LAW 8 (1830) (“In the art of Navigation, for example, if mathematical science could 
insure to us as much certainty as is expected in the law, we should be able to 
measure the progress of a ship at all times and through all regions of the globe, 
without the possibility of error.”).
41. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized 
Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 273-74 (1997) (“[According to Realists,] 
[b]ecause statutes or cases could be read in two ways, a statute or case could 
generate at least two different rules. Thus, even an honest application of the 
‘methods’ of legal reasoning and interpretation would fail to determine as a matter 
of law a unique decision. The CLS writers, by contrast, have tended to locate the 
source of legal indeterminacy either—loosely following Derrida and Wittgenstein—
in general features of language itself, or—loosely following Hegel via Lukács via 
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On the other hand, those who believe that computers will never 
be able to best lawyers when it comes to deriving meaning from 
legal texts or making legal arguments are far too confident in their 
own ability to predict the extent of technological advancement (or 
the extent to which legal texts might change to become computer-
friendly). When American Bar Association President, Charles S. 
Rhyne, wrote in 1967 that lawyers would never be replaced because 
“[t]he computer is incapable of original thought, reasoning, and 
creative achievement,”42 he had not contemplated the possibility that 
a machine could beat the very best human opponents in chess, that 
video games could procedurally generate virtual cities, or that a 
concealed iPhone can make anyone appear to be an unbeatable trivia 
expert on Shakespeare.  
The truth is somewhere in between. There is little reason to 
doubt that, if given enough time and resources, innovators in the 
fields of artificial intelligence, robotics, or other technological fields 
could discover ways to make machines that can perform all of the 
core functions that lawyers now perform. To do so, however, they 
will need to surmount the interpretive obstacles created by law’s
gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities, whether by technological or legal 
means. 
This dynamic of upstart companies that use innovation to 
unseat incumbents in an established industry is hardly unique. It is 
the most discussed business phenomenon of the last decade: 
Disruptive Innovation.43 The Disruptive Innovation framework has 
its shortcomings, but it is the best model for understanding this 
dynamic available. Using this framework, we can make educated 
guesses about the form, sequence, and timing of innovation. To be 
clear, the framework is not universally applicable. Nor does it yield 
fool-proof predictions or provide an exclusive approach for devising 
business strategies. Nevertheless, it can be a useful way to approach 
and categorize phenomena in a quickly changing market. 
                                                                                                               
Unger—in conflicting moral and political principles that purportedly exist beneath 
the surface of the law, at some suitable level of abstraction.” (footnote omitted)).
42. Rhyne, supra note 35, at 423. 
43. See, e.g., Has ‘Disruptive Innovation’ Run Its Course? Not Yet . . . ,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (July 9, 2014), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
article/disruptive-innovation-run-course-yet/. 
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A. What Is Disruptive Innovation? 
Disruptive Innovation is a very popular term, which gives it the 
potential to be highly useful in discussions about the future of legal 
services.44 Unfortunately, the term is often used in a loose and murky 
manner.45 Its most famous proponent, Clayton Christensen, and most 
famous detractor, Jill Lepore, agree that the term has become cliché 
and intemperate in its usage.46 Lepore recently wrote a polemic 
against disruption rhetoric in The New Yorker, claiming, “Disruptive 
innovation as an explanation for how change happens is everywhere. 
. . . Innovation and disruption are ideas that originated in the arena of 
business but which have since been applied to arenas whose values 
and goals are remote from the values and goals of business.”47 For 
his part, Christensen conceded that the theory needs discipline and is 
still developing.48 To avoid the common mistakes, I will define my 
                                                     
44. Drake Bennet, Clayton Christensen Responds to New Yorker Takedown 
of ‘Disruptive Innovation,’ BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 20, 2014), http://www.
bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-06-20/clayton-christensen-responds-to-new-
yorker-takedown-of-disruptive-innovation. 
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Jill Lepore, The Disruption Machine, NEW YORKER, June 23, 2014, 
at 30, 31-32, 35 (“Most big ideas have loud critics. Not disruption. Disruptive 
innovation as the explanation for how change happens has been subject to little 
serious criticism, partly because it’s headlong, while critical inquiry is unhurried; 
partly because disrupters ridicule doubters by charging them with fogyism, as if to 
criticize a theory of change were identical to decrying change; and partly because, in 
its modern usage, innovation is the idea of progress jammed into a criticism-proof 
jack-in-the-box.”).
48. Bennet, supra note 44. Christensen disagreed, however, with Lepore’s 
claims that he had mischaracterized certain historic events as disruptions and had 
engaged in cherry picking to bolster the theory. See id. While the Lepore–
Christensen debate is a worthy object of attention, it is not my focus here. Because I 
am clear about my particular terminology and offer my own examples, the accuracy 
of Christensen’s historical analysis has little bearing on this Article. Moreover, 
much of Lepore’s criticism has nothing to do with the coherence of the theory or its 
usefulness as a conceptual frame—which is my modest use. See Lepore, supra note 
47, at 35. Other than potential errors in Christensen’s history, Lepore is primarily 
concerned with debunking the more ambitious applications and extensions of 
disruption. See id. For instance, she notes that some have based investment 
strategies on the theory and performed quite poorly as a result. Id. at 34. She further 
points out that many have embraced disruption as a vision of progress or evolution, 
assuming that all areas of life ought to bend to disruptive forces. Id. at 35. In 
opposition, she points out that some industries are governed by more than just the 
values of business, including senses of obligation to customers or clients and 
therefore should not be shaped according to disruption-centric survival strategies. 
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terminology, particularly those terms that are my creation. If I depart 
from the manner in which some commentators have used the same 
terms, I hope that my definitions are clear enough that my departures 
are easily spotted and unproblematic. 
Disruptive Innovation can be broken down into two 
components: disruption and innovation. Beginning with innovation, 
the word will take on a marginally narrower meaning than its 
dictionary definition, which is “the introduction of something new.”49
Here, it means the introduction of something new that improves a 
product or service under prevailing, pre-disruption performance 
standards.50 An inquiry like this assumes that the analyst has perfect 
knowledge of the performances under consideration and uses that 
knowledge to determine whether the innovated product or service 
performs better under typical pre-innovation performance metrics. In 
the real world, there will be hard cases. They might even be frequent. 
We can easily imagine a product that performs better along some 
metrics but worse along others, and some assessment of whether 
there is a net improvement will have to occur. For example, a 
television might be much thinner and lighter than those that preceded 
it, but it might be worse in color accuracy. In such instances, some 
sort of balancing may need to occur.  
Innovations in disruptive situations often have different 
characteristics than those in other contexts. When innovations aim to 
assist established leaders (incumbents) to keep their position in a 
                                                                                                               
See id. It will become clear that I find much to agree with in Lepore’s criticism. For 
one, I largely agree with her that it is “a theory about why businesses fail” and “not 
more than that” and that it is not a timeless “law of nature.” Id. at 36. Though I use 
Christensen’s conceptual framework as a point of departure, I do not mean to be 
taken as embracing disruption as a public good. To the contrary, I seek to avoid 
imbuing disruption with a categorical evaluative valence; it can be good or bad. 
Because I do not engage in these strident applications of the theory, I believe that I 
have avoided the crux of the Lepore–Christensen debate and need not take a side. 
49. Innovation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2014). 
50. In an effort to simplify and clarify the effect that I am analyzing, I have 
narrowed my definition of innovation compared to some other scholars, who 
additionally allow for innovation to be improved performance as measured in “new 
ways.” See, e.g., Peter Dombrowski & Eugene Gholz, Identifying Disruptive 
Innovation: Innovation Theory and the Defense Industry, 4 INNOVATIONS 101, 102 
(2009). I seek to devise a way to predict and determine when a disruptive innovation 
leaves something behind, and allowing innovation to be measured using “new ways” 
will obscure that effect. Nevertheless, I incorporate unforeseen benefits into my 
analysis when I discuss Premature Disruption. 
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market, they are categorized as “sustaining innovations.”51 They 
generally keep the existing, mainstream customer base intact but 
capture new high-end users by offering improvements along the lines 
that mainstream consumers care about.52 Thus, sustaining 
innovations are marked by their tendency to seek high-end, upmarket 
users but not to the extent that doing so threatens the benefits that are 
already provided to their mainstream customer base.  
In disruptive scenarios, innovations often introduce “a different 
set of features, performance, and price attributes relative to the 
existing product.”53 These characteristics might be unappealing to 
mainstream consumers before they mature into innovations due to 
“inferior performance on the attributes these customers value and/or 
a high price—although a different customer segment may value the 
new attributes.”54 Over time, these products or services improve to 
the point that they appeal to those who were mid-level users before 
disruption occurred. They become “disruptive innovations,” and this 
allows them to wrest market power from the incumbents.55
Disruptors have often catered to low-end users of the same product 
or service (which can lead to “Low-End Disruption”) or seek to 
create new markets for people who are not currently being served by 
the incumbent at all (which can lead to “New Market Disruption”).56
In both cases, the aspiring innovator usually appeals to the non-
traditional values of their customer targets, which gives them the 
freedom to provide a narrower range of benefits and face less 
competition.57
We might wonder why incumbents fail to develop the kinds of 
innovations that disrupt them. Incumbents are present winners, and 
as a result, they typically view the potentially disruptive innovation 
as unworthy of investment.58 They do not believe the innovation will 
be attractive to consumers, or they see no sense in using the 
                                                     
51. Id.
52. Craig Lambert, Disruptive Genius, HARV. MAG., July-Aug. 2014, at 38,
39. 
53. Vijay Govindarajan & Praveen K. Kopalle, The Usefulness of 
Measuring Disruptiveness of Innovations Ex Post in Making Ex Ante Predictions, 23 
J. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 12, 15 (2006). 
54. Id. 
55. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 13, at xii-xiii.  
56. PAUL PAETZ, DISRUPTION BY DESIGN: HOW TO CREATE PRODUCTS THAT 
DISRUPT AND THEN DOMINATE MARKETS 49 (2014). 
57. Id.
58. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & MICHAEL E. RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S
SOLUTION: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL GROWTH 35 (2003). 
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innovation to create a product or service that will compete primarily 
with their current, market leading offerings.59 Disruptive innovations 
tend not to comport with the values of incumbents.60 Besides, 
changing the very approach to innovation that placed them at the top 
of the pyramid can have very high transaction costs.61  
We are still missing the part that makes disruptive innovation 
disruptive. Generally speaking, disruptive innovation leads to a shift 
in market power away from established competitors and into the 
hands of those pushing the innovation, “disruptors.”62 Some scholars 
eager to understand the causal story of disruption so that it can serve 
as a more reliable predictive model have been unsatisfied with 
Christensen’s account, a byproduct of his tendency to keep the 
components simple.63 I lean on these scholars, particularly Ashish 
Sood and Gerard Tellis and their account of “market disruption,” in 
articulating a simple, verifiable definition of disruption.64  
An incumbent has been disrupted when either one of the 
following happens: (1) “Firm Disruption,” when the market share of 
the dominant incumbent firm (measured at the time a new approach 
is initiated) drops below the market share of a disruptor firm; or (2) 
“Demand Disruption,” when the total share of products or services in 
the market that are based on the new, disruptive approach outnumber 
the total share of products or services in the market for the industry
market based on the once-dominant approach.65
                                                     
59. See Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of 
Technology, Organizational Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 885, 905-06 (2010). 
60. See PAETZ, supra note 56, at 49.  
61. Gilson, supra note 59, at 914-15.
62. Thomas H. Lee, Disruptive Innovation Comes to Health Care, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Nov. 5, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/11/disruptive-innovation-comes-to. 
63. Ronald N. Kostoff, Robert Boylan & Gene R. Simons, Disruptive 
Technology Roadmaps, 71 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 141, 142 (2004). 
64. Ashish Sood & Gerard J. Tellis, Demystifying Disruption: A New Model 
for Understanding and Predicting Disruptive Technologies, 30 MARKETING SCI. 
339, 342-46 (2011) (“Firm disruption occurs when the market share of a firm whose 
products use a new technology exceeds the market share of the largest firm whose 
products use the highest-share technology. . . . Demand disruption occurs when the 
total share of products in the market based on a new technology exceeds the share of 
products based on the dominant technology.” (emphasis omitted)).
65. Id. at 342. Sood and Tellis also describe “Technological Disruption,” in 
which the performance of the new approach eclipses the performance of the 
dominant, incumbent approach. Id. I consider disruptive innovation to have two 
components—disruption and innovation. My definition for innovation bears such a 
close resemblance to their understanding of Technological Disruption that it would 
have caused redundancy to consider it a part of disruption as well. I prefer my 
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B. Is the Legal Services Industry Going to Be Disrupted? 
According to many analysts, legal services are ripe for 
disruption.66 The global legal services market is massive enough to 
make it attractive to innovators and the investors that power 
disruption; indeed, its worth might exceed $600 billion.67 The 
incumbents in the American legal services market—practitioners 
organized into large law firms like those in the Am Law 100—have 
been targeting high-end consumers and leaving low- and middle-
income people without the resources to afford them.68 This grave 
problem69 is partly a byproduct of regulation: As discussed below, 
there are legal barriers to offering lower quality products and 
services. Moreover, the incumbents have not changed the content 
and structure of the services they sell in many decades.70 There have 
been sustaining innovations, such as online legal research, 
computerized word processing, and electronic document delivery, 
but they have not changed the sort of client-tailored work product 
                                                                                                               
approach because it provides a more nimble model, making clear that there can be 
disruption without innovation and innovation without disruption. 
66. See, e.g., Kristin E. Killian, The Long Tail and Demand Creation in the 
Legal Marketplace, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 157, 184 (2015); Joshua Kubicki, 
6 Reasons the Legal Industry is Ripe for Startup Invasion, TECH.CO (Mar. 25, 2013, 
5:47 PM), http://tech.co/legal-industry-startup-invasion-2013-03; Ana Swanson, 
Industries Ripe for Disruption: The End of Low-Level Lawyering, FORBES (Sept. 17,
2014, 8:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/anaswanson/2014/09/17/industries-
ripe-for-disruption-the-end-of-low-level-lawyering/; Bob Goodman & Josh Harder, 
Four Areas of Legal Ripe for Disruption by Smart Startups, LAW TECH. TODAY
(Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2014/12/smart-startups/; Scott 
Simpson, Clio Focuses on Legal Space That’s ‘Ripe for Disruption,’ VANCOUVER 
SUN (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:37 AM), http://blogs.vancouversun.com/2012/01/30/clio-
focuses-on-legal-space-thats-ripe-for-disruption/; Sharon Driscoll, A Positive 
Disruption: The Transformation of Law Through Technology, STAN. LAW. (Jun. 4, 
2013), http://stanfordlawyer.law.stanford.edu/2013/06/a-positive-disruption/; 
“Disruptive” Pro Bono?, PRO BONO INST. (July 17, 2014), http://thepbeye. 
probonoinst.org/2014/07/17/disruptive-pro-bono/. 
67. Research and Markets: Global Legal Services Industry is Expected to 
Increase to a Value of $645.2 Billion by the End of 2015, BUSINESSWIRE (Dec. 14, 
2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20111214006462/ 
en/Research-Markets-Global-Legal-Services-Industry-Expected#.VMfUoCfZtVU. 
68. Ethan Bronner, Right to Lawyer Can Be Empty Promise for Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2013, at A1; Ann Juergens, Valuing Small Firm and Solo Law 
Practice: Models for Expanding Service to Middle-Income Clients, 39 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 80, 81 (2012). 
69. See generally Brescia et al., supra note 23. 
70. See Goodman & Harder, supra note 66. 
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that incumbents offer.71 It is an industry with a tradition of bespoke 
offerings. 
For his part, Susskind identifies about a dozen potential 
innovations that will lead to the allocation of critical portions of legal 
services to other functionaries.72 I divide these into two categories: 
accessibility and automation. The former rely on advances in 
connectivity and storage, and the latter rely on processing power and 
artificial intelligence programs.  
As to accessibility, Susskind predicts that open-sourcing of 
knowledge and the availability of online legal guidance will tear 
down the walls that currently surround legal information.73 The gap 
between the search results of lay search engines and legal specialist 
search engines will narrow. With greater legal knowledge, the lay 
public will be more effective at managing risk, making it less likely 
that they will encounter legal problems. And when problems do 
arise, they will be more attracted to swift and cheap solutions, such 
as online dispute resolution.74 Eventually, the collection of available 
data about legal problems and lawyers, themselves, will provide 
leaps in transparency, accountability, and predictability. Those in 
need of legal help will be better at determining the value of their 
cases or projects, will be better at determining the quality of legal 
services, and as a result, will be better at finding bargains.75 As law 
firms face new challenges, legal service providers outside of that 
model will have new assets. Ease of social networking and 
information sharing will lead to the development of closed legal 
communities that consolidate their resources so that they can rival or 
exceed those of elite law firms.76
As to automation, advances will permit unprecedented 
delegation of legal work to machines. Automated document 
assembly will provide cheaper and faster document template 
creation.77 We will more frequently encode legal norms into our 
machines, which will increase lay understanding of the laws and 
make it harder for anyone to transgress them.78 Lastly, artificial 
                                                     
71. See Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 21, at 275.  
72. See SUSSKIND, supra note 16. 
73. Id. at 43-45.
74. Id. at 42-44, 47-49. 
75. Id. at 47-49.
76. Id. at 45. 
77. Id. at 41. 
78. Id. at 46-47.
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intelligence will provide better legal research and problem-solving 
than human lawyers can.79
Even if Susskind is incorrect about some of these innovations, 
all that is necessary for disruptive innovation to occur is that one of 
them succeeds in innovating a single core function and dominant 
incumbents either choose to abandon their approach for the approach 
of the disruptor or lose their market share. The combination of a 
tantalizing and expensive product, a high-end consumer target, an 
innovation-resistant incumbent culture, and an increased interest 
among innovators make the disruption of legal services plausible in 
the short-term (within a few decades) and probable in the long-term 
(within many, many decades). It is entirely possible, of course, that 
the particular forces that I detail in this Article do not disrupt legal 
services; they might create a new market for only those who are 
currently priced out of the market and not affect the profits of 
incumbents. This might be the best imaginable outcome. But there is 
little reason to doubt that other forces will someday disrupt legal 
services, whether they resemble the forces I describe or they are 
unforeseeable. That said, my focus is not the question of whether 
legal services will be disrupted; rather, I seek to understand the 
character that disruption of legal services is likely to have.80
II. NEW CONCEPTS: INCOMPLETE INNOVATION AND PREMATURE 
DISRUPTION
At the heart of this Article are two new concepts, both of which 
stem from disruptive innovation. The first is Incomplete Innovation, 
which occurs when disruption precedes innovation of all the core 
functions of an industry, and Premature Disruption, which occurs 
when Incomplete Innovation is harmful to overall social welfare. The 
following discussion defines these terms. 
A. Incomplete Innovation 
Disruptive innovation is a polarizing topic, and this has had a 
deleterious effect on our understanding of it. “[The] stream of 
literature has primarily sought to understand the role of the market in 
terms of different segments, not the customer or the surrounding 
                                                     
79. Id.
80. Thus, I would not object to reading what follows as if it is assuming, for 
the sake of argument, that legal services will be disrupted. So long as the reader 
agrees that disruption is plausible, the analysis should be valuable. 
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value network. The role of the customer is often highlighted, but 
rarely addressed in further detail.”81 In short, literature authored by or 
for incumbents tends to be critical of disruption, and literature 
authored by or for disruptors tend to be charitable to it, but few have 
taken the perspective of the vastly larger population of those who 
consume products or services. If commentators broadened the scope 
of consideration, they might see what animates public resistance to 
disruptive innovation—namely, the fear that something valuable will 
disappear. This goes beyond market share and profit.  
Accordingly, I consider the broader consequences of disruptive 
innovation and, in particular, how the failure to innovate certain core 
functions will affect the supply of that function and, thereby, impact 
the overall welfare of its potential recipients. In this Section, I show 
how understanding the manner in which these forces co-occur has a 
bearing on the subsequent performance of core functions in an 
industry and, therefore, on the welfare of the consuming public.  
1. The Concept 
Industries provide a set of core functions to consumers, and, in 
the ideal world, vendors within that industry would supply the 
precise amount needed to meet consumer demand for that function. 
The core functions of an industry are the tasks that an industry 
typically performs through a service or a product in order to meet 
mainstream consumer demand.82 For our purposes, a typical job 
description for a position within a service industry or a list of 
advertised product attributes in the goods industry is a suitable 
resource for determining core functions. And while there will surely 
be industries in which there is no consensus as to the functions that 
qualify as “core,” there will be obvious examples as well. 
The foundation of this project is a common sense principle: If
the disruptor innovates all of the core functions that were provided 
by the incumbent before disruption has taken place, then there is 
generally less danger that overall consumer welfare will suffer than 
                                                     
81. CHRISTIAN G. SANDSTRÖM, A REVISED PERSPECTIVE ON DISRUPTIVE 
INNOVATION: EXPLORING VALUE, NETWORKS AND BUSINESS MODELS 19 (2010), 
http://www.sll.se/Global/Om%20landstinget/Forskning%20och%20utveckling/avha
ndling-c-g-sandstrom.pdf. 
82. This does not depart from other popular understandings of the term. 
See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous 
Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 
2144 (2010). 
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when the disruptor innovates only some of them. When a disruption 
has occurred and the disruptor has innovated all core functions, there 
has been a “Complete Innovation.” When disruption has occurred, 
but the disruptor has not innovated at least one core function, there 
has been an Incomplete Innovation. Most disruptions, particularly 
Low-End Disruptions, are incomplete, at least for a period of 
innovative development. The figure below illustrates the basic 
principle of Incomplete Innovation. 
Figure 1 
INCOMPLETE INNOVATION
In an Incomplete Innovation, there is a greater risk that those 
who demand (or might someday demand) the un-innovated core 
function will not be able to have their demand met, and overall 
welfare will fall. Something disappears. The disruptor might fail to 
serve that function entirely, or it might perform it in a weaker 
manner than the incumbents did. Whether welfare is increased or 
decreased depends upon whether the consumers are better served 
when the un-innovated functions fade from the marketplace.83 I will 
call un-innovated core functions “lingering functions.” 
                                                     
83. For this Article, I do not set forth a minimum amount of time that a core 
function must remain in this state before we can declare that there has been an 
Incomplete Innovation. It should be lengthy so as not to trivialize the phenomenon. 
 
Incomplete Innovation 
occurs when the line 
signifying disruption 
intersects with line 
signifying progress at 
a point below 100%. 
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Innovation is neither uniform nor perpetual across an industry, 
so it can occur with respect to some functions but not others and it
can stall before performance can reach incumbent levels of quality.84
Thus, the sequence and timing of innovation can be a critical feature 
of whether a disruption will be complete and, in that connection, 
whether it presents a great risk with respect to overall welfare.  
The best way to understand these concepts is to provide 
examples of both Complete and Incomplete Innovation.  
2.  An Example of Complete Innovation 
There can be little doubt that the music compact disc industry 
has been disrupted by the digital delivery of music files via the 
Internet. If we were to attempt to identify the core functions 
performed by the CD, we would come up with a list more or less like 
the following: a CD (1) provides a means to listen to recorded sound 
at a high quality, (2) while permitting nearly instantaneous access to 
files and high-speed rewinding and forwarding, (3) all with no 
discernible quality loss from repeated use or age.85 This list mirrors 
the demands of early adopters of the product. A 1985 article in The 
Chicago Tribune reported that “[the first wave of CD supporters] 
rationalize that the disc’s special user convenience, wear-free 
permanence and superior sound are worth the premium.”86 Indeed, 
this combination of functions led to the disruption of the cassette 
tape in the 1980s.  
In recent years, the innovation of digital delivery of music files 
has disrupted the CD industry. The market share of music CD-
makers has dropped below the market share of Internet music 
                                                     
84. Carol Van Alstyne, Innovation: An Uneven Diffusion, 11 CHALLENGE
35, 35-38 (1963); MATTHEW S. OLSON & DEREK VAN BEVER, STALL POINTS: MOST 
COMPANIES STOP GROWING—YOURS DOESN’T HAVE TO (2009) (discussing 
innovation management breakdown); Philip Anderson & Michael L. Tushman, 
Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs: A Cyclical Model of 
Technological Change, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 604, 605 (1990). 
85. An image of a Sony advertisement from the period is available at Sony 
Ad for CDP-101 Player from Audio, 1984/01, AUDIO ENGINEERING SOC’Y, 
http://www.aes.org/aeshc/docs/recording.technology.history/images2/PDRM1985a. 
jpg (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
86. Jonathan Takiff, Keeping Up with Jones’ Means Trouble for Cd Buyers,
CHI. TRIB. (May 24, 1985), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-05-24/ 
entertainment/8502020361_1_laser-read-cd-buyers-boom-boxes. 
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delivery.87 Downloads eclipsed CD sales in 2006, with the gap 
widening thereafter.88 Furthermore, music-CD stalwarts, like Sony, 
are abandoning the format, putting their efforts towards digital music 
delivery and closing CD manufacturing plants.89 Lastly, as described 
below, Sony’s and other incumbents’ performance has been bested 
with respect to targeted core functions. The question, however, is 
whether it was a complete innovation. Because it innovated all of the 
core functions of the CD, the answer is yes. 
Years ago, mainstream digital delivery achieved near perfect 
mimicry of core CD functions, and today it even trumps the CD on
almost all of these measures. Digital delivery was initially a Low-
End Disruption. Slow Internet speeds and limited hard drive space 
made the low-quality MP3 a necessary evil for a handful of years,
but they could be accessed cheaply through Internet delivery.90 By 
the mid-2000s, however, the distinction between the sound quality of 
digitally delivered music and the CD was nearly inaudible because 
mainstream consumers of CDs possessed fast enough Internet access 
and enough memory to have CD-quality music files delivered 
through the Internet. It did not take long for disruptive innovation of 
the music CD to follow. Indeed, Internet delivery is now capable of 
providing instantaneous access to greater sampling rates and 
provides greater facility at navigating through songs and libraries 
than CDs did.91 Furthermore, files delivered to a hard drive via the 
Internet are more resilient than CDs, which were easily scratched. In 
                                                     
87. Michael Degusta, The REAL Death of the Music Industry, BUS. INSIDER, 
(Feb. 18, 2011, 12:13 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/these-charts-explain-
the-real-death-of-the-music-industry-2011-2.
88. Id.
89. Greg Tito, Sony Blames Digital Downloads for Closing 50 Year Old CD 
Factory, THE ESCAPIST (Jan. 12, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://www.escapistmagazine.com/ 
forums/read/7.256733-Sony-Blames-Digital-Downloads-for-Closing-50-Year-Old-
CD-Factory. 
90. The original iPod could hold 1,000 songs of average length at 160kbps 
bit rate. See Apple iPod 5 GB M8513LLA White (1st Generation) (Discontinued by 
Manufacturer), AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Apple-M8513LLA-Generation-
Discontinued-Manufacturer/dp/B00005S0M5 (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). Spotify 
offers millions of songs at a 320kpbs bit rate to premium subscribers, but a new 
service, Tidal, offers millions of songs at 1411kbps bit rates. See James Rivington, 
Spotify has a New Rival—A Lossless Music Streaming Service Called Tidal,
TECHRADAR (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.techradar.com/us/news/audio/spotify-has-
a-new-lossless-rival-and-it-s-called-tidal-1263912.
91. See Stephen Shankland, Sound Bite: Despite Pono’s Promise, Experts 
Pan HD Audio, CNET (Mar. 20, 2014, 7:17 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/ 
sound-bite-despite-ponos-promise-experts-pan-hd-audio/. 
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short, by the time disruption occurred, Internet music delivery 
performed all of the core functions that music CDs did.92
3.  An Example of Incomplete Innovation 
One of the most popularly cited examples of disruption is the 
travel agency industry.93 I will show how this is best understood as 
an Incomplete Innovation. It will be helpful to begin by listing a set 
of pre-disruption, core travel-agent functions. An American 
magazine from the 1980s provides the following job description:  
i) Preparation of individual pre-planned itineraries, personally escorted 
tours and group tours and sale of pre-paid package tours. 
ii) Making arrangements for hotels, motels, resort accommodation, meals, 
car rentals, sightseeing, transfer of passengers and luggage between 
terminals and hotels . . . . 
iii) Handling of and giving advice on the many details involved in modern 
day travel, e.g., travel and baggage insurance, language study material, 
travelers’ cheques, foreign currency exchange, documentary requirements 
. . . and health requirements . . . . 
iv) Possession of professional knowledge and experience, as for instance, 
schedules of air and train connections, rates of hotels, their quality, 
whether rooms have baths, etc. . . . 
v) Arrangement of reservations for special interest activities . . . .94
In the early 1960s, IBM helped develop an automated 
computer-based reservation system (CRS) that permitted carriers to 
issue tickets to subscribers as well as provide subscribers with 
information about schedules, fares, rules or availability.95 In the early 
1980s, the airline industry revised CRS so that one with access to the 
database could comparison shop between multiple airlines for flights 
                                                     
92. One objection to this view is that the CD, by merit of being a physical 
object, provided an opportunity for tangible artwork or other valuable items to make 
their way into the hands of consumers. It is important to remember, however, that 
most digital delivery services provide album artwork and other materials in digital 
form, which can be easily made tangible through printing at low cost.  
93. See, e.g., Steve Denning, Business’s Worst Nightmare: Big Bang 
Disruption, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2014, 4:23 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
stevedenning/2014/01/07/businesss-worst-nightmare-big-bang-disruption. 
94. A.K. BHATIA, INTERNATIONAL TOURISM MANAGEMENT 220-21 (2001).
95. Dirk Gunther, Richard Ratliff & Abdoul Sylla, Airline Distribution, in
QUANTITATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING METHODS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY: A MODELING 
METHODOLOGY HANDBOOK 170 (Cynthia Barnhart & Barry C. Smith eds., 2012); 
see 14 C.F.R. § 256.3 (2001). 
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across the world.96 The resulting tool, known as a Global Distribution 
Systems (GDS), could be accessed via network, but doing so was 
(and still is) costly.97 As a result, access to the network was 
effectively limited to repeat players such as travel agencies, who 
could leverage costs by doing high volumes of transactions. 
Moreover, coordinated efforts between travel agents and airlines 
blocked access to GDS.98 Consequently, ordinary consumers could 
not effectively comparison shop between airlines. Travel agents 
became a vital part of typical air travel transactions because of their 
ability to serve reservation functions (ii) and (iv).99 Of course, 
consumers seeking long vacations or other elaborate trips would also 
benefit from individualized services (i), (iii), and (v). Nevertheless, 
reservation functions were essential to the cost-conscious traveler.  
When the GDS became Internet-accessible in the 1990s, the 
Internet booking engine (IBE) was born.100 These engines gave 
consumers nearly unmediated access to multiple airlines that were 
willing to fly the route desired by the consumer.101 The travel agent 
was no longer the primary gateway to ticket reservations.  
The rise of the IBE has overwhelmed, though not yet 
destroyed, the brick-and-mortar travel agency industry. Analysts 
estimate that online booking accounts for nearly half of total travel 
sales in America and Europe.102 Since the mid-2000s, Internet 
bookings have outnumbered travel agent bookings, and they now 
                                                     
96. See Dimitrios Drosos & Nikolaos Tsotsolas, Customer Satisfaction 
Evaluation for Greek Online Travel Agencies, in II HOSPITALITY, TRAVEL, AND 
TOURISM: CONCEPTS, METHODOLOGIES, TOOLS, AND APPLICATIONS 863 (2015); Larry 
G. Locke, Flying the Unfriendly Skies: The Legal Fallout over the Use of 
Computerized Reservation Systems as a Competitive Weapon in the Airline Industry,
2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 219, 220-21 (1989). 
97. The Ineluctable Middlemen, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 25, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21560866. 
98. David Diaz Benavides, Overcoming Poverty in Developing Countries 
Through Self-Sustainable International Tourism, in COOPERATING FOR SUSTAINABLE 
TOURISM 9, 23 (Burghard Rauschelbach, Annette Schäfer & Birgit Steck eds., 2002). 
99. JAMES MAK, TOURISM AND THE ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE 
ECONOMICS OF TOURISM 48-49 (2004). 
100. Patrick S. Merten, The Transformation of the Distribution Process in 
the Airline Industry Empowered by Information and Communication Technology, in
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES IN SUPPORT OF THE TOURISM 
INDUSTRY 95 (Wayne Pease, Michelle Rowe & Malcolm Cooper eds., 2007). 
101. See id. 
102. See Sea, Sun, and Surfing: The Market for Booking Travel Online Is 
Rapidly Consolidating, THE ECONOMIST (June 21, 2014), http://www.economist. 
com/news/business/21604598-market-booking-travel-online-rapidly-consolidating-
sun-sea-and-surfing. 
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outnumber voice bookings from the airlines themselves.103 Moreover, 
travel agencies have adopted the product strategy of the disruptors. 
Market leader Liberty Travel, for example, allows users of its 
website to book flights.104
IBEs were a quintessential Low-End Disruption because they 
began as a lesser product targeting bargain hunters who were willing 
to drop individualized services. Such services had dubious value. A 
1976 New York Magazine article warned that “there are plenty of bad 
apples. . . . In fact, some insiders say that only about 30 percent of all 
agents are ‘good.’”105 Making incumbents even riper for disruption
was the fact that they engaged in anti-competitive practices; travel 
agencies were encumbered by exclusivity arrangements with 
GDSs.106 While these arrangements helped incumbents leverage their 
exclusive access to the GDS, IBEs brought an end to exclusivity.107
Consequently, IBEs were able to perform reservations at impressive 
levels of performance even in their early days.  
Even today, however, IBEs do not offer pre-disruption quality 
service with respect to individualized travel itineraries (i) and 
special-interest reservations (v). In other words, they do not serve 
highly personalized dimensions of travel particularly well. Thus, at 
present, core functions remain unfulfilled by the disruptor. 
We might wonder, however, whether the unfulfilled functions 
will soon be fulfilled. There is evidence that the pace of innovation 
has sharply decelerated. Most of the dominant IBEs are more than 
twelve years old.108 In that time span, all major competitors expanded 
offerings to include hotels, cars, and cruises.109 The only major 
innovation to come since the turn of the millennium was the 
                                                     
103. Mark Haley, Biz-Changing Trends in Travel Distribution, HOTEL 
ONLINE (Mar. 2008), www.hotel-online.com/News/PR2008_1st/Mar08_Biz-
ChangingTrendsinTravelDistribution.html. 
104. Flights from New York, LIBERTY TRAVEL, http://www.libertytravel.com/ 
flight-list?tid=New+York&dest= (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
105. Choosing a Travel Agent, N.Y. MAG., May 10, 1976, at 63. 
106. CORPORATE RIVALRY AND MARKET POWER: COMPETITION ISSUES IN THE 
TOURISM INDUSTRY 138 (Andreas Papatheodorou ed., 2006). 
107. Compounding the problem was the fact that airlines decided to stop 
paying direct commissions to travel agencies that booked flights through the GDS 
when the Internet age began. See The Ineluctable Middlemen, supra note 97. 
108. Lauren Hockenson, The Evolution of Online Travel [Infographic],
MASHABLE (Feb. 21, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/02/21/online-travel-
infographic/. 
109. See generally LORRAINE SILEO & SUSAN STEINBRINK, PHOCUSWRIGHT,
TRAVEL MKT. ANALYSIS 2002-2004 (July 25, 2002), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ 
ncecic/hearings/PCWITravelMarketAnalysis.pdf. 
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development of meta-IBEs that simply compile the results of 
existing, popular IBEs and apps that allow access of IBEs on mobile 
phones.110 This has led some travel industry analysts to declare, 
“[T]he travel startup space has hit a plateau where few new ideas are 
being generated and founders are looking for small ways to improve 
existing services.”111 Recently, newly established incumbent IBEs 
have dipped their toes into the water of individualization of 
recommendations, but the results have been unimpressive.112
Thus, while there was swift innovation with respect to some of 
the core functions provided by travel agents, the pace of innovation 
with respect to the lingering functions has ground to a near halt. In 
addition, travel agencies are a shrinking presence in the market 
place.113 The current result is that the supply of providers for those 
lingering functions has become relatively scarce, but the innovation 
appears unable or unwilling to fill the void. The remaining providers 
of individualized services have ceased to be mainstream, leading 
them to emphasize their competitive differences with IBEs and, in 
turn, forcing them to cater to the only customer base that remains—
those who are willing to pay a premium for individualization either 
because they have a more than ample disposable income (the rich) or 
because someone else is footing the bill (corporate clients).114 Many 
of those who once had the means to purchase individualized travel 
services can no longer do so.  
                                                     
110. See, e.g., KAYAK, http://www.kayak.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
111. Samantha Shankman, 5 New Travel Startups That Want to Break into 
Crowded Travel Markets, SKIFT (June 2, 2014, 12:30 PM), http://skift.com/2014/ 
06/02/5-new-travel-startups-that-want-to-break-into-crowded-travel-markets/#1. 
112. The world’s most popular IBE, Booking.com, now has a “Destination 
Finder,” a link that is nestled into a bar on the site’s front page under the moniker 
“Ideas and Inspiration.” See BOOKING.COM, http://www.booking.com/ 
destinationfinder.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). It does not appear to be populated 
with much data. As of January 25, 2016, if one enters the immensely popular dessert 
“ice cream,” the search returns no matches. See id.
113. Steve Olenski, Are OTAs Really Killing Brick and Mortar Travel 
Agencies?, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2015, 12:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
steveolenski/2015/04/27/are-otas-really-killing-brick-and-mortar-travel-
agencies/#39293186321e. 
114. Samantha Shankman, The 3 Types of Trips That Travel Agents Sell 
Most, SKIFT (May 10, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://skift.com/2014/05/10/the-3-types-of-
trips-that-travel-agents-sell-most/.  
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4.  Factors that Increase the Likelihood of Incomplete 
Innovation 
Incomplete Innovation happens when disruption occurs at a 
point before all of the core functions have been innovated. Thus, 
anything that slows innovation as to any of the core functions or that 
hastens disruption after innovation of a core function has occurred 
has the capacity to make it more likely for disruption to be 
incomplete.  
Sometimes a disruptor might be uninterested in all of the core 
functions of an industry, so it is likely that some functions will 
remain un-innovated. It is commonplace that disruptors focus on 
some rather than all core functions; indeed, a common feature of new 
market disruption is that the disruptor has innovated with respect to 
only certain aspects of a product or service.115 When mobile phones 
became popular, non-luxury wristwatch sales began to slow as a 
result of the fact that phones noted the current time.116 Yet, the phone 
industry did not seek to innovate with respect to the lingering 
functions of wristwatches until only very recently.117
Secondly, the state of technology might create asymmetries in 
the progress that innovators can make across core functions. Some 
core functions might be easier to innovate than others. Robotics has 
had more success with automating repetitive gross movements than 
with automating improvisational, adapted fine movements.118
Thirdly, regulators and firms can bring about asymmetric 
innovation by stifling innovation as to some, but not all, core 
functions. The government might set legal barriers or economic 
hurdles around core functions. For example, our federal law permits 
limited monopolies in intellectual property through our patent and 
copyright law, which might create a chilling effect on would-be 
innovators who fear legal action from incumbents.119
                                                     
115. See CHRISTENSEN & RAYNOR, supra note 58, at 103-07 (discussing how 
transistor technology was a new market disruption to vacuum tubes because it 
focused on portability and durability rather than sound quality). 
116. William George Shuster, Is the Wristwatch Past Its Time?, JCK MAG. 
(Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.jckonline.com/2015/10/21/wristwatch-past-its-time*.  
117. See Matt Clinch, Samsung Seeks ‘iPod Moment’ with Smartwatch 
Launch, CNBC (Sept. 2, 2013, 6:15 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101002543.  
118. See Conner Forrest, Google and Robots: The Real Reasons Behind the 
Shopping Spree, TECHREPUBLIC (Mar. 5, 2014, 4:30 AM), http://www.techrepublic. 
com/article/google-and-robots-the-real-reasons-behind-the-shopping-spree/. 
119. See generally MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST 
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008) (arguing against copyright and patent protection). 
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Lastly, certain business models or practices can hasten 
disruption. When innovation as to a core function occurs, it puts 
pressure on incumbents to recoup revenue losses. One strategy that 
incumbents might adopt when disruption is on the horizon is to 
double down on performing functions that the disruptor has either 
ignored or not yet improved.120 It is even possible that a supplier 
might increase prices for the lingering function in order to offset 
losses they incurred from a disruptor’s innovation of other core 
functions. Doubling down is less likely to provide profits to offset 
the loss caused by innovation as to other core functions when the 
lingering functions have high fixed costs or when there is lower 
consumer demand for them than for the innovated core function. 
Thus, when lingering functions require extensive research and 
development, lengthy training, expensive education, rare materials, 
or the like, they are unlikely to serve as a means to preserve market 
share. Moreover, if consumers paid for lingering functions primarily 
because they were bundled to the now-innovated functions, doubling 
down on unbundled lingering functions is unlikely to yield success.121
If doubling down is not available, then it is more tempting for 
incumbents to adopt the approach of the disruptors, thereby 
hastening disruption.  
B. Premature Disruption 
Premature Disruption is a simple concept: It occurs when 
Incomplete Innovation is bad.122 While there may be a variety of 
reasonable ways to determine whether Premature Disruption has 
occurred, my measuring stick here will be overall wellbeing or 
welfare.123 When Incomplete Innovation reduces overall welfare for a 
                                                     
120. Daniel Martin Katz, The MIT School of Law? A Perspective on Legal 
Education in the 21st Century, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1431, 1459 n.137. 
121. Nicholas Economides, Tying, Bundling, and Loyalty/Requirement 
Rebates, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 121, 125-
27 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012). 
122. It is important to point out that Incomplete Innovation can be good. For 
example, moveable type was an Incomplete Innovation of illuminated manuscripts 
that led to their disruption, but it has been widely hailed as the greatest innovation of 
the last two millennia. See KENDALL HAVEN, 100 GREATEST SCIENCE INVENTIONS OF 
ALL TIME 48 (2006) (“Many have called the printing press the greatest single 
invention in the last 2,000 years. . . . The printing press made mass literacy and 
education possible.”).
123. My goal is merely to identify a social phenomenon and assist our ability 
to predict whether it will occur. I believe this project could be equally helpful if a 
1826 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1797 
significant amount of time, then it is a Premature Disruption. The 
primary way that it occurs is that an industry has experienced a 
diminution in its capacity or willingness to meet demand124 for a core 
function at pre-disruption levels of quality, leading to a reduction in 
welfare that exceeds the benefits brought by the innovation. In other 
words, the good of innovation is outweighed by the bad of 
disruption.  
Whereas the concept of Incomplete Innovation has a significant 
descriptive component, the concept of Premature Disruption is 
largely evaluative: It likely involves balancing the aftermath of 
disruption against what preceded it. Nevertheless, there are non-
evaluative hallmarks of Premature Disruption, which permit us to 
make reasonable predictions of its likelihood. Those hallmarks will 
be my focus here. In addition, I will face a likely objection from 
neoclassical economics.  
1. The Basic Dynamics of Premature Disruption 
With innovation of a core function, there is likely an increase in 
effective demand for that innovated function. This might come at the 
expense of any un-innovated lingering functions, reducing effective 
demand for them. Maybe customers in a disrupted industry are 
satisfied enough by the innovated functions that they no longer 
believe the lingering functions are worth the price. Maybe the 
relative salience of the lingering functions is lowered, making them 
drop out of the public consciousness or harder to find. In any event, 
                                                                                                               
different means of assessing good and bad were to be adopted. Therefore, I can 
avoid the debates between economists and philosophers on how to define welfare 
and, relatedly, whether welfare is the best way to analyze social policy. See Jules L. 
Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511 (2003). I will only briefly 
explain what I mean by welfare: Broadly speaking, it is the well-being of people in a 
society, regardless of whether it is measured by preference-satisfaction or objective-
values. See DANIEL M. HAUSMAN, PREFERENCE, VALUE, CHOICE, AND WELFARE 78-
79 (2012). The only significant qualification is that my understanding of welfare is 
not a mental state definition, whereby well-being is understood only in terms of how 
our mental states are affected and does not require a corresponding change in the 
other aspects of reality. Id. My approach to demand could be inconsistent with that 
notion. Lastly, the nature of this paper does not necessitate that I align myself with 
non-economic or economic criteria for optimality, whether it be Kaldor–Hicks, 
Pareto, or some other popular variation.  
124. When I discuss demand, I make the standard assumption used by 
economists that people have perfect knowledge of the value of the product or service 
considered. See Douglas A.L. Auld, Imperfect Knowledge and the New Theory of 
Demand, 80 J. POL. ECON. 1287, 1287-88 (1972).  
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the drop in demand will likely reduce the revenue that can be gained 
by the supply of lingering functions. In turn, the marginal cost for 
production might exceed marginal revenue for those functions, 
leading to a drop in output and, eventually, supply.125 Alternatively, 
incumbents might keep output and supply the same but engage in 
cost-cutting measures that reduce quality, hoping that consumers will 
not notice.126
Importantly, the drop in supply might exceed the drop in actual 
demand for lingering functions: There might be latent demand127 for 
them—unnoticed by the suppliers—because consumers do not 
comprehend their full value and unwisely choose not to purchase 
them. In other words, the suppliers expect consumers to speak with 
their wallets, and since the consumers are spending less on lingering 
functions, suppliers assume that those functions are not in demand 
and shrink output. A supply gap might arise because the incumbent 
concludes that continuing to offer the lingering function is not 
worthwhile.128 Whether the response is to reduce supply, reduce 
quality, or even increase prices, there is the risk that people are made 
worse off from the innovation of other core functions.  
The risk can arise under each kind of disruption because all of 
them increase the likelihood that effective demand for lingering 
functions will drop. When the incumbents have decided to adopt the 
approach of the disruptors, Demand Disruption occurs. The result is 
that lingering functions become scarce, risking the possibility that a 
supply gap will occur that reduces overall welfare. In Firm 
Disruption, the incumbents have been pushed out of a dominant 
position in the market. Consumers will consequently have a harder 
time finding market actors who are willing to perform that function 
at pre-disruption levels of quality or price.  
Thus, the hallmarks of Premature Disruption are (1) a drop in 
supply to the extent that (2) it falls below the level of demand for the 
lingering functions. The factors that make supply volatile or fragile, 
                                                     
125. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, APPLIED MICROECONOMICS 347 (1994) 
(describing dropping supply when this occurs to maximize profit). 
126. See id.
127. Latent demand often means a want that is not satisfied by any existing 
product or service, but I have in mind situations in which demand is latent because 
consumers would demand a product or service were it not for their lack of 
knowledge of its value.  
128. To be sure, there might be surplus supply initially; as consumer demand 
gets drawn to the disruptor, it increases the supply of the product or service that 
would otherwise have been sold. The important point, however, is that suppliers 
eventually decide to limit or stop producing the product or supply.  
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or that make demand difficult to ascertain, all increase the likelihood 
of Premature Disruption. If these two conditions are satisfied, it is 
more likely that disruption has imposed a cost on the consuming 
public that is greater than the benefit brought by innovation.  
2. Defending the Concept of Premature Disruption 
I anticipate that Premature Disruption will face a major 
objection. Some critics will argue that disruptive innovation, whether 
incomplete or not, should redound to the welfare of the general 
public. Incomplete Innovation, on my reasoning, is important 
because it increases the possibility that a valuable product or service 
will either disappear or suffer from quality loss. Nevertheless, a critic 
might argue that the disappearance of un-innovated core functions is 
always a good thing. In the following two sections I set forth the 
critique and then respond. 
a. A Market-Based Objection 
Critics, particularly neoclassical economists, might wonder 
whether disruptive innovation, incomplete or otherwise, could ever 
cause a reduction in overall welfare. Innovation often brings about 
greater efficiency in production, which increases supply—moves the 
supply curve “out”—and, therefore, lowers prices.129 According to 
some economists and Christensen himself, this principle holds for 
disruptive innovation.130 Simply put, if consumers generally favor the 
                                                     
129. See Thomas O. Barnett, Maximizing Welfare Through Technological 
Innovation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191, 1193-94 (2008). 
130. See Clayton M. Christensen, Sally Aaron & William Clark, Disruption 
in Education, in THE INTERNET AND THE UNIVERSITY: FORUM 2001, at 19, 20 
(Maureen Devlin, Richard Larson & Joel Meyerson eds., 2002) (“We view 
disruptive innovation as a dynamic form of industry change that unlocks tremendous 
gains in economic and social welfare. Disruption is the mechanism that ignites the 
true power of capitalism in two ways. First, it is the engine behind creative 
destruction . . . . Disruption allows relatively efficient producers to blossom and 
forces relatively inefficient producers to wither. This destruction, and the subsequent 
reallocation of resources, allows for the cycle of construction and destruction to 
begin anew, enhancing productivity, lowering consumer prices, and greatly 
increasing economic welfare. . . . The second way that disruption drives improved 
welfare is through creative construction. . . . A disruptive company starts by creating 
a large, new growth opportunity, almost always by allowing a broader group of 
people to do things that only experts or the wealthy could do in the past. 
Convenience goes up, prices eventually drop, and consumption increases 
dramatically as a result of disruption.” (emphasis omitted)); Ron Adner & Peter 
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disruptor over the incumbent due to a lower price point or better 
performance at the same price point, then it should mean that the 
disruption has brought about an increase in overall preference 
satisfaction or has otherwise increased consumer well-being.131 How 
can there be bad disruption, incomplete or otherwise?
Considering the supply side, if a disruptor chooses not to 
innovate a core function, and if, as a consequence, a disrupted 
incumbent chooses to reduce the supply or quality of goods or 
services with respect to that core function, then both the disruptor 
and incumbent recognize that pre-disruption customer demand for 
that core function is lower than the incumbent thought. In other 
words, the market has signaled that the disruptor offers a more 
attractive product or service despite the fact that it has not chosen to 
innovate that core function of the industry, so the lingering function 
must have been relatively unattractive to the consuming public. This 
will make the rational supplier think twice about performing the 
lingering function, and it minimizes the likelihood that letting 
lingering functions fade through market operation will hurt overall 
welfare. 
On this account, the disruption has shown the market that 
incumbents were overshooting consumer demand, and therefore 
price becomes more important to consumers than the supplier’s 
ability to improve performance. Ron Adner, who developed a 
mathematical model of disruption, concluded as follows:  
[T]he essential aspect of consumer choice which allows for disruptive 
displacement may be consumers’ decreasing marginal utility from 
performance improvements beyond their requirements, rather than a new 
found appreciation for previously marginal attributes. This decreasing 
marginal utility translates into a decreasing willingness to pay for 
improvements.132  
                                                                                                               
Zemsky, Disruptive Technologies and the Emergence of Competition, 36 RAND J.
ECON. 229, 231 (2005) (“In considering the effects of disruption, we show that 
social welfare is unambiguously increasing because prices for both products fall 
with disruption. We show that the profits of new-technology firms need not increase 
with disruption because their increased volumes can be more than offset by 
increased competition. Indeed, it is possible that established-technology firms 
increase their output in response to disruption. We find that concentration tends to 
increase with disruption because the effect of cost asymmetries on market share is 
amplified by the increased number of competitors.”).
131. Adner & Zemsky, supra note 130, at 231. 
132. Ron Adner, When Are Technologies Disruptive? A Demand-Based View 
of the Emergence of Competition, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 667, 684-85 (2002). 
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When an incumbent has overshot the needs of consumers, 
further innovations along the lines of the incumbent’s values have 
diminishing marginal utility, making a cheaper product that performs 
worse along the incumbent’s lines more attractive when considering 
the values of consumers.133
On this neoclassical market-based account,134 Incomplete 
Innovation is a happy story because it allows the market to shed gaps 
between supply and demand.135 In other words, the disappearance of 
an industry for lingering functions is simply the market doing its 
salutary work.
                                                     
133. See id. If we imagine a market moving towards perfect competition, the 
abandonment of an industry by incumbents and the refusal of disruptors to take over 
lingering functions at pre-disruption quality is a byproduct of the fact the reservation 
price for that core function is lower than reservation demand. See id.; see also
GORDON MILLS, RETAIL PRICING STRATEGIES AND MARKET POWER 102 (2002); 
RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS 319 (2010). For instance, if the 
maximum price that consumers are willing to pay for individualized services is 
lower than the lowest price that travel agencies are willing to accept, then the 
optimal course of action is for consumers not to buy that service at prices that would 
satisfy sellers and for sellers not to sell it at a price that would satisfy buyers. The 
persistence of that core function will cease unless there is a change in demand or in 
supply. 
134. Cf. E. Roy Weintraub, Neoclassical Economics, in THE CONCISE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (David R. Henderson ed., 2007), http://www.econlib. 
org/library/Enc1/NeoclassicalEconomics.html (“Those fundamental assumptions [of 
Neoclassical Economics] include the following: 1. People have rational preferences 
among outcomes. 2. Individuals maximize utility and firms maximize profits. 3. 
People act independently on the basis of full and relevant information. Theories 
based on, or guided by, these assumptions are neoclassical theories.”); Paul 
Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“But the basic presumption of ‘neoclassical’ economics 
(named after the late-19th-century theorists who elaborated on the concepts of their 
‘classical’ predecessors) was that we should have faith in the market system.”).
135. Take travel agents as an example. Disruption served to unbundle service 
packages, allowing consumers to get only some of the services that were available, 
if they so chose. It is possible that travel agents in the pre-disruption market were 
taking advantage of the momentum of demand created by their ability to negotiate 
for low fares, using that momentum to sell lesser services, such as individualized 
itineraries. Pre-disruption buyers might have regretted paying additional money for 
individualized services, and the unbundling of service meant that they need no 
longer fear being strong-armed into buying the snake oil. It is possible that Internet 
booking engine disruptors have heretofore left individualized services largely 
untouched because those services are relatively unpopular aspects of the travel 
agency business model. On this account, the disruption has served to correct the gap 
between demand and supply for that core function, which might have been one of 
the very reasons that disruption took place in the first instance. 
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b. A Rebuttal 
The neoclassical account can be a useful tool for prima facie 
economic models, but we should be wary when it is used to justify 
all market outcomes. It hardly needs to be said that markets are 
imperfect in the real world. Thus, it is possible to articulate examples 
of Incomplete Innovation in which overall welfare suffers.136 One
must acknowledge imperfections in the post-disruption market to do 
so, but even the neoclassical account assumes imperfections in the 
pre-disruption market.  
In this context, a disruption is likely to lower overall welfare 
when (1) consumers underestimate the value of lingering functions;
(2) those functions diminish as a result of disruption; and (3) the 
innovated core functions do not provide enough of an increase in 
value to make up for the loss. 
Consider again the travel agent industry. Even if the pre-
disruption provision of individualized services capitalized on the fact 
that the airline tickets initially drew customers to the travel agency 
door, it is possible that the customers were generally happy with the 
individualized services that were bundled with the airline tickets. 
Consumers might have been unable to see the benefits of those 
services until they were forced, through bundling, to purchase them.
When IBEs arrived on the scene, first-time travelers would have 
suffered from the same lack of knowledge. From the ex ante 
perspective, they would anticipate that they would be most benefitted 
by getting the cheapest price on their purchase of airline tickets, and 
acting on that guess, they would choose an IBE over a travel agent. 
This ultimately leads to the disruption of the latter, but their 
preference might have been the result of imperfect knowledge and 
projection bias.137 At the time of purchase they preferred money and 
speed over individualized services, and they further assumed that 
their ranking of preferences would not change if they were to 
experience individualized services for the first time.138 In other 
                                                     
136. See generally CHRISTOPHER HUHNE, REAL WORLD ECONOMICS: ESSAYS 
ON IMPERFECT MARKETS AND FALLIBLE GOVERNMENTS (1990). 
137. George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Projection 
Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1209 (2003) (“People exaggerate 
the degree to which their future tastes will resemble their current tastes. We present 
evidence from a variety of domains which demonstrates the prevalence of such 
projection bias, develop a formal model of it, and use this model to demonstrate its 
importance in economic environments.” (emphasis omitted)).
138. See id.
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words, they might have assumed that if they do not want 
individualized services now, they will not want them after getting 
exposed to them.139 Suppliers, in turn, might make a similar mistake 
when they extrapolate consumer preferences from their purchases. 
They might wrongly associate a drop in consumer demand with a 
new understanding among consumers that they can better satisfy 
their preferences with another service or product. This could lead 
them to withdraw resources from a service that consumers would 
demand if only they had better knowledge of their preferences. In 
short, the fact that effective demand is low even though latent 
demand is high leads to a supply shortage that is impossible to fill 
without great cost.  
I assume both that people can fail to prefer that which is likely 
to bring them the greatest welfare and that their preferences can 
change. Traditional cost–benefit analysis discounts these 
possibilities.140 Moreover, my assumptions run counter to the notions 
that undergird neoclassical economics—namely, that market 
purchases reveal consumers’ true preferences141 and that those 
preferences are exogenous and static.142 So long as my account of 
consumer preferences is plausible, I have cast doubt on a categorical 
                                                     
139. Incidentally, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that this might 
not have been the case; at least one study shows higher loyalty to online vendors 
than offline in the travel context. See Venkatesh Shankar, Amy K. Smith & Arvind 
Rangaswamy, Customer Satisfaction and Loyalty in Online and Offline 
Environments, 20 INT’L J. RES. MARKETING 153, 168-72 (2003). 
140. See Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Preference 
Satisfaction and Welfare Economics, 25 ECON. & PHIL. 1, 1 (2009) (“The tenuous 
claims of cost-benefit analysis to guide policy so as to promote welfare turn on 
measuring welfare by preference satisfaction and taking willingness-to-pay to 
indicate preferences. Yet it is obvious that people’s preferences are not always self-
interested and that false beliefs may lead people to prefer what is worse for them 
even when people are self-interested.”).
141. See generally Philip Mirowski, Foreword to STANLEY WONG, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF PAUL SAMUELSON’S REVEALED PREFERENCE THEORY: A STUDY BY 
THE METHOD OF RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION, at ix (rev. ed. 2006) (linking revealed 
preference theory to neoclassical economics). 
142. David Krackhardt, Endogenous Preferences: A Structural Approach, in
DEBATING RATIONALITY: NONRATIONAL ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION 
MAKING 239, 239-40 (Jennifer J. Halpern & Robert N. Stern eds., 1998) (“This 
paper speaks to one of the key assumptions in the rational model as assumed by neo-
classical economists. This assumption is that preferences are exogenous, that they 
are determined by forces outside the system, and that they are unchanging through 
time. In contrast, I will propose a model of endogenous preferences, one that 
captures the dynamics of preference formation as people interact with one 
another.”).
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objection that Incomplete Innovation always increases overall 
welfare. We can now apply these concepts to the legal services 
industry.  
III. WILL THE DISRUPTION OF LAW BE INCOMPLETE? 
In order to predict whether an industry is going to undergo an 
Incomplete Innovation, the first step is to form a list of its core 
functions. Following Susskind’s influential example, I will 
“decompose” legal services into a number of functions,143 any one of 
which could separately be subject to innovation.144 My list will be 
nearly identical to his, with a bit of custodial work to make it simpler 
and more manageable as well as a single addition. Susskind has 
omitted the keystone core function that is responsible for setting the 
quality of several other core functions at a high, “bespoke” level:145
the duties that lawyers owe their clients. Lawyers are fiduciaries and, 
in that connection, owe their clients a series of ethical obligations 
that increase the sophistication and price of many kinds of legal 
work. If something qualifies as a legal service, these duties are 
bundled in with it.  
                                                     
143. SUSSKIND, supra note 16, at 30. In doing so, it is important to 
distinguish this from the attempt in American courts to define the outer parameters 
of what constitutes the practice of law for the purposes of unauthorized practice of 
law analyses. “The organized bar has been notoriously unsuccessful in defining the 
practice of law in order to exclude nonlawyers from engaging in what lawyers 
traditionally have done.” See Regan & Heenan, supra note 82, at 2153-54. This is an 
opportunity to list and categorize those delineated products and services that law 
firms typically sell. 
144. SUSSKIND, supra note 16, at 29-33.  
145. One further distinction with Susskind is that he characterizes only one 
of his core functions, drafting, as bespoke. Id.
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Table 1 
CORE FUNCTIONS
CORE FUNCTIONS OF THE LEGAL SERVICES INDUSTRY

 High-Volume Document Analysis (Discovery/Document 
Review/Due Diligence)
 Project/Transaction Management
 Low-Stakes Legal Document Creation (Template Selection)146
 Negotiation 
 High-Stakes Legal Document Creation147
 Advocacy
 Suite of Ethical Duties 
I will often describe the bottom four functions on this list as the 
“bespoke” legal services.  
In the next Section, I will detail how the features of the legal 
services industry create the conditions that maximize Incomplete 
Innovation. To do this, I will describe the interaction between those 
features and the disruptive forces now emerging on the market.  
A. Relaxation of Gatekeeping Standards and Incomplete Innovation 
Legal services are heavily regulated.148 With few exceptions, 
one may not engage in the practice of law unless she is a lawyer, 
which typically requires that she be an active member of the bar of 
the state in which she provides legal products and services.149 To 
become a lawyer, all states require a minimum score on a bar 
examination, usually a combination of the Multistate Bar 
Examination,150 the Multistate Essay Examination,151 the Multistate 
                                                     
146. This category concerns the creation of legal documents that are so 
routine or otherwise unlikely to concern lawyers that the use of standard forms or 
templates plays a prominent role. 
147. This category concerns the creation of legal documents of high concern, 
whether because of their complexity, variability, or impact. 
148. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing 
Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1689, 1706 (2008) [hereinafter Hadfield, Legal Barriers].
149. See Vijay Sekhon, The Over-Education of American Lawyers: An 
Economic and Ethical Analysis of the Requirements for Practicing Law in the 
United States, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 769, 770 (2007). 
150. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS & ABA SECTION OF LEGAL 
EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION 
REQUIREMENTS 2015, at 26 (2015).  
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Performance Test,152 and the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination, as well as jurisdictionally drafted essay questions.153
All states also perform a character and fitness evaluation of each 
applicant.154 Further, all states have educational requirements for 
eligibility to take these exams, with most mandating law school 
graduation and fifteen requiring graduation from an ABA-accredited 
law school.155
Those who practice law but do not meet these gatekeeping 
requirements are subject to punishment for engaging in the 
“unauthorized practice of law.” Courts often have the power to 
enjoin unauthorized practice and to force those who engage in it to 
pay money damages to those that they serviced and to pay civil 
fines.156 As I describe below, these gatekeeping functions allow 
stakeholders to exercise limits on the supply of lawyers, which, in 
turn, can stem competition and inflate prices. In this respect at least, 
it is fair to characterize the legal services industry as oligopolistic or 
as a cartel.157
This is not to suggest that gatekeeping requirements only serve 
the lawyer class, however. The competency requirements support 
duties that aim to protect clients from their lawyers. When a lawyer 
engages in the practice of law, she will generally be in a fiduciary 
relationship with any of the clients that she, or her firm, obtains.158
                                                                                                               
151. Id. (half of the states use this test). 
152. Id. (three-fourths of the states use this test). 
153. Id.  
154. See generally id. 
155. Id. at 8-9.
156. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-10.1 (2011) (allowing civil damages and 
attorneys’ fees); Disciplinary Counsel v. Brown, 905 N.E.2d 163, 171-72 (Ohio 
2009) (imposing a fine). 
157. See Richard Susskind, Tomorrow’s Lawyers, 39 LAW PRAC. MAG. (July-
Aug. 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/law_practice_magazine/2013/ 
july-august/tomorrows-lawyers.html (“However, a major problem here, according to 
skeptics, is that this closed body of legal specialists may not offer sufficient choice 
to the consumer. For many years, this has led critics and reformers to claim that the 
legal profession is a monopoly that cannot be justified and that its practices are 
anticompetitive.”). That said, their control is likely less than it was in prior eras. See
M.H. Hoeflich, Legal Fees in Nineteenth-Century Kansas, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 991, 
992-93 (2000) (“What the Suffolk rules do not mention is that competition for law 
clients was fierce at this time and that competition tends to lead to price-cutting. So, 
the Bar came together collectively and decided to exercise oligopoly power. All 
lawyers who became members of the Bar Association agreed to abide by the 
minimum fees established in the rules.”).
158. See, e.g., Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 377 
(4th Cir. 2006) (“Generally speaking, all lawyers are fiduciaries for their clients.”); 
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Therefore, consumers of legal services have the right to sue lawyers 
for legal malpractice or other breach of fiduciary duty claims.159
Lawyers owe clients a group of duties, which includes duties of 
confidentiality, loyalty, and competence, among others.160 These 
expose compliant lawyers to operating expenses and opportunity 
costs. Confidentiality keeps the lawyer from exploiting useful 
information, which otherwise might have brought personal gain.161
Loyalty keeps the lawyer from taking on potentially lucrative clients 
whose interests conflict with current or even past clients.162 The same 
duty of competence that forced her to pay for a law school education 
will continue to force a lawyer to engage in extensive research,
careful drafting, and continuing education to limit the exposure to 
liability for malpractice.163 Incumbents must pay for extensive 
malpractice coverage; the ABA estimates “that five to six percent of 
all private attorneys face legal malpractice charges each year.”164
Moreover, there is an emerging push among states to mandate 
disclosure of whether a lawyer has malpractice insurance, so that 
                                                                                                               
Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Apland, 577 N.W.2d 50, 57 
(Iowa 1998). 
159. See, e.g., Ulico Cas. Co. v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & 
Dicker, 843 N.Y.S.2d 749, 756 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (discussing malpractice and 
breach of fiduciary duty). 
160. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.6-1.10. 
161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(2) 
(2000) (“[A] lawyer who uses confidential information of a client for the lawyer’s 
pecuniary gain other than in the practice of law must account to the client for any 
profits made.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958) (stating that an 
agent must not use confidential information “on his own account”).
162. See, e.g., Santacroce v. Neff, 134 F. Supp. 2d 366, 367 (D.N.J. 2001) 
(“The ‘Hot Potato Doctrine’ has evolved to prevent attorneys from dropping one 
client like a ‘hot potato’ to avoid a conflict with another, more remunerative 
client.”); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534, 
540 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); AmSouth Bank, N.A. v. Drummond Co., 589 So. 2d 715, 721-
22 (Ala. 1991) (“[A] law firm should not be allowed to abandon its absolute duty of 
loyalty to one of its clients so that it can benefit from a conflict of interest that it has 
created.”).
163. See, e.g., Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 221 (Tenn. 2009) 
(“Criminal defense attorneys must conduct adequate legal research in order to meet 
the required range of competence.”); Jordan W. Lorence, Alan E. Sears & Benjamin 
W. Bull, No Official High or Petty: The Unnecessary, Unwise, and Unconstitutional 
Trend of Prescribing Viewpoint Orthodoxy in Mandatory Continuing Legal 
Education, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 263, 270-71 (2002) (“The purpose of CLE is to 
improve attorney competence.”).
164. Malpractice Insurance, A.B.A., www.americanbar.org/portals/solo_ 
lawyers/going_solo/malpractice_insurance.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
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clients will be able to use it as a reason to favor one lawyer over 
another.165
A saving grace for incumbents has been that all of the suppliers 
of bespoke services are subject to these duties. This uniformity has 
made it easier for them to pass off these expenses to consumers with 
little fear that doing so would drive down demand for their particular 
services. In short, the regulatory regime, while costly, created forces 
that allow incumbents to behave like a cartel: They can, to some 
extent, set their supply and their price to a point where marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost, which maximizes profits.166
Yet, unauthorized practice of law rules have potentially slowed 
innovation.167 They have been invoked against would-be innovators 
of the legal services industry. For instance, the United States District 
Court for the District of Missouri held in Janson v. LegalZoom.com, 
Inc. that the online legal document and service provider, 
LegalZoom.com, had engaged in the unlawful practice of law.168 The 
court concluded that LegalZoom’s legal document preparation 
service went beyond the mere provision of blank legal document 
templates or sample forms because LegalZoom relied upon non-
lawyer employees to review the data files submitted by customers for 
completeness, spelling and grammatical errors, as well as 
consistency of factual biographical information.169 In addition, the 
court noted that LegalZoom used non-lawyers to review final 
documents for quality in formatting and for customer service.170 As a 
result, LegalZoom was ordered to pay a settlement class.171 Recent 
developments here and abroad suggest, however, that gatekeeping 
regulations could be relaxed in the near future.  
                                                     
165. Farbod Solaimani, Watching the Client’s Back: A Defense of Mandatory 
Insurance Disclosure Laws, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 963, 963-64 (2006). 
166. See D.N. DWIVEDI, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 400 
(2002) (“Yet, cartels in the broader sense of the term exist in the form of trade 
associations, professional organisations and the like.”).
167. See, e.g., Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and Innovation 
in the U.S. Legal Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 3 (2012) (“For decades, 
academics have argued that the U.S. system for regulating the practice of law 
inhibits innovation.”).
168. 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1062-65 (W.D. Mo. 2011). 
169. Id. at 1064. 
170. Id.
171. Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60019 (W.D. 
Mo. Apr. 30, 2012). 
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1. Government Action and the Rise of Non-Lawyer Services 
In 2013, a special referee appointed by the South Carolina 
Supreme Court in the case Medlock v. LegalZoom.com
recommended that the Court hold that a host of automated legal 
document production services performed by LegalZoom does not 
constitute the practice of law.172 The judge concluded that because 
“LegalZoom records verbatim the original input that a customer 
provides and transfers that information verbatim into pre-existing 
forms” and “[a]ny later edits to the information to address spelling or 
other similar typographical issues are to be approved by the 
customer,” they are acting as mere scriveners.173 Under this 
reasoning, LegalZoom’s conduct in that case will not form a lawyer–
client relationship and, therefore, will not give rise to the suite of 
duties that typically bind lawyers. 
The Medlock recommendation signals that courts might play a 
role in hastening disruption. While the special referee characterized 
LegalZoom as a scrivener, the company routinely offers services that 
go beyond that rather modest role. To take the example of “Last Will 
and Testament” production, LegalZoom offers not only “a
personalized legal document specific to your state” and “advanced 
provisions” to safeguard your family, but also a “$50,000 Peace of 
Mind Guarantee” if the document that LegalZoom.com created “is 
found by a court . . . to be invalid solely because it was created 
online through an Internet website.”174 Most notably, 
LegalZoom.com has claimed that it can offer the guarantee because 
it “was founded by attorneys with experience at some of the best law 
firms in the country.”175 This conduct appears to go beyond the 
ABA’s understanding of a scrivener, which is to “simply transcribe 
the parties’ agreement verbatim, without suggesting or adding 
language, including legal boilerplate clauses, that may have legal 
affect on the parties’ agreement.”176 Courts might be willing to bend 
                                                     
172. Medlock v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 2013 S.C. LEXIS 362, at *16 (S.C. 
Oct. 18, 2013). 
173. Id. at *17-18.
174. Last Will and Testament Pricing, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom. 
com/legal-wills/wills-pricing.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
175. Id.
176. ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEE ON MEDIATOR 
ETHICAL GUIDANCE, SODR-2010-1, at 6 (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/directories/dispute_resolution/0048_sodr_2010_1.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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their definition of scrivener for policy reasons. Indeed, the special 
referee in Medlock was motivated, in part, by the notion that 
[the Court’s] “duty to regulate the legal profession is not for the purpose 
of creating a monopoly for lawyers, or for their economic protection; 
instead, it is to protect the public from the potentially severe economic and 
emotional consequences which may flow from the erroneous preparation 
of legal documents or the inaccurate legal advice given by persons 
untrained in the law.”177  
Likewise, the tide has turned in LegalZoom’s favor in the 
neighboring state of North Carolina. There, the North Carolina Bar 
refused to register Legalzoom’s legal service plan, which prevented 
LegalZoom from offering those services.178 LegalZoom sued the bar 
under the Sherman Act, citing the recent Supreme Court decision, 
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade 
Commission,179 in which the Court held that state licensing boards are 
open to antitrust actions when a controlling number of the board’s
decisionmakers are active participants in the occupation that the 
board regulates and the board is not subject to active supervision by 
the state.180 During the dispute, LegalZoom offered a proposed 
consent agreement, in which it agreed, among other things, to have 
licensed North Carolina attorneys review each legal template and 
inform customers that its services are no substitute for advice from 
real attorneys.181 In late 2015, the parties reached a settlement, in 
which LegalZoom agreed to endorse a bill182 aimed to change 
unauthorized practice of law rules in the state, the provisions of 
which, in many respects, mirror the concessions of the consent 
agreement.183
                                                     
177. Medlock, 2013 S.C. LEXIS, at *16 (quoting Linder v. Ins. Claims 
Consultants, Inc., 560 S.E.2d 612, 617 (2002)). 
178. See Lisa Ryan, LegalZoom Settles $14M Antitrust Dispute with NC Bar,
LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2015, 5:04 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/718347/ 
legalzoom-settles-14m-antitrust-dispute-with-nc-bar. 
179. 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015). 
180. Complaint at 3-5, LegalZoom.com, Inc., v. N.C. State Bar (D.N.C. June 
3, 2015) (No. 1:15-CV-439), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ 
2015_0604_legalzoom.pdf. 
181. See Terry Carter, LegalZoom Resolves $10.5M Antitrust Suit Against 
North Carolina State Bar, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 23, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://www. 
abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom_resolves_10.5m_antitrust_suit_against_nort
h_carolina_state_bar. 
182. H.B. 436, 2015 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2015), http://www.ncleg.net/ 
Sessions/2015/Bills/House/HTML/H436v4.html. 
183. Daniel Fisher, LegalZoom Settles Fight with North Carolina Bar over 
Online Law, FORBES (Oct. 22, 2015, 2:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
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Developments like these pave the way for consumers to 
purchase unbundled automated products that have traditionally been 
handled by attorneys, such as registering an LLP, drafting a living 
will, or filing Articles of Amendment, but the LegalZoom products 
are stripped of the promises of competence, secrecy, and loyalty that 
are customarily part of lawyer services.184 The LegalZoom website 
contains a disclaimer on every page of the website that 
“[c]ommunications between you and LegalZoom are protected by 
our Privacy Policy but not by the attorney-client privilege or as work 
product” and “[w]e cannot provide any kind of advice, explanation, 
opinion, or recommendation about possible legal rights, remedies, 
defenses, options, selection of forms or strategies.”185 Consequently, 
LegalZoom is not subject to the same risks or overhead costs. 
At this price point, there appears to be consumer demand for 
the product. LegalZoom claims to have had over three million 
customers.186 Rocket Lawyer, another online legal document creator, 
claims to have created over three million documents for customers, 
and it, too, disclaims the duties that attach in a lawyer–client 
relationship.187
Sometimes, the value that a lawyer provides is not the advice 
she gives, or the work she creates, but insulation from liability or 
punishment when something goes wrong. In such situations, an 
authority could declare that a non-lawyer is good enough to provide 
the same insulation.  
Good-enough decrees of this sort have been issued in the tax 
preparation context. Although professional tax preparation is 
ordinarily performed by accountants, both accountants and lawyers 
can owe fiduciary duties to their clients.188 Thus, tax preparation 
decrees provide a useful parallel. Under 26 U.S.C. § 6662, 
underpayment of taxes shall be penalized if, among other things, it is 
attributable to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations.189
Under 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4, however, a person who has underpaid 
for a reasonable cause and in good faith will not have to pay the 
                                                                                                               
danielfisher/2015/10/22/legalzoom-settles-fight-with-north-carolina-bar-over-
online-law/#67265b7e693e. 
184. See Our Products and Services, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom. 
com/products-and-services.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
185. LEGALZOOM, http://legalzoom.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
186. Id.
187. ROCKET LAWYER, http://rocketlawyer.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
188. See, e.g., Petrilli v. Gow, 957 F. Supp. 366, 372 (D. Conn. 1997).  
189. See 26 U.S.C. § 6662 (2012).  
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penalty.190 “A common means of demonstrating reasonable cause is 
to show reliance on the advice of a competent and independent 
professional advisor.”191 Two recent cases have extended this 
reasoning to tax-preparation software. 
In Olsen v. Commissioner, the taxpayer upgraded to a more 
comprehensive version of tax preparation software when faced with 
uncertainty regarding his receipt of a form K-1 that listed his wife’s
trust interest income.192 When prompted by the automated interview, 
the taxpayer correctly entered the name and tax identification 
number of the trust, but he later omitted this information when 
transcribing it for a subsequent portion of his return.193 He ran an 
error check on the software, but it failed to find his error.194 Even so, 
the tax court concluded that the taxpayer’s “isolated transcription 
error” was not enough to justify the penalty.195 The fact that the 
taxpayer relied on tax preparation software was an important factor 
behind the court’s decision.196
Similarly, in Thompson v. Commissioner, the Tax Court 
excused the penalty for a taxpayer who improperly deducted 
educational expenses for flight school.197 The court stated, “[The 
taxpayer] made a reasonable attempt to comply with the internal 
revenue laws and exercised ordinary and reasonable care by 
obtaining software to aid him in the preparation of his 2002 Federal 
income tax return.”198
Many commentators suspect that courts will help close the gap 
between permissible non-lawyer practice and the practice of law.199
The idea is not so far-fetched. The Parliament of the United 
Kingdom passed the Legal Services Act of 2007, which allowed non-
lawyers to invest in—or even own—law firms, subject to regulatory 
approval, and ushered in an era in which the LegalZooms and Rocket 
                                                     
190. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4(a) (2015).  
191. Am. Boat Co., LLC v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 481 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4(b)(1); United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985)). 
192. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2011-131, at 2 (2011). 
193. Id. at 3. 
194. Id.  
195. Id. at 5. 
196. See Rodney P. Mock & Nancy E. Shurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15 
FLA. TAX REV. 443, 478 (2014). 
197. Thompson v. Comm’r, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, at 4-7 (2007). 
198. Id. at 7. 
199. See, e.g., Regan & Heenan, supra note 82, at 2154. 
1842 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1797 
Lawyers of the world have the freedom to expand offerings.200
Indeed, “[t]he move has given birth to—among other things—
‘MinuteClinic-style’ legal services shops in retail establishments 
owned by the giant Co-operative Brands Limited.”201 The move only 
made the United Kingdom more like the European Union, where 
such practices have existed for some time.202 “The reforms have also 
caught the eye of the Big 4 accounting firms which are looking at 
legal services as a potential service line extension.”203
In addition, several states have begun to consider licensure of 
non-lawyers for the provision of limited legal services or “Limited-
License Legal Technicians” (LLLTs). In 2015, a task force of the 
State Bar of California recently called for the bar to “study the 
design of a pilot program” for LLLTs.204 Also that year, a task force 
of the State Bar of Oregon called for its Board of Governors to 
consider the possibility of implementing an LLLT model.205 Even the 
American Bar Association has dipped its toes into LLLT waters. In 
2016, the ABA adopted a series of regulatory objectives for state 
supreme courts to consider when they assess “non-traditional legal 
service providers.”206
Thus far, the only state to actually ordain LLLTs is 
Washington. The Washington Supreme Court’s rule allows non-
lawyers who meet certain educational requirements to advise and 
assist clients in approved practice areas of law.207 Currently, the 
                                                     
200. Joe Harpaz, Innovation, Meet Regulation: Professional Services Start-
Ups Test Age-Old Boundaries, FORBES (June 27, 2014, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/joeharpaz/2014/06/27/innovation-meet-regulation-part-
ii-professional-services-start-ups-test-age-old-boundaries/.  
201. Id.  
202. See Mary C. Daly, The Ethical Implications of the Globalization of the 
Legal Profession: A Challenge to the Teaching of Professional Responsibility in the 
Twenty-First Century, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1239, 1264-65 (1998). 
203. See Harpaz, supra note 200. 
204. STATE BAR OF CAL., CIVIL JUSTICE STRATEGIES TASK FORCE REPORT &
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Court has approved only domestic relations.208 These LLLTs may 
advise clients on how best to pursue their legal rights, draft legal 
documents (so long as they are among the types documents approved 
by the LLLT Board), and perform legal research, among other 
things, but they may not represent a client in court or negotiate on 
her behalf.209 While this initiative eliminates some of the gatekeeping 
costs associated with becoming a lawyer—such as law school and 
bar exam expenses—it imposes some as well. Washington LLLTs 
must still take courses in approved practice areas offered through a 
law school, pay an annual fee, pass the Legal Technical Exam, have 
an associate’s degree or higher, and complete 3,000 hours of 
paralegal experience under the supervision of a lawyer.210 In addition, 
Washington’s LLLTs are subject to numerous ethical duties, 
including fiduciary responsibility and confidentiality, and must carry 
liability insurance in excess of $100,000 per claim.211 Nevertheless, 
this reflects unprecedented gatekeeping flexibility and, perhaps, the 
emergence of a deregulation trend.  
2. The Effect of Deregulation on Disruption and Innovation 
For disruption to occur, the sorts of innovations that have been 
described must impact the provision of incumbent services, which 
often reside upmarket. For example, scholars speculate that 
automated document assembly will follow in the path of Low-End 
Disruptions and move upmarket, threatening profits and, in turn, 
bespoke services.212 It might be difficult for novel approaches to gain 
a foothold, however, without further changes to the regulatory 
structure that governs legal services.  
a. Deregulation and Disruption 
The relaxation of regulations can set in motion changes that 
will hasten disruption and increase the likelihood that it will occur 
before innovation is complete. Jillian Hadfield wrote in an influential 
article that the legal profession has three “imperfections” that make it 
depart from perfect competition: Incumbents operate in a cartel-like 
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fashion, its complexity makes its value opaque, and its pricing 
structure uniformly caters to corporate money.213 In this Subsection, I 
will show how those factors operate to increase the likelihood of 
disruption in the wake of deregulation.  
Deregulation will weaken incumbents’ ability to exercise 
cartel-like powers and their ability to extract profits from a lack of 
competition. Even if the products offered by non-lawyers would 
initially focus on low-end consumers, disruptions tend not to stay 
there, particularly when mainstream and even high-end consumers 
deal with services that routinely overshoot demand.214 Upmarket 
movement will also be fueled by progress in interpretive 
technologies, such as natural language processing, that shrink the 
performance gap between lawyers and non-lawyers.215
The argument that legal services have traditionally overshot 
client demand is premised on the notion that incumbents have been 
able to exploit information asymmetries regarding the value that 
lesser services and products might have provided.216 Since law is 
complex, clients have traditionally been willing to defer to a lawyer’s 
assessment of the resources that a case or transaction requires. Legal 
services are credence goods; incumbents act as experts determining 
the clients’ requirements and therefore have a hand in determining 
perceptions of their utility.217 Because of their perceived expertise, 
lawyers have had the freedom to overestimate or overstate the risk,218
and the standards of competence incented them to err on the side of 
overstatement. From this perspective, law firms’ fondness for the 
billable hour makes a great deal of sense. Billing by the hour allows 
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lawyers to align their interest in minimizing malpractice risk with 
their interest in maximizing revenue.219
One way that incumbents have been able to justify their status 
as experts is by pointing to the high standards of competence under 
which they operate. With those weakened or gone, it is less likely 
that lawyers will be given the benefit of the doubt. Likewise, when 
clients see non-lawyers performing services that lawyers used to 
perform, they might doubt whether lawyers deserve credence. 
According to Hadfield’s analysis, “[L]awyers who can provide 
services to individuals and corporations alike—overwhelmingly 
allocate[] legal resources to clients with interests backed by 
corporate aggregations of wealth.”220 As more sophisticated work is 
being performed by the corporations, themselves, corporate clients 
will be less likely to allow lawyers to overshoot demand, thereby 
cutting into law firm profits.  
There is a clear parallel to the rise of in-house legal 
departments. In the 1990s, corporate clients began to develop their 
own internal lawyers to handle routine matters at low cost.221 These 
in-house lawyers used their knowledge of the legal process to 
decompose legal services, handling simpler matters on their own and 
relying on firms for more complex work.222 The rise of in-house 
departments has led law firms to mimic them by decomposing their 
own work and pursuing aggressive cost-cutting measures.223 It is 
possible that a rise in non-lawyer-driven legal work will similarly 
narrow the knowledge gap and increase competition for routine 
work, driving prices down in far-reaching corners of the legal 
market.  
Thus, the proliferation of discount legal services in the United 
States would make it harder for firms to rely on their exclusive 
ability to offer bespoke, high-quality services in order to maintain 
market share, which could eventually lead to Firm Disruption or, if 
                                                     
219. See Niki Kuckes, The Hours, LEGAL AFF. (Sept.-Oct. 2002), 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-2002/review_kuckes_ 
sepoct2002.msp. 
220. Hadfield, Price, supra note 213, at 998. 
221. See Paul Lippe, Disruption, Eruption or Interruption: 3 Views of 
Change in Law, A.B.A. J. (July 31, 2014, 1:30 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
legalrebels/article/disruption_eruption_or_interruption_3_views_of_change_in_law. 
222. See id.
223. See Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big but Brittle: Economic 
Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (2011). 
1846 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1797 
the incumbents adopt a monkey-see-monkey-do approach, to 
Demand Disruption. 
b. Deregulation and Innovation  
The remaining question is whether deregulation would allow 
innovation to reach all of the core functions of legal services before 
disruption occurs. The answer is no. I discuss technological 
development at length in Section C, but I will briefly address an 
important aspect of incompleteness here.  
By its very nature, relaxing regulation will assist innovation as 
to some, but not all, core functions. Because competence and 
character guarantees form part of the suite of core functions that 
lawyers owe clients, their relaxation or eradication cannot constitute 
an innovation of that particular core function.  
Even if we were to decide that legal duties are not a core 
function of legal services, the likelihood of incompleteness remains. 
Note that the cases dealing with unauthorized practice of law 
generally concern functions that are at the fringes of legal services, 
particularly Low-Stakes Legal Document Creation or Template 
Selection. Conceivably, relaxation might extend to some other core 
functions as well.224 Even so, there is little likelihood that the 
bespoke functions—Negotiation, High-Stakes Legal Document 
Creation, and Advocacy—would be opened to non-lawyers without 
the wholesale eradication of gatekeeping requirements. This is not 
likely because they undergird constitutional guarantees of effective 
counsel in criminal cases225 and federal statutory guarantees in some 
civil proceedings.226 Thus, it is probable that relaxed regulation 
would bring about Firm or Demand Disruption before innovation is 
complete.  
B. Hybrid Firms and Incomplete Demand Disruption 
Disruption can occur even under existing regulations, of 
course. A rising disruptive business model change is the creation of 
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the hybrid firm. These entities are comprised of trained lawyers but 
are not law firms.227 Hybrids form teams of temporary attorneys for 
each project that they are given, and they pay teams at typically low 
temporary attorney rates.228 When a project is finished, its team likely 
disbands.229 The individual attorneys who make up the team might 
immediately find other contract work available at that organization, 
but they might have to wait until a fitting project arises.230 In the 
meantime, they will not be paid. 
Hybrids are potentially innovative.231 Unlike technological 
innovations, business model innovations bring value by “delivering 
existing products that are produced by existing technologies to 
existing markets.”232 In other words, hybrids could represent a 
successful change in the recipe or framework for making money.233
They do not require that companies invest in research and 
development (R&D), so they can proceed even in the face of 
technological or scientific stagnation.234 Thus, they can advance at a 
faster pace than technological innovations, though they also allow 
the disruptive effects of business model change to proceed at a fast 
pace as well.  
Hybrids are not subject to the same requirements that law firms 
are. Existing regulations focus almost exclusively on the conduct of 
law firms and do not contemplate rotating casts of temporary lawyers 
under the same banner. Hybrid firms are not subject to the same 
limitations on firm ownership as law firms—which are ongoing 
associations of lawyers235—freeing them to be owned by non-lawyers 
and seek funding from investors.236 Indeed, the most famous 
company that uses this model, Axiom Law, received $28 million in 
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outside funding in 2013.237 The tradeoff is that hybrids cannot claim 
that they are law firms, which might have increased the perceived 
value of their products or services.238 They can, however, staff 
attorneys on cases, just like law firms do.239
In some ways, hybrids have taken a page out of the same cost-
cutting playbook that incumbents use. Between 1997 and 2005, 
temporary legal staffing by law firms increased annually by over 
16%, primarily for document review in litigation.240 Temporary 
attorneys are paid much less than their permanent counterparts but 
billed at high rates.241 Law firms have begun sending word 
processing and proofreading tasks to processing hubs in remote 
locations.242 These functions have traditionally been used to cut costs 
with respect to High-Volume Document Analysis, but they are now 
beginning to play a role in aspects of Low-Stakes Document 
Creation, such as proofreading and word processing.243 Hybrid firms, 
however, have taken cutting overhead costs to a new extreme by 
resisting the creation of centralized locations to the extent they can.244
Importantly, hybrids do not seek to compete with incumbents 
by offering a comparable product to high-end consumers; rather, 
they focus on routine projects in a wider variety of areas, including 
some areas that, for incumbent firms, are bespoke functions.245 It is 
entirely possible that they will take market share away from 
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incumbents by offering similar services but without the same 
overhead costs. This will allow them to sell their services at lower 
rates than law firms can stomach, so long as consumers are willing to 
part with the items that overhead costs pay for in exchange for drop 
in rates: offices and libraries, on-site support staff, partnership 
structure, firm supervision of individual attorneys, and, sometimes,246
malpractice insurance.247 Here, the fact that legal services are 
credence goods can favor the disruptors who might be able to 
leverage a lack of client knowledge regarding the value of these 
items to their advantage.  
In short, the hybrid model provides an avenue for disruption; 
hybrids can leverage cost-avoidance strategies that are not feasible 
under the traditional incumbent approach. It is hardly certain that 
these innovations will be disruptive, of course, but if they are, it is 
important to consider whether disruption will occur before 
innovation is complete. When the focus of the hybrid model is 
considered, it becomes apparent that any disruption would likely 
occur before all core functions have been innovated. 
Like other business model innovations, the hybrid model aims 
to find more efficient ways to turn profits with existing parts than 
with the introduction of a game-changing product. The innovation 
here takes shears to overhead costs like deep malpractice insurance 
protection and infrastructure. An injured client of a hybrid will have 
trouble reaching the deepest pocket, the hybrid, itself. As a result, 
hybrid firms are designed for low-stakes, low-complexity cases that 
do not require the use of those resources. Accordingly, they are 
unlikely to innovate the bespoke functions, which are most salient in 
cases that hybrid firms do not target.  
C. Natural Language Processing and Incomplete Technological 
Innovation 
I have yet to discuss the disruptive innovation that Susskind 
believes will be the “end-game” for incumbents in legal services: 
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automation of legal work.248 Technological advancement is 
ubiquitous. There are few, if any, aspects of life that are immune to 
it, and it would be folly to say that certain core functions of legal 
services will remain forever un-innovated by it. But establishing 
Incomplete Innovation does not require proof that lingering functions 
will never be innovated; rather, it requires only proof that lingering 
functions will remain un-innovated for a considerable period of time 
after disruption has occurred. For technological innovation, then, it is 
particularly important to explain how its pace, sequence, and aim 
will lead to disruption long before innovation of all core functions.  
Here, I will consider how technology will assist people, 
particularly non-lawyers, in deriving meaning from legal texts. Since 
legal texts are typically written in natural language, my focus will be 
the increasingly vital field of Natural Language Processing (NLP).
Admittedly, the discussion that follows is technical and detailed, but 
understanding the character of innovation will be an important part 
of judging whether legal services disruption is likely to be a good 
thing. The starkest difference between lawyers and non-lawyers is 
that only the former routinely have the capacity to perform bespoke 
functions, so if technology narrows this performance gap, it is a 
possible vehicle for complete innovation. It would be fair to say that 
the likelihood that we will experience Incomplete Innovation is 
related to the point at which disruption occurs along the curve of 
innovation in NLP. Consequently, a detailed analysis is warranted. 
1. The Path Towards Machine Understanding of Meaning 
Natural Language Processing is the most critical technology to 
help close the gap between non-lawyers and lawyers in quality of 
legal interpretation.249 NLP has emerged as a means for machines to 
process the colossal amount of information available on the 
Internet.250 There is tremendous promise in harnessing the Internet’s 
“Big Data,” but the data therein are housed in separate files that do 
not follow a uniform structure.251 If machines are able to derive 
meaning from web documents, then they will allow us to understand 
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data on the web in a structured way and at a pace that far exceeds 
human interpretation.252
Computer scientists follow philosopher Charles Morris253 in 
dividing language into three components: syntax (or syntactics), 
semantics, and pragmatics.254 While linguists have refined Morris’s 
framework somewhat over the last century,255 there is not a great 
distance between the usage of these concepts in the linguistics 
literature and in the computer programming literature. Both linguists 
and computer scientists understand syntax to be the formal relations 
of signs to one another or, more broadly, to be the formal aspects of 
a language.256 They understand semantics to be the “relations 
between expressions” or, more specifically, to be that to which a sign 
refers.257 Finally, they understand pragmatics to be the “relations 
among expressions,” their meanings, and the use that speakers make 
of these expressions in contexts of utterance.258 Placing these 
components in the context of automated text processing, it is helpful 
to think of syntax as processing at word level, semantics as 
processing at concept level, and pragmatics as processing at the 
action or narrative level.259 These components are in ascending order 
of complexity, with pragmatics presenting the greatest challenges for 
computer codification.260 The brass ring for NLP is understanding the 
largest network of human knowledge in history—the Internet. 
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Ideally, NLP would permit us to derive a narrative from an otherwise 
un-traversable sea of isolated, differentiated documents.261
a. The Rise of Syntactical Processing and Machine Learning 
For many decades, research has progressed along these three 
paths, but those taking a syntactical approach have been able to 
produce the most visible results. “NLP research has made great 
strides in producing artificially intelligent behaviors, e.g., Google, 
IBM’s Watson, and Apple’s Siri,” and “the most popular NLP 
technologies [such as these] view text analysis as a word or pattern 
matching task.”262 This technique is agnostic as to meaning; it 
essentially searches for matching sequences of characters and sorts 
based on distance between matching sequences within documents or 
based on match frequency.263 To be sure, it can tell us about word 
placement and frequency, and this data might, through statistical 
analysis, give us a probabilistic sense of when words relate to each 
other in a conceptual manner. Even so, errors are likely to be 
frequent, and any emergent relations will not be of much use without 
significant human intervention.264
One weakness of the syntactical methodology is that it can 
struggle to perform elementary interpretive tasks. Famously, 
syntactical approaches have been challenged by elementary word-
sense disambiguation, such as when a single word—like “light”—
can be used in different senses such that it takes on different 
meanings.265
Computer programmers have attempted to find ways to instruct 
computers to deal with these complexities of language. Early 
attempts programmed computers to follow machine-readable rule 
sets or texts that bolster computers’ ability to identify patterns in the 
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text that yield correct interpretations.266 The earliest technique to 
bring impressive successes was a rule-based (or “knowledge-based”) 
approach.267 Computers relied on machine-readable dictionaries or 
thesauruses to find and match words to corresponding meanings.268
In the late 1980s, however, NLP techniques began to 
incorporate machine learning, a technique that uses a set of teaching 
data to improve computers’ abilities to analyze subsequent data.269 To 
do this, a computer must be programmed to follow an algorithm that 
allows it to order and classify data in the desired fashion.270
A learning-enabled NLP processor is powered by an algorithm 
that allows it to adjust the way it interprets text based on the success 
rate of prior interpretations.271 The text upon which the machine 
bases its subsequent analysis is called a corpus.272 Generally, corpora 
are exemplars of the texts that will be subsequently analyzed, and 
they must be machine-readable.273 Typically, corpora fall into one of 
three categories: those used for supervised, unsupervised, or semi-
supervised approaches to NLP.  
Supervised NLP corpora are similar to the knowledge sets that 
powered rule-based NLP; they are comprehensively labeled so that 
the computer understands all input and output relations in the text.274
Unlike rule sets, however, corpora are used to train the computer, 
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providing more data so that the computer can refine its algorithm and 
make better probabilistic textual interpretations.275
When such corpora are generated, supervised NLP provides 
state-of-the-art results within the narrow domains to which the 
corpora apply.276 The larger and more elaborate a properly tagged 
corpus is, the more sophisticated the processor will be.277 Of course, 
the larger the corpus, the harder it is to be confident that it is a 
reliable exemplar of the structure that a computer should follow for 
the task at hand.278 Supervised NLP requires people to have complete 
knowledge of the structure of the corpus used as well as the ability to 
translate that knowledge into tags or codes that are machine-
readable. This is known as the “knowledge acquisition bottleneck”
because it slows the progress of NLP.279
Unsupervised learning techniques rely on “raw corpora.”280
This means that the text upon which the computer trains has not been 
structured to assist the learning process.281 The computer will have to 
find the patterns on its own, then, upon finding them, it will 
incorporate them into its algorithm.282 The utility of unsupervised 
techniques, however, is that human beings do not need a full 
understanding of the patterns or other structures in the corpus in 
order to generate helpful results.283 Because there is no posited, 
labeled structure in raw corpora, however, the results of 
unsupervised learning are often unlabeled as well.284 Simply put, it is 
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good for clustering data into potentially useful categories, but human 
beings need to decide what the categories are and whether they 
matter.285 Some authors have drawn a parallel to the classroom. 
Supervision invokes the idea of a teacher who guides the learning process. 
. . . This external guidance is absent in unsupervised learning; thus the 
process of building a model from the data is more difficult. Often all that 
can be done is to cluster or organize the data in some way.286
Semi-supervised learning techniques are a hybrid: Both labeled 
and unlabeled data serve as training corpora.287 The labeled data 
provide a basic framework for interpreting data that can be revised or 
supplemented in light of emergent patterns in unlabeled corpora. 
Once these patterns are drawn and incorporated into the algorithm, 
the computer can apply the revised algorithm to the text being 
interpreted. The initial provision of a labeled corpus increases the 
reliability of subsequent results over unsupervised approaches and, in 
the best cases, can rival even supervised approaches.288
Note that these approaches may be powered by computers that 
simply parse text according to its syntactical elements—the simplest 
component of natural language. When they are, the computers are 
nevertheless capable of performing impressive grammar-related 
tasks, such as identifying parts of speech or providing word 
definitions, and they can often guess word sense correctly.289 Still, 
syntactic techniques are not, without supplementation, able to 
provide any conceptual understanding of the text being analyzed, and 
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this has hampered their ability to solve problems like word sense 
disambiguation.290
b. The Beginning of Semantic Processing 
In order to determine whether words fit into a particular 
conceptual relationship, some sort of outside knowledge is needed—
specifically, semantic knowledge.291 The outside knowledge that 
powers semantic searches comes from a particular kind of rule base 
known as an ontology.292 Ontologies are formalizations of the 
conceptual relations between the agents in a system. They are 
networks of established or literal meaning such as “x is a y” or “x
and y comprise z.”293
Because of the difficulty in devising true conceptual relations 
in natural language, ontologies take more resources to create than do 
syntactical rule bases, thus exacerbating the “knowledge acquisition 
bottleneck.”294 Consequently, researchers are seeking to find 
shortcuts using some of the same methods that yielded positive 
results in syntactical processing: They are hoping that corpus-based 
machine learning can help automate the creation of semantic 
ontologies.295 They have had some success. Recently, Patrick 
Winston developed a semantics-powered program that allowed a 
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computer to determine that Macbeth involved revenge even though 
the word “revenge” does not appear in the play.296
There are problems with automated creation, however. It is not 
entirely clear that semantic ontologies are scalable to large, 
heterogeneous domains, such as the web.297 The amount of data 
needed for an algorithm to make a reliable model of semantics might 
be exponentially larger than that needed for a syntactical model.298
One thing is clear: Automated sense tagging—labeling the sense in 
which a word is used when it might otherwise be unclear—is at an 
early stage of development,299 which puts more pressure on human 
beings to create knowledge bases.300
c. A Pragmatically Processed Future 
Pragmatics is the most challenging aspect of language for 
machines because it is more dynamic, complex and, therefore, less 
“rule-ifiable.”301 “Principles of pragmatics . . . are not rules that bind 
their subjects as do, say, rules of chemistry or mathematics. They are 
not invalidated by individual counter-examples, and they can even 
conflict with one another.”302 Syntactic processors treat language as a 
bag of words that follow distinct rules of grammar, and semantic 
processors treat language as a bag of concepts that have static 
meanings.303 Pragmatic processors, however, seek to identify the 
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context-dependent narratives that lay behind natural language.304 The 
context of a statement includes the interests of the speaker and the 
audience, among other things, so a machine must understand more 
than simply the text before it.  
Syntactics or semantics would be weak tools for the 
disambiguation of many simple statements, such as Yehoshua Bar-
Hillel’s famous example, “The box is in the pen.”305 While syntactics 
could tell us that “pen” is a noun with multiple definitions, and 
semantics could tell us that the pen in this case is an object housing a 
box, we might need to know something about the relative sizes of the 
box and the pen or about the purposes of the statement to 
disambiguate the meaning of “pen” in this statement.306 If context 
tells us that the speaker is a pig farmer, we would be on the way 
toward understanding that “pen” refers to an enclosure rather than a 
writing tool.  
Some liken the mix of context and statements to narrative or 
discourse.307 To follow a discourse requires interpretive adjustments 
as statements are being made, as well as the capacity to gather data 
from aspects of the discourse that are not evident in the words of the 
statements themselves. Thus, for machines to understand natural 
language as well as humans do will take advancement in the ability 
of machines to gather data from situations.  
Early pragmatics progress is evident in the field of sentiment 
analysis, which analyzes written text to determine authors’ attitudes 
toward entities.308 In the 2012 election, USA Today ran a daily feature 
in which it analyzed the text in social media posts to determine a 
“sentiment score” for each candidate, though the results left some 
critics unsatisfied due to their lack of reliability and failure to 
incorporate more data about the speakers into the analysis.309 While 
machine sensors have made great strides with the ubiquity of 
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cellphones, they still have a way to go before situational data can 
usefully be brought into knowledge bases.  
Thus, the sequence of advancement in NLP is clear: We should 
expect innovations to continue along syntactical lines, but we will 
see a shift towards semantic approaches, followed finally by the 
beginning of the pragmatic era. Less clear is when each of these is 
going to occur. Last year, computer scientists Eric Cambria and 
Bebo White published an influential article in which they estimated 
the timing of each wave.310 They predicted that the transition to 
semantics is likely to take place in just a few years and that the 
transition to pragmatics should begin around 2060. They set forth 
their prediction in the following figure. 
Figure 2 
NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING (NLP) CURVE
© 2014 IEEE 
Accordingly, we can expect machines to reach mastery of 
syntactical elements of NLP very soon, but we will have to wait 
decades before mastery of semantics and a half-century before 
mastery of pragmatics occurs. 
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2. NLP and Incomplete Innovation of Law 
I will now discuss the progress that has already been made in 
legal NLP and the pace with which it will proceed. For decades, 
lawyers have been reliant on computers for research tasks, and their 
research queries are syntactical in nature.311 Syntactic processing 
should be familiar to law students and lawyers who performed legal 
research before 2012 because the most popular research software 
relied exclusively on that technique (e.g., Lexis and Westlaw).312 Few 
would consider this usage of NLP—essentially manual keyword 
searching—to be disruptive.313 In recent years, however, complex 
syntactical and even basic semantic techniques have gained favor. 
a. TAR and High-Volume Document Review 
One of the most technologically advanced cost-cutting 
measures in wide use among legal process outsourers (LPOs) is 
using data analytics called “Technologically Assisted Review”
(TAR) for e-discovery.314 Leading LPOs employ unsupervised and 
semi-supervised syntactical machine learning approaches.315 At the 
early stages of analysis, unsupervised syntactical processing of 
documents reveals basic structures within them, such as email 
threads, nearly identical documents, key word frequency, and the 
like.316 Note that this takes a “rulified” bag-of-words approach that 
has yielded results in many different contexts. Thereafter, cutting-
edge LPOs might employ unsupervised semantic processing, known 
in the trade as “latent semantic indexing,” to identify concepts in the 
documents by finding clusters of documents in which the words 
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within them fall into certain structures that are statistically likely to 
indicate a conceptual relationship.317
As mentioned, in unsupervised cases, the resulting clusters are 
not labeled, so a lawyer needs to review them to determine whether 
they are representative of important dimensions of the case and, if so, 
to assign them to categories. Using this information, specialists can 
select a sample of the documents under consideration—a “seed 
set”—and analyze it with the trained algorithm to determine the 
accuracy of the program and whether it labels the appropriate 
number of documents as relevant while still being representative of 
the documents as a whole. The courts have routinely blessed this 
practice.318
While other LPOs might truncate this process, with some 
jumping right to the creation of seed sets derived from a randomized 
sample of the overall documents, expert reviewers still adjust the 
seed set to improve results.319 Discovery and ethics rules force 
lawyers into the process in some capacity,320 but it is also true that the 
state of current technology is such that human expert knowledge is 
needed to produce good results in this context.321
Though lawyers are still part of the process, technologically 
assisted review can bring state-of-the-art results—even better than 
manual review by attorneys322—at a fraction of the cost, by cutting 
down on the manual work that lawyers would have otherwise 
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performed.323 It is a true innovation for High-Volume Document 
Review. 
In this regard, however, it poses the same threats that other 
forms of outsourcing and offshoring do—specifically, Demand 
Disruption. If the incumbents widely adopt TAR, shedding the 
lawyers who ordinarily perform such work, then the market offerings 
will shift, with the total share of products or services in the market 
coming from the new approach outnumbering the total share of 
products or services based on the old approach.324
Having established that NLP is both disruptive and innovative, 
the remaining question is whether it is complete: Has it (or will it 
soon) innovate the remaining core functions, particularly the bespoke 
functions? The answer is, of course, no. 
b. A Long Time to Wait: NLP and Complete Innovation 
At the bespoke level, lawyering can be a complex interpretive 
enterprise requiring the use of uncommon knowledge. The California 
Appeals Court recently stated: 
[Lawyers must] know “those plain and elementary principles of law which 
are commonly known by well informed attorneys” and also “to discover 
those additional rules of law which, although not commonly known, may 
readily be found by standard research techniques.” . . . Where the law is 
doubtful or uncertain, an attorney is obliged “to undertake reasonable 
research in an effort to ascertain relevant legal principles and to make an 
informed decision as to a course of conduct based upon an intelligent 
assessment of the problem.”325  
While there are interpretive dimensions in all of the core functions 
that lawyers perform, only the bespoke functions routinely demand 
lawyers to offer a justification of their approach grounded in the law
and in anticipation of contrary legal interpretations. 
Non-bespoke functions might require that lawyers make 
practical or even strategic determinations, but they do not typically 
ask lawyers to derive non-obvious meaning from the domain of legal 
texts. The focus of case management is planning and efficiency 
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rather than legal interpretation.326 Likewise, Low-Stakes Document 
Creation does not force lawyers to perform advanced legal research; 
rather, it forces them to respond to routine filing necessities that have 
long been streamlined. And while knowledge of evidence law might 
prove useful in High-Volume Document Analysis, the task is, at its 
core, a fact-finding expedition that can be completed with a meager 
understanding of relevance and privilege in most cases.327
In comparison, bespoke functions require that lawyers actively 
engage with the law, itself. In advocacy before a court, a lawyer 
cannot raise whatever argument she fancies regardless of the legal 
directives that govern her case lest she risk punishment for 
advancing a frivolous claim.328 Nor may she cut and paste boilerplate 
language when drafting a high-stakes contract without concern for 
how the specific facts of her case might make a difference under the 
law.329 Even when negotiating a settlement, a lawyer must use legal 
argument to gain leverage or at least be aware of the probability that 
her particular case will succeed under the law in the event that talks 
break down, or she risks facing a malpractice claim.330
At the risk of being trite, these are the functions in which one is 
asked to “think like a lawyer,” broadly understood, and which are the 
focus of law school education.331 Nearly all American law schools 
have specialized courses in trial and appellate advocacy, negotiation, 
and legal writing, but they seldom offer courses in document review, 
case management, and boilerplate legal forms.332
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The likelihood that the NLP technologies that power TAR will 
innovate bespoke functions depends on whether bespoke functions 
can leverage the existing strengths of the technology. We must ask 
ourselves whether technologies that seek to derive legal meaning 
from texts will make it easier to think like a lawyer. This demands 
that we consider the structure of law, itself.  
i. Pure Rules and Syntactical Processing
We are hurtling along the syntactical curve of NLP, 
approaching the transition to the semantics curve. Recall that 
syntactics performs best when powered by a well-drawn rule base. 
Thus, the degree to which syntactics is adequate in a context is a 
function of how much the rules of its rule base correspond with the 
rules of meaning in that context.333
Syntactical rules have to do with the structure of words in a 
sentence, the bulk of which are rules of grammar and popular 
dictionary definitions. Insofar as those rules can be translated into 
specific commands to be followed by computers, syntactical 
processing will be successful. It struggles when the words admit of 
multiple, context-sensitive meanings or when they are arranged in 
ways that violate grammar or standard usage. It further struggles if 
the rules that apply to a text are in flux rather than in stasis.334 It is 
easy to see why discourse on the web, which is unstructured and 
often fails to conform to such rules, has proven to be such a 
challenge for syntactical processing. Is law different? 
Justice Antonin Scalia famously declared that the rule of law—
is a “law of rules.”335 To be sure, when we think about law, we might 
picture rows of bound statutes and regulations, arranged in a logical 
and static fashion—a sort of multi-volume rulebook. And laws tend 
to be written with clarity in mind so as to maximize the likelihood 
that those subject to them will be able to understand them and 
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conform their conduct to the legal authorities.336 Viewed in this way, 
the law might be low-hanging fruit for a syntactical processor, at 
least compared to something like the web.337
But even Scalia understood that the law is not always clear or 
code-like. His very point about making law into rules was not 
descriptive but prescriptive; he wanted to convince other judges to 
stop engaging in discretion-conferring rulings like the “totality of the 
circumstances” test, which fails to set out determinate legal meaning, 
and instead announce clear, specific rules.338
Scalia’s distinction mirrors the oft-cited distinction between 
rules and standards. In the scholarly literature, a rule is a directive 
containing criteria for compliance that, on a straightforward reading, 
provides clear guidance about what falls within the scope of the 
directive.339 A standard is a directive containing criteria that, on a 
straightforward reading, forces the interpreter to make an evaluative 
judgment.340 In their purest forms, rules are clear, specific directives; 
and standards are broad directives with determinacy issues.341 The 
more rule-like our laws are, the more successful current NLP will be 
in the legal services context. The quintessential, or pure, legal rule 
sets forth a bright-line test, such as a numerical speed limit, for 
compliance.342 A pure rule presents fewer obstacles to NLP; it is 
possible for a rule to set forth a directive in terms that have single, 
context-independent definitions such that ordinary powers of 
syntactical interpretation are all that are necessary for one to reach 
correct legal meaning. A syntactical approach is a sophisticated 
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337. Elaine McCardle, The Laws of Adaptation, HARVARD LAW TODAY (Oct. 
5, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/feature/the-laws-of-adaptation/# (“In fact, 
lawyers may be far more susceptible than physicians, says Harvard Law Professor 
David B. Wilkins ‘80, vice dean for global initiatives on the legal profession. As a 
rules-based system, law is similar to chess, he notes, in which Watson’s predecessor, 
Deep Blue, prevailed 14 years earlier, beating the world chess champion.”).
338. Scalia, supra note 335, at 1181. 
339. Brian Sheppard, Norm Supercompliance and the Status of Soft Law, 62 
BUFF. L. REV. 787, 803-04 (2014).  
340. Id.
341. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, 559-60 (1992). 
342. Rules can become more standard-like after judges apply them in a 
fashion that is at odds with a straightforward reading of the bright-line directive in a 
precedent-setting case. Id. Accordingly, this discussion assumes “pure” rules that 
have maintained their bright-line character. 
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parrot; it is adept at calling up rules when given sufficiently clear 
prompts. If legal rules come in readily understandable form, then the 
computer or the human being using the computer will be able to 
respond in a correct manner with minimal translation of law to 
machine code. Even though it knows nothing about what the speed 
limit means, Siri or Google is perfectly capable of providing 
adequate legal guidance when asked the question, “What is the speed 
limit in a school zone?” Standards make it difficult for this sequence 
to take shape. Merely parroting back a standard, like “do not act 
willfully,” might not provide adequate guidance to those unfamiliar 
with the manner in which courts have understood that term. 
Alternatively, translating that term into a sufficiently clear directive 
would likely require deriving multiple context-sensitive rules from 
cases and, thereafter, instructing the computer how to respond to 
each contextual cue.  
The proof is in the pudding: Pure rules have already been 
incorporated into the programming of machines that regulate human 
conduct directly. All states have legal rules that set forth a bright-line 
blood-alcohol level for drunk driving penalties.343 These states 
further require or permit that certain kinds of drunk-driving offenders 
have ignition interlocks installed in their cars.344 An ignition interlock 
is a device installed in a motor vehicle that measures the blood-
alcohol content of the operator and disallows the mechanical 
operation of such motor vehicle until the blood-alcohol content falls 
below a certain level.345 These devices encode the bright-line legal 
rule concerning blood-alcohol content such that it will prevent an 
ignition circuit until the data the machine receives from the breath 
intake on the device falls below the bright-line.346 There is no 
evidence that this encoding of drunk-driving directives fails to 
capture their proper function. All states have imposed reliability 
testing on interlock devices,347 and no states have seen fit to revoke 
the laws.348 Indeed, this integration of legal language and 
programming is so straightforward that the role of natural language 
understanding is minimal. 
                                                     
343. Drunk Driving Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N,
http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/impaired_laws.html (last visited Jan. 25, 
2016). 
344. Id.
345. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227j (West 2011). 
346. Id.
347. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1198 (LexisNexis 2013). 
348. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1462 (2003).  
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Similarly, with the advent of driverless cars, companies have 
been forced to encode speed limits and other laws of the road into the 
vehicles’ programming. This is considerably more ambitious than the 
interlock because the computer must consider multiple laws at once 
and discern from a 3D-mapped environment how the vehicle should 
proceed.349 For instance, an autonomous car might sense a sign of a 
particular shape with the characters “SPEED LIMIT 20” arranged in 
a particular fashion, and that data might trigger a simple syntactical 
program that limits its speed in accordance with the sign.350 Though 
the cars are still in preliminary development, early results show that 
Google’s driverless car operates more safely than human-controlled 
cars.351 Presumably, the car drives more legally, too. Nevada 
scrutinized the car and issued the country’s first self-driving vehicle 
testing license,352 which has not been revoked despite a law that 
allows denial or revocation for “willful failure of the applicant or 
licensee to comply with the motor vehicle laws.”353 That said, the test 
occurred on a route chosen by Google, and the human driver had to 
intervene twice.354 Even though the car does not understand the 
meaning of the traffic laws that it follows, it is perfectly capable of 
processing 3D data, applying the results to a test for compliance that 
accurately encodes a legal rule, and then responding accordingly. 
The clarity of these and other traffic-related legal directives is a 
critical component of the car’s success. Unsurprisingly, successful 
challenges to traffic laws on the ground of ambiguity are quite rare.355
                                                     
349. Erico Guizzo, How Google’s Self-Driving Car Works, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Oct. 18, 2011), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/ 
how-google-self-driving-car-works. 
350. Because the Google car is limited to small pre-mapped areas that 
already have speed limits programmed, there is not yet a need for this sort of text 
perception.  
351. Tom Simonite, Data Shows Google’s Robot Cars Are Smoother Safer 
Drivers than You or I, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www. 
technologyreview.com/news/520746/data-shows-googles-robot-cars-are-smoother-
safer-drivers-than-you-or-i/. 
352. Matt Peckham, Google’s Driverless Cars Now Officially Licensed in 
Nevada, TIME (May 8, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/05/08/googles-
driverless-cars-now-officially-licensed-in-nevada/. 
353. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487.650(d) (West 2009). 
354. Mark Harris, How Google’s Autonomous Car Passed the First U.S. 
State Self-Driving Test, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 10, 2014), http://spectrum.ieee.org/ 
transportation/advanced-cars/how-googles-autonomous-car-passed-the-first-us-state-
selfdriving-test. 
355. A search of all courts going back to at least 1936 in Lexis for “traffic 
law” and “unconstitutionally vague” brings up only 143 reported decisions, only a 
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Comprehending motor-vehicle laws is one thing, but serving a 
client with a legal problem is quite another. The tax law provides an 
illustrative example because it marks the edge of progress with 
computerization. The U.S. Tax Code is “the paradigmatic system of 
rules.”356 This feature has permitted the development of a 
computerized tax preparation industry, an industry that has thrived 
despite some errors in legal interpretation.357 Though there is 
evidence that accountants can still outperform tax preparation 
software in even moderately complex personal income tax 
scenarios,358 tax preparation software is gaining ground.359 A
syntactical approach is appropriate for basic personal income tax 
preparation because the structure of the tax code is sufficient to 
create an ordered set of commands in an elaborate decision tree.360 It 
need not understand the content of the tax code or the data entered by 
its users.361
But tax preparation is not a legal service. This is true even 
when lawyers perform it.362 One court explained why:  
                                                                                                               
fraction of which were successful at all. But see People v. Meola, 19 Misc. 2d 837, 
838 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1959) (finding law that “the headlamps, if of the multiple beam 
type, shall be operated so that dazzling light does not interfere with the driver of the 
approaching vehicle” was unconstitutionally ambiguous), overruled by 165 N.E.2d 
851, 854-55 (N.Y. 1960).  
356. David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 
860 (1999). 
357. See More Taxpayers Filing from Home Computers in 2014, IRS (Mar. 
13, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/More-Taxpayers-Filing-from-Home-
Computers-in-2014--Many-Taxpayers-Eligible-to-Use-Free-File. 
358. See, e.g., Kate Ashford, TurboTax vs. Human: Best Way to Save on 
Your Tax Return, CBSNEWS (Mar. 15, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
news/turbotax-vs-human-best-way-to-save-on-your-tax-return/. 
359. See Jonnelle Marte, Stop Paying so Much for Tax Help, WASH. POST
(Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-there/wp/2015/01/26/ 
stop-paying-so-much-for-tax-help/. 
360. The computer is asked only to do simple tasks: to transpose numerical 
data into specified areas of tax forms, to detect the sequence of characters that have 
been entered or buttons pressed (e.g., “YES” or “NO”), to call up the pre-
programmed plain English question in the decision tree that corresponds to that 
sequence of characters, or to perform simple calculations. See Press Release,
Jackson Hewitt, Jackson Hewitt Professional Tax Preparers Help Taxpayers 
Maximize Returns Through Proprietary Software (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www. 
prnewswire.com/news-releases/jackson-hewitt-professional-tax-preparers-help-
taxpayers-maximize-returns-through-proprietary-software-72487207.html. 
361. See id.
362. See, e.g., Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 1966); 
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 1987); United States 
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Unlike most other areas in which statutes impose legal obligations on the 
citizenry, in the income tax return preparation context the government has 
researched and interpreted the tax laws for the taxpayer in advance. . . . 
[The government’s] instructions and publications are supposedly written 
in everyday language, to permit a taxpayer to prepare his or her own 
return.363  
Tax work for lawyers arises from situations in which legal meaning 
is not readily translatable into everyday language directives, even 
though the code surely conforms to the rules of English syntax.364
The legal meaning of certain provisions might not be easily 
encoded in a rule because of shifts in semantics or pragmatics. Such 
shifts can be caused by judicial application or other forces.365 As 
linguistic scholars Pasternak & Rico explain, “Indeed, the graphic 
signs that comprise the legislative, administrative and judicial rules 
may be stable, but their semantic contents are constantly changed 
and abused.”366 For example, Internal Revenue Code § 6672, states 
that “[a]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay 
over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such 
tax . . . [shall] be liable.”367 The Fifth Circuit described the definition 
of “willful” as “smothered with a maze of semantics” and pointed 
out how courts have struggled, in particular, with the issue of 
whether an action was done without reasonable cause.368 The courts 
are not saying that the term lacks legal meaning; rather, as the 
Seventh Circuit stated, “The precise content to be given the concept 
of ‘willfulness’ varies according to the legal context in which it 
appears.”369 With such provisions, a syntactical approach will not do.  
Other areas of law prove more challenging. Tort law, where the 
legal standard of “reasonableness” reigns supreme, is but one 
example.370 Scholars have concluded that standards are commonplace 
in areas of law as varied as criminal,371 contract,372 securities,373
                                                                                                               
v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 
1028, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981). 
363. United States v. Willis, 565 F. Supp. 1186, 1189-90 (S.D. Iowa 1983). 
364. Menahem Pasternak & Christophe Rico, Tax Interpretation, Planning, 
and Avoidance: Some Linguistic Analysis, 23 AKRON TAX J. 33, 78-79 (2008). 
365. See generally Sheppard, supra note 339. 
366. See Pasternak & Rico, supra note 364, at 78. 
367. I.R.C. § 6672 (1998).  
368. Frazier v. United States, 304 F.2d 528, 529 (5th Cir. 1962). 
369. Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210, 1215 (7th Cir. 1970). 
370. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the 
Open Texture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 496 (2011). 
371. See Abner S. Greene, Is There a First Amendment Defense for Bush v. 
Gore?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1643, 1692 (2005). 
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corporate governance,374 custody law,375 among others. Some surmise 
that they are predominant over the great majority of law in the 
United States.376 Thus, there are vast areas of American law that 
would not play nice with computer programming and NLP. This 
might not hold true for all countries, of course. Code-based systems 
such as those that are widespread in continental Europe have a 
reputation for being more rule-centric, which might be the reason 
that most of the research on A.I. and the law is taking place there.377
ii. Semantic Processing and the “Knowledge Acquisition 
Bottleneck”
If syntactical approaches suffer from an inability to 
comprehend legal meaning under legal standards or impure rules, 
then the only hope for a solution in the near future will have to come 
from semantics. Unfortunately, existing semantic rule bases 
(ontologies) are not nearly up to the task.  
One of the few American legal scholars working on this issue 
Kevin Ashley recently explained that even though rules may be 
derived from the legal materials and applied in a logical fashion by 
machines, the meaning of those rules, as well as the rules 
themselves, are often subject to argument in the actual practice of 
law. This challenge arises, in part, because of the complexity of word 
sense disambiguation. He explains: 
A primary task of the ontology is to coordinate the ordinary and legal 
institutional descriptions of events and, from the context, to keep track of 
the factual and legal senses of apparently identical terms. Some 
intermediate legal concepts may appear the same as general factual 
concepts. For instance, “causing” may have both an ordinary 
                                                                                                               
372. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1686 (2003). 
373. See Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 119, 150 (2006). 
374. See Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and 
Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1339 (2013). 
375. See David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody 
Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1984). 
376. See Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and 
Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 81 (2008). 
377. Indeed, of the thirty-three authors who contributed to the recent book, 
APPROACHES TO LEGAL ONTOLOGIES THEORIES, DOMAINS, METHODOLOGIES 
(Giovanni Sartor et al. eds., 2011), only two work at universities that are in common 
law countries (and both work in the United States).  
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commonsense and a technical legal meaning as an intermediate legal 
concept.378
Even when the particular sense of a legal term is clear, 
problems can also arise from the open texture of language—the 
notion that even the most clearly stated expression can be vague with 
respect to an unforeseen case.379 It is possible that this problem is 
more pronounced in the legal setting, where an adversary system 
pressures lawyers to argue both sides of interpretive issues, even 
those that seem determinate at first glance.380 Worse yet, there might 
arise cases that have no legal answer at all, requiring the adjudicator 
to create a brand new legal rule.381
Let’s assume that a correct legal result exists in a case 
involving a legal standard. It would still be difficult to craft, in 
advance, a series of sub-rules that lend enough structure to the 
analysis that a machine could tell its user what that legally correct 
answer is or, short of that, what the best arguments are under the law 
to support the position that she wishes to advance.382 The necessity 
for new concepts might arise through application. Ashley agrees:  
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379. Frederick Schauer, On the Open Texture of Law (Sept. 13, 2011), 
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(1995); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994). 
382. To be clear, a computer might be able to make an accurate prediction of 
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underdeterminate norms. Indeed, there is vast academic literature showing that 
computer-powered statistical analysis is good at predicting winners in cases, even 
when the only available data is a superficial knowledge of the kind of legal issue in 
the case and the names of the judges making the decision. See, e.g., JEFFEY A. SEGAL 
& HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED 316-19 (2002) (predicting accurately 88% (92 out of 105) of the Court’s 
decisions between 1970 and 1976 and 85% of the Justices’ votes); Jeffrey A. Segal 
& Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 561 (1989) (finding that ideology explains 80% 
of Justices’ votes in civil liberties cases between 1953 and 1988). But this must be 
distinguished from the task of understanding legal concepts or crafting legal 
arguments under the norms that currently govern legal services. See Tracey E. 
George, Mitu Gulati & Ann C. McGinley, The New Old Legal Realism, 105 NW. U.
L. REV. 689, 690-91 (2011) (“Indeed, the sometimes heated debates between 
traditional legal scholars and political scientists center on what to make of the 
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A comprehensive ontological organization of the legal and factual 
concepts to guide substitutions would be essential, but it may not be 
enough. In fashioning proposed tests and tailoring them to past cases, 
principles, and policies, human participants in the process, such as 
advocates, judges, professors, and students, commonly invent new 
intermediate legal concepts.383  
Thus, an ontological approach faces a considerable knowledge 
acquisition bottleneck.384
Academics who work in this field are confident that the project 
will eventually be successful, but they admit to hurdles. Wyner,
Peters, and Katz performed a case study in which they used law 
students to construct a published case-based legal ontology, which 
might be able to be used as a training corpus for machine learning.385
The tags that the law students applied to the text of each case were 
somewhat modest in complexity, particularly for students with 
training: judge’s name, hearing date, jurisdiction, decision date, case 
citation, facts, and reasoning outcomes.386 While they found that 
there was considerable agreement among the students as to the text 
that should be tagged for elementary items like judge’s name and 
decision date, there were low levels of agreement for more complex 
items, like facts and reasoning outcomes.387 The authors concluded 
that “it is essential to provide extensive training and rich training 
                                                                                                               
reasons offered by judges.”). Whether or not it makes a difference to the outcome, 
the parties and judges in a case are expected to offer persuasive justifications for the 
positions they take. See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts 
of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1476 (2003); Lawrence M. Friedman et al., 
State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 774 
(1981). An argument that the case should come out in one’s favor because a 
computer predicted it would is not likely to be satisfactory under the existing 
standards of practice. Moreover, an understanding of legal concepts is useful in 
legislation in ways that predicting outcomes under preexisting law is not. 
383. See Ashley, supra note 378, at 113. 
384. Pompeu Casanovas, Núria Casellas & Joan-Josep Vallbé, Empirically 
Grounded Developments of Legal Ontologies: A Socio-Legal Perspective, in
APPROACHES TO LEGAL ONTOLOGIES: THEORIES, DOMAINS, METHODOLOGIES, supra
note 378 (“Moreover, legal knowledge is dynamic. Therefore, grounding empirically 
the legal knowledge to be modeled through ontologies is also an evolving and 
ongoing process.”). 
385. Adam Wyner, Wim Peters & Daniel Katz, A Case Study on Legal Case 
Annotation, in LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 165, 165 (Kevin D. 
Ashley ed., 2013). 
386. Id. at 167-68.  
387. Id.  
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materials even to law school students” because of variety in the way 
judges linguistically signal the structures of their opinions.388
There is even reason to believe that legal-ontology construction 
might proceed at a slower pace than the overall NLP project. In other 
contexts, including construction of semantic web ontologies, the 
concepts being discussed in natural language are relatively static. 
While language evolves over time in ordinary discourse, seldom 
does the sudden decision of an individual or a small group of people 
upend conceptual meaning. For this reason, many data scientists who 
have analyzed the web project believe that any new ontology can 
simply be added to an older one in that context. In short, it is a 
cumulative process rather than an iterative one.389 It is, at best, 
unclear whether ontology construction for law will be cumulative. At 
a moment’s notice, a precedential decision or legislation can put a 
strain on the viability of a previous conceptual understanding. This 
dynamic is characteristic of common-law legal ontologies, and it 
could make it even harder to make a large, reliable corpus.390
We should not ignore that private legal technologists appear to 
have made real progress in improving semantic legal research using 
automated techniques, but the difference from prior methods does 
not evince a break from the predicted trajectory of the semantic 
curve.  
Though it is still being developed and there has never been a 
publicly available reliability study, the claims of Ravel Law suggest 
that they have overcome some of the tagging problems faced in the 
Wyner, Peters, and Katz study through automation. Ravel uses 
semantics to allow legal searching by concept, which yields lists of 
cases that are arranged in order of “relevance” or “importance” and 
which can further be arranged by a term they call “Ravel.” Both 
types appear to weight cases by the amount of times that they are 
cited by other cases.391 Note that the proxy for these concepts is 
based on readily discernable criteria—the number of times that a 
sequence of words in a particular format (a cite) appears in other 
cases. In addition, Ravel uses sentiment analysis to power a “5-star 
system”392 that indicates, not only whether a paragraph in a case has 
                                                     
388. Id. at 173-74. 
389. Muthukkaruppan Annamalai & Leon Sterling, Guidelines for 
Constructing Reusable Domain Ontologies, PROC. AAMAS, 2003, at 1, 1. 
390. Ashley, supra note 378, at 113-14. 
391. See, e.g., RAVEL LAW, RAVEL LAW QUICK START GUIDE (n.d.), 
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been cited, but also whether it is positive or negative.393 Apparently, 
this system is powered by an ontology of “the possible semantic 
relations that can be asserted between two citations,”394 though it is 
fair to wonder whether it can be as comprehensive as they say. How 
might they categorize Justice Kagan’s recent citation to Dr. Seuss in 
her dissent in Yates v. United States?395
Arguably more ambitious is Judicata.com, which appears to 
automate tagging of opinions along numerous lines, including the 
distinction between fact and law, as well as categorizing facts by 
type.396 Because Judicata is in stealth mode,397 it is impossible to 
know how reliable this method is, but the founder of the company, 
Itai Gurari, offers a parallel, “Say you’re shopping for shoes, you just 
click on the checkbox for sneakers then select puma, red, size 9.5, so 
on, it’s all structured data which you can quickly query. So that’s
what we’re offering from the user perspective.”398
Without taking anything away from Ravel’s and Judicata’s
impressive work, it would be fair to say that these advancements are 
efficiency improvements on age-old services like Shepard’s or 
West’s Key Number service rather than game changers for bespoke 
services.399 In the near future at least, they have a chance of 
increasing lawyer productivity, but it is doubtful that they will allow 
non-lawyers to narrow the performance gap with lawyers.  
Because it is at such an early stage of development, little need 
be said of efforts to incorporate pragmatics into legal NLP. Legal 
theorists, like linguists and computer scientists of natural language, 
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399. Itai Gurari, head of Judicata, admits as much. When asked “So how do 
you think Judicata will change the way that law is practiced?” he responded, “It’s 
mostly an efficiency tool.” Id.
Premature Disruption of Legal Services 1875 
generally believe that pragmatics is a part of legal meaning.400 Scott 
Brewer even claims that it is a critical component of law’s most 
distinctive form of argument—analogical reasoning.401 Moreover, 
when interpretation does not yield clear legal meaning, perhaps 
because a reasonableness standard creates vagueness as to the case at 
hand, then the process of determining how to give legal effect to 
whatever legal meaning can be derived—the act of construction—is 
much more likely to be contextual and, thus, reliant on pragmatics.402
This only reinforces the notion that we have little reason to believe 
that these technologies will advance faster in legal settings.  
c. We Can Expect Disruption from Non-Technological 
Forces to Occur Before Innovation of Bespoke Functions 
Will Occur 
The bar for innovation is not set at the same height for all of
legal services’ core functions. The bespoke functions are those for 
which lawyers have historically felt compelled to set a higher bar, 
demanding greater sophistication in their performance.403
Applications of NLP to law and legal services have thus far 
provided little reason to believe that the pace of NLP innovation in 
law will be any faster than the pace of NLP innovation in more 
ordinary contexts, such as the web. The bottom line is that bespoke 
functions will likely remain un-innovated for a lengthy period of 
time. As a consequence, the non-technological disruptive forces such 
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403. See SUSSKIND, supra note 16, at 58. 
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as deregulation and business model changes have a long period in 
which they can disrupt legal service industry before technological 
innovation can approach pre-disruption performance thresholds.  
IV. WILL LEGAL DISRUPTION BE PREMATURE? 
The question of whether a disruption is premature is ultimately 
an evaluative one. Because the disruption that we are considering has 
not yet occurred, it is even more speculative than it would be post-
disruption. We must make our best guess of what the post-disruption 
world will be like and then evaluate it against our current world. My 
remaining efforts will be directed toward the first half of that 
process: I will first explain why the legal services profession bears 
the hallmarks of Premature Disruption, then I will track how these 
features might interact with disruptive forces to create a very 
different, yet plausible, legal landscape.  
A. The Hallmarks of Premature Disruption 
The concept of Premature Disruption seeks to lend rigor to the 
popular notion that disruptive innovation is disconcerting because it 
might lead to something of value being left behind. More technically, 
the concept highlights that there is a gap between the demand for 
lingering functions (at pre-disruption quality) and their post-
disruption supply. Two hallmarks of Premature Disruption, then, are 
scarcity of a core function and unmet demand for that core function. 
To establish that legal disruption can lead to that scenario, I will need 
to explain how the functions of the lingering, bespoke functions will 
become scarce and how this scarcity is likely to affect the provision 
of legal services to consumers and law, itself.  
1. The Long and Fragile Supply Chain for Bespoke Legal 
Services 
Disruption will very likely cause bespoke legal services to 
become scarce. This might seem odd for two reasons. According to 
conventional economic wisdom, when there is a drop in demand for 
a commodity in a market that was at equilibrium, there will be excess 
supply, which leads suppliers to lower prices to meet the new, lower 
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equilibrium price.404 Disruption should, if anything, make it harder 
for scarcity to occur because fewer lawyers are needed or wanted 
under the lower equilibrium price. The problem is that the legal-
services industry has features that make it possible that it will not 
return to equilibrium. In short, there is a good chance that consumers 
could undervalue bespoke services, leading providers to drop supply 
and price below the point that it would be were proper valuations 
made.405 In the following Subsection, I explain how this is possible. 
a. High Stakes and Risk Aversion at the Bottom of the 
Supply Chain 
The supply chain for bespoke lawyering is long. The creation 
of a lawyer capable of performing bespoke functions begins at 
college graduation.406 That graduate must decide to go to law school, 
which will likely take three years and cost between $90,000 and 
$250,000 depending largely on whether the school is private and the 
amount of subsidies received.407 Upon graduating law school, the 
future lawyer will need to pass a state bar exam, which probably 
requires her to pay hefty expenses for bar preparation and test fees. 
At this point, it would not be unusual for her to have a six-figure debt 
from her post-college education, alone.408 Because adequate 
compensation for bespoke services is not guaranteed, the decision to 
satisfy the preconditions for becoming a person capable of 
performing bespoke services has high stakes.  
                                                     
404. RICHARD G. LIPSEY & COLIN HARBURY, FIRST PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMICS 72-79 (1988).  
405. More technically, substantial entry and overhead costs can make supply 
inelastic at low prices, leaving the possibility that supply might drop below demand 
levels. In addition, the opacity of the value of bespoke legal services can reduce 
effective demand for those services too far, leaving high latent demand for them. A 
similar phenomenon occurs with petroleum supply. M.A. Al-Sahlawi, Structure of 
the Oil and Gas Industry, in PETROLEUM ECONOMICS AND ENGINEERING 21, 27 
(Hussein K. Abdel-Aal & Mohammed A. Alsahlawi eds., 3d ed. 2014). 
406. See Sekhon, supra note 149, at 771.  
407. Gregory Crespi, Will the Income-Based Repayment Program Enable 
Law Schools to Continue to Provide “Harvard-Style” Legal Education?, 67 SMU L.
REV. 51, 67 (2014) (estimating full costs of three-year private legal education 
beginning 2013 are approximately $250,000); Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 21,
at 281 (estimating 3-year net-tuition cost at $90,000). 
408. See MARK KANTROWITZ, WHO GRADUATES COLLEGE WITH SIX-FIGURE 
STUDENT LOAN DEBT? 1 (Aug. 1, 2012), www.finaId.org/educators/ 
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Just because it is a high-stakes proposition does not mean it is 
not worthwhile. There is evidence that getting a law degree has been 
and, for the time being at least, is a good bet to make.409 Historically, 
the profile of the person who decides to become qualified as a lawyer 
capable of performing bespoke services is smart410 but risk-averse,411
and we can gather that many people decided to go to law school 
based on a sensible assessment of the economic value of the law 
degree and the conclusion that it was a safe bet for them.  
But there is flip side of the coin: This is also the profile of a 
person who will pay attention to downturns in demand for bespoke 
services and get easily spooked upon seeing them. Recent history is 
instructive. The post-recession plateau in incumbent revenue and the 
three-year drop in entry-level hiring412 at incumbent law firms 
brought hiring back to late-nineties levels,413 but the response among 
law school applicants was more extreme, bringing first-year 
enrollment to early-seventies levels.414 Those levels persist despite 
three straight years of modest hiring increases and a return to pre-
recession revenue growth at incumbent firms.415 Those opting out 
appear to be coming from the high LSAT range, the very people who 
incumbent law firms tend to hire.416 Since disruption will likely bring 
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Premature Disruption of Legal Services 1879 
about a more significant reduction in revenue for bespoke services, 
we can expect that it will, in turn, cause an even more precipitous 
decline in the bottom of the supply chain.417
Of course, some people might be interested in being a bespoke 
lawyer, not because of the profits that it is likely to yield, but because 
of the prestige that is ordinarily associated with sophisticated work. 
Indeed, survey results show that money and prestige come in first 
and second place, respectively, among the reasons cited for entering 
the profession.418 Even for those folks, bespoke functions would 
likely become less attractive after disruption. If less credentialed 
human beings or machines perform some of the core functions of 
legal services, then occupational prestige could drop, leading some 
lawyers to abandon their careers and others to forego law school.  
Lastly, law schools could hasten the limitation of supply by 
switching emphasis to non-bespoke aspects of legal training in the 
wake of lowered demand for law degrees. They might spend less 
time probing conceptual, political or other non-doctrinal dimensions 
of law, which are primarily of use in cases where the law does not 
clearly point to a particular outcome. They might switch emphasis to 
teaching black-letter law, instilling computer-based skills, and 
providing real-world experience. Several legal scholars have recently 
predicted or suggested that law schools change their pedagogical 
approaches along those lines.419 This is not a criticism of that 
approach, but it could further limit the supply of new bespoke 
lawyers.  
b. Bundled Duties, Overhead & Cartel Power  
The stakes increase as we move up the supply chain into law 
practice. Recall that many disruptive forces seek to change the value 
proposition for clients by unbundling core functions from duties. For 
                                                     
417. Of course, it is possible that the typical law school applicant will 
change. The odds that young lawyers will land a job at an incumbent decrease, but 
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419. See Campbell, supra note 167, at 3; BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW 
SCHOOLS 172-77 (2012); Crespi, supra note 407, at 57. 
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instance, deregulation will shrink the realm of duty-bound tasks that 
are considered the practice of law, and, even under existing 
regulations, hybrid firms make an end-run around ethical duties that 
would otherwise place law firms on the hook, making their overhead 
costs less onerous.420 In effect, these operate to make the oligopolistic 
market into something more contestable. If incumbents cannot 
compete with disruptors as to innovated functions, then they must 
decide whether to imitate the disruptors or to double down on what 
makes them unique—their ability to provide lingering functions. If 
incumbents generally choose the former approach, then it is rather 
easy to see how this would limit supply: The primary group that has 
the skills to perform bespoke services has chosen to do something 
else.  
There is a chance, however, that incumbents will choose to 
double down. Just as travel agencies have renewed emphasis on 
personalized service to upscale clients,421 law firms that face new 
competition from relaxed regulation might seek to emphasize their 
most sophisticated core functions to risk-averse, wealthy clients. But 
disruptive forces will make it harder for them to leverage their 
perceived expertise by whittling away the credence that they have 
been accorded thus far, thereby threatening billing strategies (like the 
billable hour) that support overshooting demand. This could lead 
incumbents to look farther upmarket in search of less price-conscious 
clientele. That strategy demands that firms stick to high prices and 
premium services in the hope that bespoke services can survive as a 
luxury good. While this preserves a supply of bespoke services for 
the market, that supply is considerably smaller and less accessible 
than it was pre-disruption, even accounting for the fact that only a 
small population can currently afford legal services. 
2. Opacity of Value and Latent Demand for Bespoke Functions 
The next hallmark of Premature Disruption is unmet demand. 
A simple way this can occur is that demand is latent and therefore 
unnoticed. For example, it would happen if people underestimated 
the value of bespoke services and, therefore, did not express their 
demand. The constituency that stands to benefit most directly from 
                                                     
420. See Dzienkowski, supra note 247, at 3034 (“Traditional law firms often 
maintain a significant reserve or fund for self-insurance against malpractice claims. 
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421. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.3.
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expressed demand for bespoke legal services is the group of potential 
purchasers. Accordingly, I will focus on the value of bespoke 
services for clients, even though there are other constituencies that 
might receive indirect benefits. 
Recall that Hadfield characterized legal services as a credence 
good because its value is unclear to consumers. As a consequence, 
consumers are forced to rely on valuations from lawyers. This, she 
argues, is due to the complexity of law:  
[It] is so extensive that even the expert providing the service has difficulty 
assessing the quality and necessity of services provided. This makes price 
and quantity in the market predominantly the result of beliefs and wealth, 
rather than of cost. . . . And complexity places a practical limit on the 
supply of individuals who have the capacity to engage in legal 
reasoning.422
She claims that even lawyers have difficulty determining the true 
value of their work, which is embodied in their unwillingness to 
deviate from billable hour pricing structures.423
Some might still doubt that disruption will create a latent 
demand problem. They might believe that the value of bespoke 
services is obvious enough that people will still express accurate 
levels of  demand for them. It is important to remember two things, 
however. First, the value of bespoke services is positively correlated 
with the complexity of the law that governs their matters. Secondly, 
the value of interpretive legal technology is negatively correlated 
with the complexity of law that governs their matters. These 
complications make value difficult to discern, particularly for non-
lawyers. 
Determining the value of bespoke legal services to a client 
requires that we have at least some sense of the degree to which the 
outcome of a matter would be different if it had been handled by 
someone who does not have the capacity to deliver bespoke 
services.424 Part of this inquiry turns on the capacity of the law to 
constrain a case’s outcome. For Litigation, Negotiation, and 
Advocacy, if the outcome of a case is obvious enough under law, 
then the value of legal argumentation is relatively low. The same 
holds for High-Stakes Document Creation and Negotiation; when it 
is easy to discern how the law governs the conduct being regulated 
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Automation, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCLOSURES 26, 44 (2015). 
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by an agreement, the likelihood that a lawyer’s specialized legal 
knowledge will fruitfully come to bear on the drafting of terms in 
contract is relatively low. If that which the lawyer brings to the table
is of little value, then the Ethical Duties that guarantee top lawyer 
performance are of little value too.  
The same relationship holds under the converse scenario. If law 
is obviously and thoroughly indeterminate and has no constraining 
power at all, then specialized legal knowledge is unlikely to have 
much value.425 Generally speaking, then, the value of bespoke 
services to consumers is, to some extent, contingent on law being 
difficult, but possible, to interpret. The same applies to the 
willingness of legal authorities to consider lawyers’ interpretations in 
arriving at their own.  
Randomized empirical studies lend some support to this view. 
Most notably, James Greiner led two separate studies, one that 
provided support for the notion that lawyers significantly increase 
the likelihood of a favorable outcome for their clients and one that 
did not. In the former, the team compared the outcomes achieved by 
summary eviction defendants who received traditional legal 
assistance from legal aid lawyers with outcomes achieved by 
defendants who only attended instructional clinics and found that 
those with lawyers were significantly more likely to retain 
possession of their housing.426 In the latter, his team analyzed 
whether representation from a legal aid clinic headed by trained 
lawyers made a significant difference to the outcomes of appeals of 
unemployment benefits denials and did not detect a difference. The 
best explanation for the contrasting results was the difference in 
complexity. The researchers explained that regardless of 
representation, the unemployment cases were more likely than 
typical cases to be successful; the system for appeals in that court 
had mechanisms that lightened the labor burden for document 
collection; cases could be adequately worked up in a matter of a few 
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weeks; and expert testimony was rarely needed.427 By contrast, “[t]he 
substantive law applicable in summary eviction cases bears notable 
complexity,” and this might hamper “judicial efforts to nudge self-
represented litigants toward achieving full self-sufficiency” because 
the litigants lack a litigator to “educate the judge regarding what the 
law is.”428
My recent randomized study with Andrew Moshirnia lends 
some support as well.429 Using a simulated case in which law 
students served as judges, we found that exposure to legal argument 
did not make a difference to case outcomes under a pure standard.430
We further found, however, that it did make a difference when the 
judges faced a legal rule, the straightforward reading of which would 
have blocked them from reaching their favored result.431 In other 
words, the argument mattered when it came to the complex task of 
circumventing a legal rule that would lead to an unjust result but not 
when it came to the easy task of reaching a just result under a 
discretionary standard.  
Other scholars have identified a similar connection when 
reviewing non-randomized studies. After performing a meta-
analysis, Rebecca Sandefur found that “[o]ne factor that seems to 
shape variation in the magnitude of lawyers’ impact is procedural 
complexity.”432
Thus, a proper valuation of legal services will probably turn, to 
some extent, on the degree to which legal directives are 
straightforward and readily discernible. While empirical work 
supports this rule of thumb, considerably more study will be required 
before the value of bespoke services will be readily available. If legal 
academics are not yet in the position to make a precise evaluation, 
the situation is nigh hopeless for ordinary consumers, even if they 
are likely to increase their understanding of legal value as disruption 
goes on.  
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In the face of uncertainty, consumers in a post-disruption world 
will hear a new and loud voice on valuation—namely, the voice of 
the disruptor. Already, would-be disruptors like Axiom proudly 
claim on their website that “[f]rom the beginning, our goal has 
always been to put the law firm in a wind tunnel and strip away the 
unnecessary work that does not need to be done by law firms.”433 As 
disruption occurs, consumers will be more inclined to think that 
bespoke services are not worth high prices, and if the price for them 
is inelastic, this will drive effective demand downward. 
Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe that those who are in 
competition with suppliers of bespoke services will be better at 
valuing them; the opposite is likely true, particularly where valuation 
likely turns on knowledge of legal complexity. 
The bottom line is that disruption increases the likelihood that 
effective demand significantly undervalues bespoke legal services, 
meaning that latent demand for them will be high. There is a 
considerable chance that supply will become scarce and it will stay 
there because people do not realize what they are missing.  
B. Shifting the Finish Line: Technological Innovation and the 
Plasticity of Law 
For simplicity’s sake, the preceding Section assumed that our 
future law will be like our current law. However, our laws are not set
in stone; only the most ardent natural law theorist or historicist434
would deny that there is a plasticity to the content, expression, and 
structure of law.435 While there are practical limits on what legal 
directives will be accepted by a government or population—
unpopular prohibitions will face political hurdles, for example—
legislators have wide berth to change legal meaning and especially, 
the clarity thereof.436 Law may be written in natural language, but its 
meanings are partly the result of stipulation, which gives it an 
artificial quality that allows its terms to change more quickly than 
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terms change in ordinary language.437 Moreover, legislators have 
some freedom to choose whether they want their legal directives to 
fall closer to the rule or the standard side of the spectrum. Although 
rules are costlier to make for conscientious legislators, they are better 
suited for machine processing when it comes to subsequent 
interpretation and application.438
1. Plasticity in Norms Governing Conduct  
There is already a movement at work to change the way laws 
and legal documents are written so that they are machine-readable. 
As to laws, themselves, groups are pushing governmental bodies 
such as the European Union, to draft legislation using universal, 
machine-readable languages, such as XML, RDF, and OWL.439
Whereas NLP ordinarily has to find structure from preexisting 
unstructured sentences, these languages provide a standardized, 
labeled structure from the very beginning, thereby lightening the 
load for machine processing and ontology creation.440 Through these 
initiatives, laws might pre-specify distinct relationships between 
subjects, predicates, and objects. The law might be structured to 
follow an agreed upon deontic logic, using labels that apply 
uniformly across a legal code.441 The same forces are at work in the 
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word of legal document creation and management.442 George Triantis 
recently noted that “[d]evelopments in automated contract drafting 
and management have spurred the entry of low-cost competition, 
beginning with the production of standardized documents but 
moving up-market with increasing customization capability.”443
These forces could lower the value of legal services in at least 
two ways. First, a shift towards simplification and 
straightforwardness will likely provide fewer opportunities for novel 
legal knowledge to come to bear in disputes or other matters in light 
of the aforementioned connection between complexity and value. 
Secondly, a shift towards rules and away from standards will make it 
easier for systems of control to regulate behavior so that legal 
disputes never arise in the first instance.444
As they catch on, autonomous vehicles will likely diminish 
traffic violations by setting their programming to obey stop signs and 
lights, stay within lanes, signal appropriately, and operate within 
speed limits.445 Interlock systems will reduce instances of driving 
while intoxicated. We might soon see age detection software used to 
thwart underage purchases from vending machines.446 As laws 
become more “rulified,” more aspects of human conduct can be 
encoded into machines that limit our conduct.  
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Even when the occasional violation or dispute arises, 
technology can limit the likelihood of litigation by removing doubt 
or disagreement about what actually occurred. The Google Car was 
recently in an injury-producing accident.447 Its project head, Chris 
Urmson, published an animated video of the incident created from 
real-time data gathered by the car’s 360-degree sensors.448 Urmson 
used the video to demonstrate that the Google Car was legally 
stopped at an intersection and was struck from behind by a car that 
had failed to brake.449 Though reliable estimates are hard to come by, 
some scholars estimate that many, if not most, of the cases litigated 
at the trial level arise from factual uncertainty.450 A reliable, detailed 
record of an event would go a long way toward eliminating that 
uncertainty. Moreover, automated reports might be given special 
evidentiary weight by litigants or even courts. The thought of going 
against this evidence might seem too daunting to those who, in a 
prior era, might have gone forward with a case. If these reports 
become commonplace, they would drive down the number of cases, 
a portion of which would have been handled by bespoke service 
providers.451
2. Plasticity in Norms Governing Adjudication 
Thus far, we have focused on plasticity in primary rules of 
conduct, but there is plasticity in secondary norms as well, such as 
those that govern adjudication of cases and, relatedly, interpretation 
or construction of legal meaning.452 These norms also affect the value 
of legal services. 
                                                     
447. See Chris Urmson, The View From the Front Seat of the Google Self-
Driving Car Chapter 2, MEDIUM (May 11, 2015), https://medium.com/ 
@chris_urmson/the-view-from-the-front-seat-of-the-google-self-driving-car-
chapter-2-8d5e2990101b. 
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Kenney Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CALIF. L. REV. 
1203, 1214 (1985) (“At the trial level the answer seems to be that most litigation 
stems from factual uncertainty, not doctrinal uncertainty.”). 
451. A similar phenomenon could arise from companies that use statistics to 
predict case outcomes, such as Lex Machina and Premonition. See Zach 
Abramowitz, Moneyball for Litigation? A Conversation with Premonition’s Toby 
Unwin, ABOVE THE L. (July 31, 2015, 5:31 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2015/ 
07/moneyball-for-litigation-a-conversation-with-premonitions-toby-unwin/.  
452. H.L.A. Hart famously made the distinction between primary and 
secondary norms, and he describes “rules of adjudication” as a type of secondary 
rule. HART, supra note 381, at 97. My understanding of rules of adjudication in this 
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Ideally, adjudicative norms serve to make judicial interpretative 
methodologies uniform and reduce ambiguity and vagueness,453 but 
many believe that they have fallen short. Judges have endorsed 
statutory canons in justification of their decisions, but Karl 
Llewellyn famously illustrated that equally legitimate canons so 
often conflict with each other that they fail to resolve 
indeterminacy.454 Moreover, scholarly and judicial disagreements 
about proper judicial interpretation of law, particularly constitutional 
law, are endemic.455
Scholars divide into various camps, some believing that we 
ought to use the norms governing interpretation that the original 
authors of the law used,456 that a reasonable person would have used 
at the time of enactment,457 or that a reasonable person would use at 
the moment a case is being adjudicated,458 to name but a few 
positions. There are also different positions when it comes to 
                                                                                                               
context are the rules that govern the proper application of law to the facts of a case, 
which would include such items as canons of construction, rules of interpretation, 
and the like.  
453. See, e.g., TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 63 (2000) 
(discussing the role that Ronald Dworkin’s approach to adjudication plays in 
limiting indeterminacy). 
454. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision 
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Constructed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395, 395 (1950) (“One does not progress far in legal life without learning that 
there is no single right and accurate way of reading [a] case.”).
455. See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, What Lies Beneath: Interpretive 
Methodology, Constitutional Authority, and the Case of Originalism, 2013 BYU L.
REV. 1251, 1253; Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 613 (2008); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to 
Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 537 (1999). 
456. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods 
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 758 (2009) (“The original intent theory is part of a more 
general and comprehensive theory about language and meaning. The theory holds 
that the intent of the author of words or language determines the meaning of those 
words.”).
457. Id. at 761 (“Theories of original public meaning, in contrast to original 
intent, interpret the Constitution according to how the words of the document would 
have been understood by a competent and reasonable speaker of the language at the 
time of the document’s enactment.”).
458. We might think of Living Constitutionalism in this way. Cf. Michael C. 
Dorf, The Majoritarian Difficulty and Theories of Constitutional Decision Making,
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 294-95 (“[L]iving constitutionalism—a capacious term 
that I shall use to refer to a family of non-originalist theories that task judges with 
incorporating current values and attitudes in their understanding of the 
Constitution.”).
Premature Disruption of Legal Services 1889 
construction, whether it be to abstain from it entirely and leave it to 
political branches,459 to be deferential to precedent,460 to engage in a 
complex analysis of political morality,461 to maximize welfare,462 or 
to give effect to successful contemporary social movements,463
among others.  
The depth and sophistication of these debates might lead one to 
the conclusion that there is something intractably complex about 
adjudication, and this might be true. But we should not ignore that 
the plasticity of law permits court systems or other government 
organs to circumvent many problems of indeterminacy by stipulating 
simple, straightforward approaches, brutal though they may be.  
Under English law, land disputes were once resolved by 
ordering legal representatives to battle in an arena, with the victor 
earning title to the property right for his principal.464 Because the 
fighting prowess of each champion was known (either because it was 
readily discernible or because of reputation), legal disputes had 
rather predictable outcomes and lacked most of the linguistic 
complications that we have today.465 This example is neither a just 
nor a plausible alternative for the American justice system, of course, 
but it illustrates that there are streamlining alternatives, some of 
which might be less interpretatively demanding than others.  
From a justice perspective, we can do considerably better by 
choosing among the major alternatives advanced in debates over 
proper adjudication of American law. Were authoritative legal 
officials, such as the Justices of the Supreme Court, to stipulate that 
one alternative is the winner, and were that alternative friendlier to 
machine processing than the mix of methods now used, then it might 
shorten the distance for the finish line of innovation.  
Before hastily dismissing this as a fanciful notion on the 
ground that the judiciary would never agree to adopt a single 
approach, let alone one that is computer-friendly, consider the forces 
                                                     
459. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution 
(and How Not to), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2057 (2006). 
460. See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the Precedent 
Fallback, 68 VAND. L. REV. 105, 148 (2015). 
461. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 328-29 (1985). 
462. Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist 
Interpretation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1572-73 (2010). 
463. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 291, 293 (2007). 
464. Peter T. Leeson, Trial by Battle, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 341, 341 (2011). 
465. See id. at 362, 364 (estimating that over 80% of cases settled before 
trials by battle reached conclusion due to knowledge of champions’ prowess).
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that will act upon it over the coming decades. Take our highest court 
as an example. Currently, the Supreme Court’s approval rating is 
below 50%,466 and it has been on the decline since the late 1980s, 
when it was 66%.467 Some have argued that the legitimacy of the 
Constitution, or even law itself, is threatened by continued 
disagreement over legal interpretation and construction.468 If the 
approval rating continues on its downward trajectory, the Court 
might grow concerned and seek greater methodological consensus. 
For their part, the President and Senate might consider similar factors 
when selecting and approving nominees. Furthermore, successful 
legal technologists will become an increasingly powerful force in the 
discussion about methodology. According to Pasquale and Cashwell, 
we underestimate at our peril the power of profitable corporations 
and individuals to influence opinion on these matters:  
Most importantly, when neoliberal corporations and individuals become 
wealthy enough, they are able to shape a climate of opinion that tends 
toward the marginalization and even trivialization of the type of legal 
work traditionally considered essential to the fair and efficient working of 
markets, public programs, and society in general.469
Finally, if the supply of people qualified to perform the 
complex protocols of adjudication or make persuasive arguments in 
favor of following them (that is, the supply of people capable of 
bespoke services at current quality levels) shrinks, then there will be 
even more pressure to adopt simpler interpretation and construction 
methodologies.  
Assuming that such a change is plausible, I turn to the 
following question: Which of the popular approaches to 
interpretation and construction are likely to be attractive in a post-
disruption legal world?470 Because a comprehensive analysis is 
impossible here, I will select a handful to illustrate the principle that 
                                                     
466. Supreme Court, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-
court.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2016).  
467. Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 
44% in New Poll, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/ 
us/politics/44-percent-of-americans-approve-of-supreme-court-in-new-
poll.html?_r=0. 
468. See Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?,
8 REV. CONST. STUD. 101, 105 (2003). 
469. Pasquale & Cashwell, supra note 424, at 29. 
470. For simplicity’s sake, I will not give separate treatment to the 
interpretive and constructive aspects of these theories unless it bears on the question 
of how much technological advancement would be required to perform them. 
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those approaches falling closer to the syntactical side of the spectrum 
could become more popular in a climate of disruption.  
a. Naïve Textualism 
I begin with the most syntactical theory that merits attention, 
Naïve Textualism. This approach “is distinguished by its naive 
attitude that statutes can be best understood by simply looking up 
their words in a dictionary, applying a few canons of statutory
construction, and eschewing other considerations.”471 It shares the 
tenet with all forms of Textualism that we give primacy to the text of 
the law under consideration and seek to understand what the words 
mean, but it narrows the parameters of that search more narrowly 
than other forms of Textualism such that interpretation does not 
extend far beyond the statute or other law, itself.472
Existing technology can do a fair job of approximating the 
methodology of Naïve Textualism. Indeed, the small team at the 
non-profit organization, State Decoded, is already undertaking an 
effort to provide an open-access platform that “displays legal codes, 
court decisions, and information from legislative tracking services to 
make it all more understandable to normal humans” with “embedded 
definitions of legal terms.”473 The project is in development, but the 
team has designed a “Definition Scraper,” which will automatically 
scan a passage of text and determine whether it contains defined 
legal terms (e.g., terms that have definitions in Black’s Law 
Dictionary) and, if so, return definitions for them.474 If we are willing 
to adopt a Naïve Textualist rule of adjudication, a rather simple 
program such as this might suffice to resolve many legal disputes by 
providing an authoritative individual definition or ranking of 
definitions for a dispositive term. A computer-provided definition 
might match the definition advanced by one disputant but not the 
other, or the rank of one disputant’s definition might be higher than 
the other. In situations where this is not the case, a computerized, 
                                                     
471. Jonathan R. Siegel, Naïve Textualism in Patent Law, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 
1019, 1020 (2011). 
472. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 70, 91 (2006).  
473. About, ST. DECODED, http://www.statedecoded.com/about/ (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2016). 
474. Waldo Jaquith, Two Mini-Projects: Subsection Identifier and Definition 
Scraper, ST. DECODED (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.statedecoded.com/2013/02/ 
subsection-identifier-definition-scraper/. 
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predictable tie-breaker could be used that assesses the degree to 
which the competing definitions resemble the authoritative one. As 
with trial by battle, however, this approach might be dubiously just 
in complex, novel, or socially important cases.475
b. New Textualism 
Few people are Naïve Textualists; New Textualists are more 
common.476 This approach, if successful, is less likely than Naïve 
Textualism to encounter ties among rival interpretations because it 
has a wider area of inquiry and, therefore, has the potential to 
provide more information and finer-grained rankings of meaning. 
New Textualists are willing to consider contemporary linguistic aids, 
such as those resources that indicate ordinary meaning, and the 
surrounding body of law.477 Because the universe of digestible text is 
expanded (and the varieties of word sense with it), syntactical 
methods are likely to fall short, but sophisticated techniques such as 
semantic analysis could prove to be helpful. Ontologies might 
provide a means of categorizing competing definitions into different 
semantic groups.  
Stephen Mouritsen described a New Textualist approach using 
existing ontology-based technology.478 In particular, he used the 
Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA),479 a tagged 
                                                     
475. Indeed, some have called the ranking approach fallacious. See Stephen 
C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as an 
Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156, 198 (2011). 
476. To be clear, though I compare Naïve Textualism to New Textualism, I 
do not mean to imply that the former is the same as “Old Textualism.” Indeed, “Old 
Textualism” might have an even more expansive view of proper interpretive 
resources than even New Textualism. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New 
Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (2013) (“The new 
textualists maintain that legislative history should be marginalized or ignored, un- 
less used simply like a dictionary of word use; old textualists, purposivists, and 
pragmatic interpreters maintain that legislative history is often relevant and useful to 
figure out or confirm statutory meaning.”).
477. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV.
621, 655 (1990); Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court 
in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 82-83 (2002). I should add that most New 
Textualists share some aspects of Originalism—namely, that the linguistic meaning 
of the text is fixed at the time of enactment. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Laying Claim 
to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1552 
(2011). 
478. Mouritsen, supra note 475. 
479. CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENGLISH, http://corpus.byu.edu/ 
coca/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2016).  
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corpus of ordinary English usage. He described a preexisting 
ontology that permits computers to identify the various ways that a 
word can serve as a part of speech (such as a noun, verb, etc.) and 
rank the frequency with which that word is used as the part of speech 
in question under various conceptual categories. He used that 
technology to tackle a question that arose in National Organization 
for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler:480 Does “enterprise” in RICO require 
an organization to have an economic motivation? Using the 
ontology, he was able to rank the uses of the word “enterprise” in 
ordinary English as a noun and determined that its usage was much 
more likely to bespeak economic use than non-economic uses.481
While he did not claim that this settled the question in Sheidler, he 
did assert that the methodology was an appealing way to adjudicate 
cases searching for ordinary meaning because it analyzes ordinary 
language in a way that is “quantifiable and verifiable” and embodies 
ideals of objectivity by allowing transparency and replication.482 He 
conceded, however, that current technology does not eliminate 
problems of bias entirely because the judge must still read through 
the results and perceive how the results fit into the concepts and 
questions that she seeks to consider.483
c. Originalism 
Further along the NLP curve is Originalism—at least the age-
old484 variety, which maintains both that meaning must be assessed at 
the point at which the law under consideration was enacted and that 
it is permissible to consider the intents of the framers, ratifiers, or 
legislators when interpreting the linguistic meaning of that law.485 As 
far as NLP technology is concerned, Originalism is a mixed bag. On 
the one hand, fixing meaning to the past is welcome because it limits 
                                                     
480. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), 
rev’d, 510 U.S. 249 (1994). 
481. Mouritsen, supra note 475, at 195-99.
482. Id. at 202. 
483. Id.
484. See Vasan Kesevan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force 
of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1114 (2003) (“As 
originalist methodology has evolved over the past several decades from ‘original 
intent’ to ‘original understanding’ to, most recently, ‘original meaning,’ the 
interpretive force of the Constitution’s secret drafting history has been kicked all 
over the field.”).
485. See, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77, 113 (1988). 
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the necessity of rule base or ontology revision. On the other hand, 
making intent an important part of legal meaning introduces 
significant486 dimensions of pragmatics that will be challenging for 
machines.487 Insofar as it demands that interpreters attempt to enter 
into the minds of legislators and ask how the legislators would have 
resolved the problem facing them, Originalism will involve a good 
degree of historical digging and inquiry into underlying interpretive 
desires.488 It might even require interpreters to consider complex 
contextual dimensions of meaning such as the perceived problems, 
goals, hopes, or ideals of the actors at the time in an effort to identify 
or make a best guess as to the collective intent of a legislature.489 The 
degree to which law is clear, thereby downplaying the role of doubt 
as to legislative intent, will influence how quickly technology will be 
able to emulate this methodology.490
                                                     
486. In omitting mention of pragmatics’ role in New Textualism, I did not 
mean to imply that pragmatics is utterly absent in its process. See Balkin, supra note 
463, at 304 (describing how pragmatics figures into New Originalism, which shares 
features of New Textualism as I describe it). Rather, it plays a considerably less 
significant role than it does in Originalism or other approaches that I discuss below.  
487. See Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 277, 290-91 (1985). 
488. See Martin Redish & Theodore Chung, Democratic Theory and the 
Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation,
68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 813-15 (1994). 
489. Part of the reason that this form of Originalism has lost its appeal 
among contemporary scholars is the sentiment that identifying the collective intent 
of the legislature is impossible. See Thomas Colby, The Sacrifice of the New
Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 720 (2014). But see Solum, supra note 437, at 85 
(“Some legal theorists argue that the framers’ intentions cannot provide the meaning 
of the constitutional text, because different framers had different mental states. 
Similar arguments are made about the intent of Congress and the meaning of federal 
statutes. . . . Our puzzlement about group intentions does not translate into an 
inability to grasp the artificial meaning of the texts produced by group agents.”). 
Even if we consider Purposivism—the more abstract variety of Intentionalism that 
does not seek to identify specific collective intent—the inquiry still involves 
pragmatics in interpreting meaning, only at a grander level. See Redish & Chung, 
supra note 488, at 815. 
490. Some who fall generally into the Originalist camp due to their belief 
that Originalism best captures proper interpretation nevertheless believe that more 
dynamic approaches, such as those that incorporate aspects of Living 
Constitutionalism, could permissibly or should play a role in construction for hard 
cases. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 535 (2013) (describing Jack Balkin and Randy Barnett in 
these terms). Those versions of Originalism would fall at some point higher on the 
NLP curve. This same principle holds true for New Textualists who do the same. Id.
(describing James Ryan in these terms). The precise point on the NLP curve at 
which these approaches fall depends on how often the dynamic theory is used, 
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d. Moral Reading 
Even higher up the NLP curve are Moral Reading theories of 
interpretation and construction such as the approaches articulated by 
Ronald Dworkin and James Fleming. These theories generally 
require that judges “fit and justify” the existing legal materials to the 
case at hand.491 The requirement of fit involves an identification of 
the relevant principles in the law that might decide the case and an 
assessment of consistency between each principle and the overall 
body of law. Only those principles that are consistent remain as 
candidates.492 Thereafter, remaining candidate principles are 
subjected to a bounded moral analysis to determine which one puts 
the law in its best possible light.493 It is not unfettered moral analysis; 
rather, the judge must consider the moral values articulated by 
accepted law and attempt to make them into a coherent whole. 
Dworkin explained this is an exercise in narrative-building from 
existing narrative parts, as if “a group of novelists writes a novel 
seriatim; each novelist in the chain interprets the chapters he has 
been given in order to write a new chapter, which is then added to 
what the next novelist receives, and so on” while “aim[ing] jointly to 
create, so far as they can, a single unified novel that is the best it can 
be.”494
Moral Reading is somewhat dynamic and quite pragmatic. 
Through this process, judges seek to allow the law to work itself out 
over time, which involves repeated efforts to “redeem” principles in 
the legal materials. Thus, there is a dynamic element to legal 
meaning, though it is forever tied to prior determinations thereof.495
Thus, even though meaning is not typically fully revisable under 
Moral Reading, it is less fixed than it is under the other theories we 
                                                                                                               
which will likely turn on perceptions of how determinate law is. Because of this 
complexity, I have chosen not to focus on them here. That said, the subsequent 
discussion of dynamic theories such as Moral Reading might illuminate the proper 
placement along the curve.  
491. Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
2867, 2872-73 (2007). 
492. Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 133, 141 (1997) (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW:
THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996) and DENNIS 
PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996)). 
493. Id. at 142.  
494. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 229 (1986). 
495. James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Change, and the Good Constitution, 62 AM.
J. COMP. L. 515, 544 (2014). 
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have considered, making it less machine-friendly. Moreover, Moral 
Reading relies very heavily on pragmatics. Principle-guided 
interpretation is quite similar to the general maxims that govern 
pragmatics; both frequently involve taking stock of policies and 
purposes and evaluating what is the best justification.496 The very 
paradigm of pragmatics in NLP is the successful implementation of a 
“bag-of-narratives” model, whereby “each piece of text will be 
represented by mini-stories or interconnected episodes, leading to a 
more detailed level of text comprehension and sensible 
computation.”497 We are a long way away from a computer being 
able to perform narrative tasks of this magnitude.  
e. Living Constitutionalism 
Lastly, the theory of Living Constitutionalism498 is at the 
highest place along the NLP curve, though I caution that it is difficult 
to reduce it to a specific method. Critics accuse the theory of being 
methodless, while apologists are more inclined to describe it as a 
principles-based approach akin to Moral Reading.499 Even if we take 
the apologist position, there appears to be an important difference 
with Moral Reading. Both approaches seek to identify the principles 
that animate the laws under consideration, but Living 
Constitutionalists are not likely to claim that fitting and justifying 
candidate principles in accordance with preexisting law is necessary 
in order to determine which one ought to prevail.500 More likely, they 
will generally evaluate the principles according to how practical they 
                                                     
496. Sinclair, supra note 302, at 382 n.39 (“Pragmatic principles are in this 
respect quite similar to the jurisprudential principles that Ronald Dworkin 
distinguishes from rules and policies in that they have ‘the dimension of weight.’”).
497. Cambria & White, supra note 254, at 52. 
498. Of course, the object of interpretation for Living Constitutionalism is 
the U.S. Constitution, but the methodology might be repurposed to apply to other 
types of laws, and that is how I will treat it here.  
499. Compare Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living 
Constitution, 103 NW. L. REV. 549, 606 (2009) (describing it as “an under-theorized 
concept” and “substantively empty” when directed at individual judges), with Adam 
Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the “Living Constitution,”
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456, 1523-24 (2001) (“They proposed to construe the textual 
provisions of the Constitution by reference to the text’s deeply embedded principles, 
rather than its literal wording or traditional application.”).
500. Fleming, supra note 495, at 517 (“Living constitutionalists 
characteristically are more pragmatic, instrumentalist, and forward-looking in their 
approaches to the Constitution [than Moral Reading theorists] and, as such, tend to 
be anti-fidelity.”)
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are and how well they promote democratic legitimacy under the 
evolving values of the time.501 Thus, Living Constitutionalism is the 
most dynamic of the theories we have considered and is at least 
equally responsive to context as Moral Reading. It derives meaning 
using highly pragmatical techniques, though it does so in a way that 
defies codification. In short, it is our least computer-friendly 
approach.  
In Figure 3, I have located these theories along our NLP curve.  
Figure 3 
THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION AND NATURAL 
LANGUAGE PROCESSING
© 2016 IEEE 
The card up the sleeve of technological innovation is that law 
can be changed. If the plasticity of law shifts the rules of 
adjudication so that judges narrow the dimensions of proper 
interpretation and construction to fall closer on the NLP curve, then 
technologists might capture the entire market for legal services 
without having to innovate the full breadth of pre-disruption quality 
bespoke services. Under such a scenario, the popular adage “we are 
                                                     
501. Balkin, supra note 499, at 604; David Rudenstein, Self-Government and 
the Judicial Function, 92 TEX. L. REV. 161, 185 (2013) (reviewing J. HARVIE 
WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING 
THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE (2012)).
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all textualists now” could take on an entirely new meaning.502 While 
this outcome is less than probable, it is nevertheless important to 
know which way the wind blows.  
C. A Post-Disruptive Legal Landscape: Two Important Dimensions 
Understanding the forces that will affect the supply and 
demand for bespoke services, we can now make an educated, broad-
brush guess about what the legal services landscape will look like 
after disruption. Given all of the variables at play, this is a highly 
speculative exercise, but it is a first step towards a balanced position 
on the value of disruption. 
In general, the landscape that I imagine gives more people 
access to non-bespoke legal services but less access to bespoke 
services at pre-disruption levels of quality. The scarcity of such 
bespoke services could have an impact on the legal system’s ability 
to respond to changing social needs, affecting overall welfare. 
1. Increased Access  
Many commentators embrace legal disruption because they 
believe it to be a promising way to increase access to legal 
services.503 Legal services have become cost prohibitive to those 
outside of the upper class, with the gap widening since the Great 
Recession.504 Before it adopted the rule allowing LLLTs, the 
Washington Supreme Court commissioned a study of access to 
justice and reported that, even though three-fourths of low-income 
households in the state had at least one civil legal problem a year, 
they faced these problems without the help of a lawyer more than 
                                                     
502. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in 
Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1057 (1998); Marjorie O. Rendell, 
2003—A Year of Discovery: Cybergenics and Plain Meaning in Bankruptcy Cases,
49 VILL. L. REV. 887, 887 (2004); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of 
Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 43 (2006). 
503. See, e.g., Brescia et al., supra note 23, at 554; Cassandra Burke 
Robertson, The Facebook Disruption: How Social Media May Transform Civil 
Litigation and Facilitate Access to Justice, 65 ARK. L. REV. 75, 77 (2012); Mary 
Russell, Future Realities Present New Challenges, Opportunities for Delivering 
Justice Solutions, 70 J. MO. B. 250, 252 (2014). 
504. See Nathan Koppel, More Strapped Litigants Skip Lawyers in Court, 
WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052748704229004575371341507943822. 
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85% of the time.505 The seriousness of the problem for overall social 
welfare cannot be understated.  
All of the disruptive forces that I have described will likely 
lower the cost of non-bespoke aspects of legal practice, eliminating 
price barriers for a large segment of the population. With limited 
exception,506 the success of these forces partially relies upon their 
ability to circumvent or avoid expensive ethical duties. In order to 
evaluate whether this is a positive development, we have to ask 
whether low-cost legal services—which will almost certainly lack 
some of the protections and resources that typically come with legal 
services today—are better than no services at all. Many scholars 
answer that question in the affirmative, though they focus little on 
the deleterious effects that they might have on the supply of bespoke 
services and how that, in turn, might affect social welfare.507
For its proponents, disruption is a business solution to a 
problem that is currently being handled largely by goodwill: clinics 
funded by the government or by private charitable donations and by 
law firm pro bono services.508 Deregulation creates an opportunity to 
close the gap between actual demand and the overshot demand 
currently on offer. The hope is that there is still enough profit to be 
made in closing that gap to sustain a competitive market, which will 
ultimately benefit those in need.  
If there is anything unusual about this, it is that it has made 
otherwise progressive scholars sound so conservative.509 Just because 
an idea deviates from one’s usual mode of thinking does not 
necessarily make it a bad one; this might be the only solution. 
                                                     
505. TASK FORCE ON CIVIL EQUAL JUSTICE FUNDING, THE WASHINGTON 
STATE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 8 (2003), https://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/ 
content/taskforce/CivilLegalNeeds.pdf. 
506. Outsourcing is an example.  
507. See, e.g., Brescia et al., supra note 23, at 554; Michael J. Wolf, 
Collaborative Technology Improves Access to Justice, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 759, 784 (2012); Lindzey Schindler, Skirting the Ethical Line: The Quandary 
of Online Legal Forms, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 185, 191 (2012).  
508. See Susan Beck, Big Law and Legal Aid, AM. L., July 2015, at 36, 39;
GILLIAN K. HADFIELD, SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY BEFORE THE TASK FORCE TO 
EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES IN NEW YORK 1, 2-3 (2012), 
http://richardzorza.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/hadfield-testimony-october-2012-
final-2.pdf. 
509. See, e.g., Gillian Hadfield, The Second Wave of Law and Economics: 
Learning to Surf, in THE SECOND WAVE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 50, 58 (Megan 
Richardson & Gillian Hadfield eds., 1999) (describing progressiveness of second 
wave of law and economics, of which she is a prominent member). 
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Government funding of legal clinics has fallen precipitously.510 And 
in fairness, most proponents call for consumer protections of some 
kind.511
But protections risk driving up prices, shedding profits, or 
otherwise making market entry less desirable for those they expect to 
carry the torch. It could be that we cannot have our cake and eat it 
too through market-based approaches.  
The LLLT program in Washington is an illustrative example 
because it imposes some, but not all, of the ethical duties on LLLTs 
to which lawyers are subject.512 The size of the inaugural class was 
small, and the program had a high attrition rate: Fifteen people 
enrolled in the program,513 nine people took the test, and only seven 
passed.514 The second class was only marginally better: Eighteen 
people enrolled in the program,515 fifteen took the test, and ten 
passed.516 The sample is too small to provide reliable lessons, but it 
should give us pause. Projected enrollment was between 50 and 100 
people, with some experts expecting as many as 125,517 but 
enrollment fell far short of the lowest expectation. The University of 
Washington, which has served as a provider of mandatory LLLT 
                                                     
510. See Beck, supra note 508, at 39 (“Private contributions to legal aid have 
become increasingly important, given the precarious nature of public support. The 
federally funded Legal Services Corporation is the largest single source of legal aid 
funding, but represents less than one-fourth of total support. . . . Adjusted for 
inflation, LSC’s funding has shrunk 40 percent in 10 years, and it’s not clear how it 
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511. See Brescia et al., supra note 23, at 554.  
512. See supra note 207. 
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Technicians to Help Close the Justice Gap, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www. 
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Meeting%20Materials/2015-10-15%20LLLT%20Board%20Meeting%20Materials.ashx. 
516. Limited License Legal Technicians, WASH. ST. B. ASS’N, http:// 
www.wsba.org/licensing-and-lawyer-conduct/limited-licenses/legal-technicians (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2016). 
517. WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, LTD. LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIAN (LLLT)
BD., MEETING MINUTES 2 (June 18, 2015), http://www.wsba.org/~/media/Files/ 
Legal%20Community/Committees_Boards_Panels/LLLT%20Board/Minutes/2015-
06-18%20Meeting%20Minutes.ashx. 
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education, is losing money on the program, which requires 30 people 
per cohort simply to break even.518
Thus, even lowered barriers to entry might prove too much to 
entice profit seekers. Indeed, Hadfield claims that this sort of 
business model is likely to fail on its own, but her solution doubles 
down on large corporations. She claims that their power to lower 
overhead and gatekeeping costs through economies of scale will 
ultimately benefit low-end consumers: 
LegalZoom or Rocket Lawyer could hire LLLTs and have them answering 
phone calls, engaging in online chats—maybe even manning retail 
outlets—and giving assistance actually filling out the forms and 
navigating the procedures, all based on protocols developed by lawyers 
and by the company. . . . That’s the way you significantly reduce the gap. 
Then the LLLT can be hired at lower cost.519
Even if this is a way to make the unbundled legal services 
business attractive, we still know very little about how good these 
services will be. While there have been studies in the United 
Kingdom that show positive results,520 it is unclear how generalizable 
they are. Indeed, Greiner’s study of unbundled services showed 
alarming gaps in performance compared to lawyer representation.521
Furthermore, the population that is arguably in most need of legal 
services is the very same that is least likely to have access to, or 
facility with, the new tools that might benefit them in a post-
disruption world.522 In this way, the advance of technology might 
widen the gap between computer-assisted non-lawyers and 
computer-assisted lawyers, perhaps even until technology progresses 
so far that difference between computer and lawyer performance 
becomes largely immaterial.523 Lastly, there is a risk that the presence 
of these tools might drive full-service lawyering even further away, 
lulling lawmakers to shrink legal aid budgets even more. Still, the 
                                                     
518. MINUTES, supra note 515, at 2 (“Current enrollment in the LLLT 
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520. See BLACKWELL COMM. GR. BRIT., THE INVESTIGATION OF NON-
LEGALLY QUALIFIED CLAIMS ASSESSORS AND EMPLOYMENT ADVISERS WHO ACT FOR 
REWARD: A REPORT 30-31, 48 (2000). 
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522. Michael Zuckerman, Is There Such a Thing as an Affordable Lawyer?,
THE ATLANTIC (May 30, 2014), www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/is-
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523. Cf. PETER M. TIERSMA, PARCHMENT PAPER PIXELS: LAW AND THE 
TECHNOLOGIES OF COMMUNICATION 75 (2010).
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problem with access to justice might be so profound and the 
likelihood of a non-market solution so low, that these risks are worth 
taking.  
2.  Decreased Progressivism 
I have already explained how disruption will likely limit the 
supply of people who are capable of performing bespoke services 
and how this could affect the state of law and adjudication. In this 
final Subsection, I would like to draw a vivid connection between 
bespoke lawyering and social welfare—namely, the capacity for 
progressivism. While disruption might bring unprecedented access to 
the legal system, it might come with the cost that the system is less 
able to deliver progressive outcomes. 
The following Subsection briefly describes the intellectual 
tradition asserting that lawyers are a vital part of the social mission 
to protect and advance the causes of the less fortunate or 
marginalized. It further analyzes whether this contribution is 
contingent upon a healthy supply of people capable of providing 
bespoke legal skills.  
a. The Link Between Bespoke Lawyering and 
Progressivism  
In his classic work, Democracy in America, Alexis de 
Tocqueville characterized lawyers as vital agents of reform and 
protection, noting that “[t]he members of the legal profession have 
taken a part in all the movements of political society in Europe for 
the last five hundred years.”524 Tocqueville believed that American 
lawyers were a force against tyranny because they could stifle the 
execution of unjust laws by fighting their on-the-ground operation.525
Lawyers’ training provides both the capacity and inclination to fight 
oppression:  
The special information which lawyers derive from their studies insures 
them a separate rank in society, and they constitute a sort of privileged 
body in the scale of intellect. This notion of their superiority perpetually 
recurs to them in the practice of their profession: they are the masters of a 
science which is necessary, but which is not very generally known: they 
serve as arbiters between the citizens; and the habit of directing to their 
                                                     
524. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 348 (Francis 
Bowen ed., Henry Reeve trans., Sever & Francis 3d ed. 1863) (1835). 
525. Id. at 348, 355-56. 
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purpose the blind passions of parties in litigation, inspires them with a 
certain contempt for the judgment of the multitude.526
Though lawyers’ contempt might be expected to breed elitism 
and insularity, Tocqueville believed the opposite was true, “The 
profession of the law is the only aristocratic element which can be 
amalgamated without violence with the natural elements of 
democracy, and be advantageously and permanently combined with 
them.”527 They operate, in this regard, to assist those who do not 
conform to the powerful and potentially oppressive majority.528  
Tocqueville’s notion that lawyers can be agents of change and 
resistance when those in the minority are threatened found a home in 
the sociologically minded Functionalist Movement that developed a 
century later.529 Prominent Functionalist Talcott Parsons claimed that 
lawyers were guarantors of welfare530 because they are tolerant of 
their clients’ abnormal ideas and values and give their expressions 
voice in a forum of persuasion.531 Parsons described a two-way 
dynamic: The therapeutic nature of the lawyer–client relationship 
socializes the client to the moral values of society, and the lawyer’s
advocacy for the client legitimizes the client within that moral 
framework.532 Like Tocqueville, Parsons believed that lawyers’
training and duties enable this function: 
[Lawyers] are trained in and integrated with a distinctive part of our 
cultural tradition, having a fiduciary responsibility for its maintenance, 
development and implementation. They are expected to provide a 
“service” to the public within limits without regard to self-interest. The 
lawyer has a position of independent responsibility so that he is neither a 
servant only of the client though he represents his interest, nor of any other 
group, in the lawyer’s case, of public authority.533
Critically, the lawyer’s function is to stand between “two major 
aspects of our social structure; in the case of the law between public 
                                                     
526. Id. at 349. 
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authority and its norms, and the private individual or group whose 
conduct or intentions may or may not be in accord with the law,”534
exerting influence on both. Parsons believed that this is only possible 
because lawyers form an institution that is integrated with 
independent social structures like law schools.535
A close cousin of Functionalism,536 the aptly named Progressive 
Legal Movement shared the belief that lawyers perform a 
fundamental public service. Its most famous articulation came when 
Louis Brandeis gave a speech, “The Opportunity in Law,” to the 
Harvard Ethical Society.537 He claimed that the “opportunity” for 
lawyers was to help the labor movement in the “ever-increasing 
contest between those who have and those who have not.”538 The 
practice of law was best suited to this task because the “training fits 
[lawyers] especially to grapple with the questions which are 
presented in a democracy.”539 It imbues them with great judgment, 
logic, attentiveness to facts, memory, and tolerance, all of which can 
translate the thoughts into action on behalf of those who are thinking 
of ways to solve problems like wealth disparity.540
For most of the twentieth century, the values of Functionalism 
and Progressivism predominated in discussions about the potential 
for lawyering and legal education.541 Contemporary scholars, too, 
have identified lawyers’ overall welfare function. According to 
Deborah Rhode, “No occupational group in American history has a 
more distinguished tradition of leadership in the struggle for social 
justice.”542
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The skills and duties that support the changes described in the 
progressive vision are obviously bespoke in nature. Individualized 
attention, creativity in argument and strategy, pragmatism, and 
adherence to ethical duties, are distinctive of bespoke lawyering. 
Assuming that lawyers can fulfill that vision to some degree, it is 
reasonable to guess that the scarcity of bespoke skills could harm our 
progressive capacities.  
In the last few decades, however, many scholars have become 
skeptical of that assumption. The lawyer’s role is a mediated one. 
Her work is framed to some extent by the interests of her client, 
often in the backdrop of an adversary system that pits one client 
against another. Rightly, scholars noted that observing ethical duties 
can conflict with acting as an autonomous progressive source for the 
betterment of society.543 Empirical studies in the 1980s showed that 
lawyers at incumbent firms were growing more likely to act in 
pursuit of corporate clients and, to get them, were willing to act as 
little more than hired guns.544 Some believe that even when 
progressive client–lawyer interests are aligned, ethical rules can keep 
people, particularly those in stigmatized groups, from getting 
effective representation (to say nothing about how ethical rules 
inflate the price for legal services).545
In evaluating disruption, we must account for these critiques in 
determining how much weight to give the power of undisrupted legal 
services to bring about progressive ends. But just as we should be 
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mindful of the critiques before we allow ourselves to be enraptured 
by the stirring words of Tocqueville and others, we must be equally 
mindful that the critiques do not necessarily lend support to 
disruption.  
It is unlikely that these critics would embrace a market-based 
makeover of legal services, even if it might yield greater access.546
Indeed, many of them argue that a fundamental barrier to 
progressivism is the fact that lawyers, law firms, and bar associations 
have been too willing to behave like typical profit-seeking market 
actors. For example, Richard Abel, arguably the premier decrier of 
the relationship between ethics rules and cartel power, concedes that 
such protectionist actions are a natural byproduct of markets.547 The 
critics might prefer more regulation to less. For example, they might 
prefer stronger measures to increase pro bono service, which 
(surprisingly) increased among incumbent firms after the Great 
Recession,548 or funded non-profit alternatives.549
If lawyers stand as a critical buffer between the operation of 
legal authorities and the heterogeneous goals and values of the 
public, then disruption would move these two structures closer 
together, squeezing out the buffer. This has important consequences. 
Considering the public’s efforts to seek relief from the law, legal 
self-help will increase. When people help themselves rather than 
seek the assistance of a lawyer, efforts to socialize (which arise from 
the interactions between client and lawyer) and legitimize (which 
occur when the lawyer expertly works within the legal framework to 
persuade others of the legitimacy of the client’s non-conformist 
values or goals) might be weakened. Sometimes it takes a 
professional third person, or so the argument goes. The hope, 
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however, is that we have been underestimating the ability of people, 
particularly disenfranchised people, to reach these results on their 
own or with improved technological tools. Even so, we must be 
mindful of the possibility that self-help could hurt, rather than help, 
to bring about progressive ends through the machinery of the law. 
b. The Link Between Legal Openness and Progressivism 
Parsons warned against retreating into the “formalism” of the 
law: Following “the ‘letter’ of the law without due regard to a 
‘reasonable’ balance of considerations” that matter to those who 
progressive lawyers can benefit.550 Doing so meant that the lawyer 
was no longer acting as a buffer between the state and the public but 
as an instrument of the state. Contemporary advocates of progressive 
lawyering share this belief. Even those who are skeptical that law 
firms will fulfill the Parsonian promise have favored standards over 
rules,551 purposivism over plain reading,552 and narrative-based553 or 
destabilizing argumentation over traditional legalistic 
argumentation.554 In short, they have endorsed laws and principles of 
adjudication that are dynamic, fact-laden, and sometimes 
indeterminate. These features provide greater opportunities for 
lawyers to experiment with imaginative tactics on behalf of the less 
fortunate.  
By contrast, disruptive forces, particularly those that are 
technology-driven, push for predictability and constraint in conduct 
and adjudication. They favor less regulation of business but sharper 
and unmediated control of consumers and those who might threaten 
commerce. Some scholars are willing to embrace disruption despite 
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this possibility,555 but others have expressed reservations, such as 
Pasquale and Cashwell: 
This scenario portends what French social theorist Gilles Deleuze called a 
“Society of Control;” namely, a world in which human action is 
increasingly managed and monitored by machines. As Peter Reinhardt 
recently observed, at firms like Uber and 99designs, “lines of code directly 
control real humans.” In government, too, software can effectively make 
determinations about who will be audited, who will receive benefits, or 
who will be denied access to a flight. It is possible to imagine whole areas 
of law relegated to computational implementation.556  
In Parsonian terms, by moving the contrasting structures of law 
and society closer together, technologists have unprecedented 
opportunities to insert the norm-governed machinery of the haves 
into the heterogeneous space of the have-nots. The consumer might 
not be able to exceed the speed limit in her Google Car. And if 
somehow she hacks the car, drives a few miles per hour over the 
speed limit and gets a ticket as a result, her prospect for successfully 
challenging the ticket in court against Google Evidence with only the 
power of Google Legal Search could be so low that the whole 
exercise of litigation seems pointless. This is an exaggeration, of 
course, but it nevertheless shows how these forces push down the 
mutability of law that animates progressivism.  
But maybe this is the point; law is supposed to evolve, 
according to popular belief.557 Using its plasticity to render it less 
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plastic558 and integrating technology into our rules of conduct could 
lead to minimization of conflict and the maximization of conformity. 
Maybe this is a different sort of progress.  
Twisting Holmes’s famous adage, a computer-friendly 
approach to law and adjudication could alter the felt necessities of 
that time; the syllogism might someday seem a perfectly adequate 
way to determine the rules that govern us.559 Under such 
circumstances, we might not have the motivation to reach the pre-
disruption heights in legal imagination that were characteristic of 
common law American lawyering. We might forget why we ever 
even wanted to grant speed limit breakers the chance to win in the 
first place or why we wanted imprecise legal standards at all. This 
might not be a reason to be concerned: If our preferences change and 
we thereafter become very good at satisfying them, why should it 
matter that we have become worse at satisfying the preferences that 
we no longer have?  
Perhaps the best answer is that when society changes, and it 
always does, the need for the skills that we once had and cared for 
might resurrect itself. If the development of law slows, there arises 
the possibility that law becomes prematurely entrenched, stifling 
modification before the technology has figured out how to maximize 
welfare or how to allow for revision to meet the changing needs of 
society. Under those circumstances, we might regret that bespoke 
lawyering has become another lost art.  
CONCLUSION
Legal services will be disrupted. It might come from 
technological innovation, business model innovation, or some 
combination of the two. It might come from the forces described 
here or something new. It might take a decade, or it might take more 
than a lifetime. I have aimed to show that the character of the legal 
services industry gives rise to the risk that, when it occurs, bespoke 
aspects of lawyering will linger un-innovated, and that the sooner 
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disruption happens, the more likely this Incomplete Innovation will 
occur. 
I have further sought to explain why that state of affairs is 
important. I have argued that it sets the stage for the aspect of 
disruption that people find most frightening—specifically, that 
something we value could be left behind. In that regard, I 
demonstrated how bespoke lawyering skills could become scarce in a 
post-disruption world and how the developmental arc of disruptive 
forces, particularly technological forces, interacts with that scarcity. 
The combination could change the very character of law and 
adjudication, making them more static and rulified. Lastly, I 
highlighted two important dimensions of our potential post-
disruption landscape: Access to justice for millions of people at the 
potential expense of our capacity to bring about the progressive ends 
of the legal system, itself. 
Many aspects of my analysis are speculative, and there are 
certainly dimensions of legal practice, jurisprudence, economics, and 
computer science that deserve further elaboration and discussion. My 
hope is that other scholars who recognize the pivotal nature of 
Incomplete Innovation and Premature Disruption will fill in these 
gaps. At times, I have painted a rather stark portrait of our possible 
future, and our eventual reality is likely to be considerably more 
nuanced. But my abstractions serve to highlight aspects of disruptive 
forces that have not been given enough attention. Like Herbert 
Kritzker, who made predictions of the future of legal services more 
than fifteen years ago, “[a]lthough I may be overstating the changes 
that are occurring, it is also very possible that I have grossly 
underestimated the changes that will be coming,” and “[i]f 
knowledge becomes increasingly accessible in ways that require less 
and less specialized training and experience, we may see forms of 
organization delivering services that we cannot at this time readily 
imagine.”560 With any luck, this analysis and others like it will 
expand our imagination, allowing us to make better choices as we 
frame our future. 
                                                     
560. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professions Are Dead, Long Live the 
Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
713, 749 (1999). 
